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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is guided by three research questions. First, how does host
market corruption impact the equity-based market entry strategies implemented by
multinational enterprises (MNEs) with respect to their foreign subsidiary investments?
Second, does host market corruption increase the likelihood of market exit? Third, can
MNEs implement strategies which reduce the likelihood of market exit under conditions
of more pervasive host market corruption?
In the first essay, I synthesize insights from institutional theory and integrative
social contracts theory to disaggregate the concept of government corruption into two
dimensions (grand and petty). My theory pertaining to informal institutional pluralism
suggests that discrete institutions (such as government corruption) within a host market
can be conceptualized as pluralistic phenomena constituted by distinct dimensions which
exert a disparate impact on the foreign entry strategy of MNEs. The results support
aspects of this theory.
In the second essay, I build on the concept of informal institutional pluralism,
categorizing corruption into two dimensions (public and private) to study its impact on
the structure of equity-based foreign subsidiary investments. My theory proposes that the
primary mechanism that drives the distinct approaches to foreign entry is the firm’s
anticipated reliance on different sources of bargaining power to reduce information
asymmetries that it expects to encounter in the host market.
In the third essay, I study the relationship between host market corruption
pervasiveness, the subsidiary localization strategies implemented by MNEs and the
likelihood of host market exit. In this context, the strategic insights proffered by resource
dependence theory (RDT) and institutional theory (IT) are characterized by distinct
spatial orientations. While RDT predicts that subsidiaries will implement proximal (or,
host market-oriented) localization strategies, IT suggests that distal (or, home marketoriented) localization strategies are better-suited to reducing the likelihood of exit from
increasingly corrupt host market environments. I find that a proximally-oriented
partnering strategy heightens the likelihood of market exit under conditions of more
pervasive host market public corruption, but not more pervasive private corruption.
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Conversely, a distally-oriented expatriate strategy increases the likelihood of market exit
under conditions of both more pervasive public corruption and private corruption.
Taken as a whole, this dissertation introduces new theory, constructs and insights
into the relationship between host market corruption and the equity-based foreign entry
strategies of MNEs.

Keywords: Corruption; Government Corruption; Grand Corruption; Petty Corruption;
Public Corruption; Private Corruption; Foreign Direct Investment; Market Entry
Strategy; Ownership Structure; Emerging Markets; Developed Markets; Institutional
Pluralism; Informal Institutional Pluralism; Institutional Theory; Integrative Social
Contracts Theory; Resource Dependence Theory; Bargaining Power Theory; Binary
Logistic Regression; Multinomial Logistic Regression; Event History Analysis.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In July 2000, the United Nations launched the Global Compact, an initiative
designed to promote the adoption of socially responsible and sustainable business
practices by corporations. The Compact’s framework was originally constituted by nine
principles that were organized under three broad categories - human rights, labor and the
environment. However, in an effort to garner greater transparency in both the public and
private sector, academics, non-governmental organizations and industry executives began
to petition for the recognition of “the missing tenth principle”, in reference to the
institution of corruption (Waddock, 2004: 318). Their concerns were well-founded.
Research by the World Bank estimated that global expenditures on bribery totaled
approximately one trillion dollars per year, an amount equal to roughly three percent of
global gross domestic product (Svensson, 2005). Consequently, by 2004, advocacy
efforts culminated in the creation of the tenth canon of the Global Compact – Businesses
should work against corruption in all its forms, including extortion and bribery.
Subsequent to the expansion of the Global Compact’s purview, institutional
scholars have directed their attention towards the development of theory that could be
used to facilitate corruption-based inquiry (Lambsdorff, Taube, & Schramm, 2005).
Moreover, international business strategy researchers have also emphasized the need to
develop theory, frameworks, measures and methods within the domain of corruptionoriented international business scholarship (Rodriguez, Siegel, Hillman, & Eden, 2006).
Notwithstanding the overlap between these research agendas, we continue to lack a
comprehensive, theoretically-grounded and empirically-validated understanding of how
host market corruption affects the subsidiary-level strategic behavior of multinational
enterprises (MNEs) in foreign markets. I contend that two factors have precipitated this
theoretical impasse. First, the literature pertaining to the relationship between MNE
strategy and host market corruption has focused primarily on the interrelationship
between global foreign direct investment flows and the degree of perceived corruption in
host markets. Second, researchers that have focused on the impact of host market
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corruption on subsidiary-level strategy have adopted an overly broad conceptualization of
the corruption phenomenon.
The resultant theoretical deficiency has important practical consequences from the
perspectives of both international strategy scholars and international business ethicists.
Absent sufficiently precise theory, scholars are not able to formulate theoreticallygrounded predictions with respect to the strategic behavior of MNEs under conditions of
heightened host market corruption, nor are they able to recommend strategic
configurations that will enhance the likelihood of achieving positive investment
outcomes. Moreover, without a theoretically-based understanding of the interrelationship
between host market corruption and subsidiary-level strategy in foreign markets, it
becomes more difficult to prescribe how MNEs can effectively integrate the Global
Compact’s tenth principle into the business strategies, operations and structures of their
foreign subsidiaries. Notably, in developing a framework designed to secure corporate
commitment to the Global Compact’s principles, the United Nations has suggested that
the engagement of worldwide subsidiary operations is one of the most important avenues
through which MNEs can scale-up corporate responsibility efforts (Kell, 2012).
As such, this dissertation is guided by three broad research questions. First, how
does host market corruption impact the equity-based market entry strategies implemented
by MNEs with respect to their foreign subsidiary investments? Second, does host market
corruption increase the likelihood of market exit? Third, can MNEs implement strategies
which reduce the likelihood of market exit under conditions of more pervasive host
market corruption? As an international business scholar, my dissertation research is
principally motivated by my commitment to bolstering MNEs’ comprehension of the
strategic impact of corruption in foreign markets. Nonetheless, my efforts to advance
understanding with respect to the phenomenon of host market corruption do not preclude
the possibility that normative insights might also emerge from this work. More
specifically, it is anticipated that the theory and empirical findings associated with this
dissertation will also be of interest to policy makers and business ethicists, particularly
given that “understanding corruption…is vital to any effort to limit corruption”
(Rodriguez et al., 2006: 739).
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This chapter proceeds with a review of the extant literature pertaining to the
relationship between MNE strategy and national corruption, before providing an
overview of the manner in which corruption has been conceptualized by management
scholars. It also briefly discusses the author’s rationale for employing institutional theory
as the core theoretical foundation that informs this dissertation research. This chapter
concludes with an outline of each essay in order to provide an overview of the research
that constitutes the dissertation.

The Strategic Responses of Multinational Enterprises to Corruption
Historically, the corruption-oriented international business strategy research
agenda has been primarily constituted by a rich body of macro-level studies that have
focused on the role of host market corruption as a factor influencing the international
flow of foreign direct investment (FDI). Two of the earliest studies yielded contradictory
findings. While Mauro (1995) found that higher levels of corruption resulted in lower
levels of FDI, Hines Jr. (1995) concluded that the level of corruption did not predict
inward FDI, but he also found that FDI from the United States into more corrupt host
countries decreased after the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was enacted in 1977. More
consistent with Mauro’s (1995) work, subsequent studies have determined that MNEs
invest less in countries that have higher levels of corruption (Smarzynska & Wei, 2000)
and that an increase in the absolute difference in the level of corruption between an
MNE’s home and host markets negatively impacts upon the FDI decisions of MNEs
(Habib & Zurawicki, 2002). Focusing more specifically on emerging markets, which Luo
(2011) contends are more prone to corruption, Voyer and Beamish (2004) extended prior
corruption-FDI studies when they found that heightened levels of corruption in emerging
market countries predicted lower levels of FDI. While many of these prior studies
measured the level of perceived host market corruption based upon the opinions of
foreign executives situated in the host markets, subsequent research has found that the
prevailing attitude towards corruption in the MNE’s home market also impacts upon an
MNE’s FDI decisions. Cuervo-Cazurra (2006) found that MNEs that are headquartered in
countries with higher levels of corruption tend to invest more in countries where
corruption is more prevalent. He also concluded that MNEs headquartered in countries
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that were signatories to the OECD convention that combats bribery in foreign markets
were less likely to invest in markets characterized by greater corruption. Subsequent
research has suggested that this is because laws against foreign bribery have made it more
costly for MNEs to invest in countries characterized by higher levels of corruption
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008).
While the insights garnered by studies pertaining to the relationship between the
FDI decisions of MNEs and host market corruption have advanced comprehension of the
phenomenon, more recently, international strategy scholars have begun to focus attention
on the impact of host market corruption on subsidiary-level strategies. This smaller body
of work serves as the starting point for this dissertation and it informs the associated
theory-building efforts at the phenomenological level.
MNEs have been found to prefer joint equity investments in markets
characterized by higher levels of corruption, unless the MNE is more technologically
advanced, in which case the MNE will be less likely to engage in a joint venture
(Smarzynska & Wei, 2000). In another study on the relationship between corruption and
firm strategy that was based on a sample of emerging market-based subsidiary
investments, Meschi (2009) found that government corruption is significantly related to
the likelihood of foreign partners terminating an international joint venture (IJV). Further,
Meschi determined that the country experience of foreign partners moderates the
relationship between government corruption and changes in the equity stakes of foreign
partners in emerging market-based IJVs.
Subsequent conceptual work by Rodriguez et al. (2005: 385) has characterized
corruption in terms of its pervasiveness or, “the likelihood of encountering corruption in
normal interactions with state officials.” In testing this theory, Uhlenbruck et al. (2006)
found that as the pervasiveness of corruption increases, foreign investing firms are more
likely to prefer nonequity modes of entry over equity modes (JV or WOS). This
observation has been supported by Luo (2011) who found that an increase in the
pervasiveness of host market corruption decreased the likelihood that MNEs would
engage in subsidiary investments in emerging markets and increased the likelihood that
they would adopt an export market orientation.
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However, while an increase in the pervasiveness of host market corruption has
been found to precipitate a preference among internationalizing MNEs for nonequity
modes over equity modes of entry, the pervasiveness of host market corruption has not
been found to be a significant predictor of the entry mode (JV versus WOS) employed by
MNEs that engaged in equity-based foreign investments (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). Given
the ample evidence supporting the relationship between the pervasiveness of host market
corruption and MNEs’ preference for nonequity approaches to investing in foreign
markets characterized by more pervasive corruption, it is surprising that the
pervasiveness of host market corruption does not significantly predict the equity-based
entry mode decisions of foreign-investing MNEs, particularly given the recent results of
Spencer and Gomez (2011). They find that a positive relationship exists between the level
of host country corruption and the pressure that foreign subsidiaries face to engage in
host market bribery. Further, they observe that MNEs from less corrupt home countries
report less pressure to engage in corrupt local practices when they do not partner with
locals in foreign markets.
Rodriguez et al.’s (2005) conceptual work has provided a strong theoretical
foundation for scholars to advance corruption-oriented international business strategy
research. However, the qualified empirical support for its propositions suggests the need
for further conceptual effort in order to refine the theory’s precepts. Consistent with this
position, Uhlenbruck et al. (2006: 411) have suggested that “…there may be underlying
constructs behind pervasiveness that have conflicting effects on the firm’s choice
between joint venture and wholly-owned subsidiary. Further exploration of the
institutional underpinnings of the pervasiveness of corruption is an important next step
for corruption researchers.”
In this dissertation, I contend that the traditionally-employed conceptualization of
corruption is overly broad and, as a consequence, it has inhibited progress in advancing
comprehension of the relationship between host market corruption and the subsidiarylevel strategies of foreign-investing MNEs. In this regard, my work draws from
Rodriguez et al. (2006: 739) who argue that the domain of corruption-based research
would benefit from more attention being given to defining and conceptualizing the
phenomenon.
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Defining and Conceptualizing Corruption
Settling upon a comprehensive definition of corruption has proven to be a
challenging exercise for academics, policy-makers and business executives alike. While
Argandoña (2003: 255) has acknowledged that corruption is “a varied and shifting
phenomenon that is difficult to define in terms that are clear”, the chair of Transparency
International’s Board of Directors recently lamented that “(The boundaries) of corruption
are becoming harder to define, despite the best efforts of high profile international treaties
and initiatives” (Labelle, 2010: 109). An extensive tradition of corruption research exists
in the academic fields of law, political science and economics. While legal theorists have
defined corruption as “the misuse of public office for private gain by an elected official”
(Rose-Ackerman, 1996: 83), political scientists have framed corruption as “the exchange
of money or favor for a benefit disbursed by a government official” (Oldenburg, 1987:
512). Similarly, economists have characterized corruption as “an arrangement contracted
between a private individual and public official, (in which) the payment for, or the
counterpart of the arrangement may be political patronage, tutelage or some other type of
barter” (Macrae, 1982: 678).
These early efforts to conceptualize corruption have informed the more recent
work of international business strategy scholars. As examples, in the leading conceptual
and empirical work on the phenomenon, both Rodriguez et. al. (2005: 383) and
Uhlenbruck et al. (2006: 402) define corruption as “the abuse of public power for private
benefit.” In this dissertation, I contend that that there are two important limitations
associated with this extant conceptualization of the phenomenon. First, the definition has
encouraged scholars to focus only upon public sector corruption to the exclusion of
private sector corruption. Second, it has prompted scholars to adopt an overly broad
conceptualization of public sector corruption. As a consequence, the current
conceptualization of host market corruption risks the possibility of muting the effects of
the phenomenon upon the strategy of foreign-investing MNEs (Milliken, 1987).
This dissertation builds on Rodriguez et al.’s (2005: 385) extant conceptualization
of host market corruption in terms of its pervasiveness or, “the likelihood of encountering
corruption in normal interactions with state officials.” I propose that the concept of
pervasiveness provides an appropriate foundation upon which to construct more robust
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and theoretically-rich conceptualizations of the phenomenon. My work further
dimensionalizes the phenomenon according to the host market sector within which it
occurs (public versus private), and according to the origins of the norms that permit or
prohibit the existence of corrupt transactions in the public sector of foreign markets
(grand versus petty). In doing so, my theoretically-grounded efforts extend the scope of
the pervasiveness construct, as well as establishing boundary conditions within and
around the government corruption pervasiveness construct developed by Rodriguez et al.
(2005). Ultimately, my efforts are consistent with the work of both Mezias and Mezias
(2010: 284) which calls for “future research on the dimensionality and meaning of
multiple measures of corruption”, and Uhlenbruck et al. (2006: 411) which proposes that
“…there may be underlying constructs behind pervasiveness that have conflicting effects
on the firm’s choice between joint venture and wholly-owned subsidiary.”
Notably, in addition to the theoretical relevance of the new dimensions that are
proposed in this dissertation, a review of executive surveys pertaining to corruption and
international legal compacts that have been designed to combat corruption, reveals that
these dimensions are also relevant in practice. Accordingly, my dissertation employs
these more nuanced conceptualizations of the phenomenon in order to investigate the
impact of host market corruption upon several strategies, including foreign entry strategy
(the choice between nonequity entry and equity entry), equity entry strategy (the choice
between a joint venture and a wholly-owned subsidiary) and partnering strategy (the
choice between a traditional joint venture and a crossnational joint venture), as well as
exploring the longer-term implications of corruption upon the subsidiary’s continued
existence.

Institutional Theory
Despite the extensive tradition of management scholarship grounded upon
institutional theory, the use of institutional theory in international business strategy
research is more recent (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000). Scott (2008) recently
identified two important developments that have made institutional theory more pertinent
to strategic management scholarship. First, Oliver’s (1991) efforts to incorporate the role
of agency within institutional theory have challenged researchers to investigate the active
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responses of firms and managers to the pressures precipitated by institutional
environments. Second, the theory has evolved from one in which institutional phenomena
were “restricted to realms lacking competitive processes” to one in which institutions are
regarded as providing the boundaries for strategic action (2008: 437).
Institutional theory is employed as the base theoretical foundation in this
dissertation for a combination of practical and philosophical reasons. First, the conceptual
work upon which I build my theoretical contributions is broadly grounded in institutional
theory (cf. Doh, Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, Collins, & Eden, 2003; Lambsdorff et al., 2005;
Lambsdorff, 2007; Rodriguez et al., 2005; Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). Second, embedded in
my research is a belief in the power of institutional theory to predict and provide
explanations for the behavior of foreign-investing MNEs. This commitment traces its
roots to my background as a lawyer and my ten years of executive-level experience in
industry. My extensive involvement in both domestic and cross-border business activity
has made me acutely aware of the routine impact of institutions upon strategic and
operational decision-making.
Corruption is inherently difficult to study because “…the parties involved have
every reason to keep the data hidden” (Klitgaard, 1991: 30). This challenge has grown
even more imposing. In fact, Webster (2008: 807) notes that “Ten years ago, corruption
was considered incidental to doing business internationally and, for better or worse, an
inescapable reality. Today, corruption is considered to be…an enemy that must be
defeated. Accordingly, the international community is focused, like never before, on
efforts to reduce corruption.”
Notwithstanding the obstacles associated with pursuing scholarship pertaining to
the phenomenon of corruption, institutional scholars have made considerable advances.
Notably, both institutional economists and institutional sociologists have contributed to
this research imperative. Accordingly, this dissertation leverages tenets from both of
these theoretical perspectives, an approach advocated by Lambsdorf (2005: 1-3) who
suggests that “the task is too complex to rely on a single theoretical tradition…only an
interdisciplinary approach is likely to be successful…approaching corruption from an
institutional economic perspective, as well as from a sociological one, can enrich our
understanding.”
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Dissertation Overview
Building on Uhlenbruck et al.’s (2006: 411 ) proposition that “there may be
underlying constructs behind pervasiveness”, this dissertation is organized as a collection
of integrated essays. Figure 1 illustrates the structure of the dissertation, detailing the
theoretical foundations underpinning each essay, along with the contributions that link
the essays together. Essay 1 theoretically disaggregates government (public) corruption
within host markets into grand corruption and petty corruption, in addition to building on
early theory with respect to institutional pluralism to develop theory pertaining to the
pluralistic nature of distinct informal institutions such as host market government
corruption. Essay 2 builds on the theory elaborated in Essay 1 to develop a theoreticallygrounded distinction between public sector corruption and private sector corruption, as
well as drawing upon bargaining power theory to detail the theoretical mechanisms that
link each type of host market corruption (public and private) to the foreign entry strategy
of MNEs. Finally, Essay 3 investigates whether host market corruption increases the
likelihood of market exit and whether MNEs can implement strategies which reduce the
likelihood of market exit. Essay 3 theoretically categorizes the choice of strategies that
MNEs implement as being either proximal (host market-oriented) or distal (home
market-oriented).

Essay 1
The first essay (Chapter 2) is entitled Institutional pluralism: Host market
government corruption and the equity-based foreign entry strategies of multinational
enterprises. It focuses specifically on two distinct manifestations of government
corruption in the host market environment – petty corruption and grand corruption. This
essay is motivated by both a theoretical question (Can host market institutions, that have
traditionally been regarded as discrete institutions, be conceptualized as pluralistic
phenomena?) and, an empirical question pertaining more specifically to the phenomenon
of host market government corruption (Do the different dimensions of government
corruption (grand corruption versus petty corruption) each exert a distinct impact upon
the equity-based foreign entry strategies of MNEs?). While extant theory proposes that
the

pervasiveness

of

host

market

corruption

will

influence

the

equity
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FIGURE 1
Overview of the Dissertation

AIB 2013 (Sheth Doctoral Dissertation Proposal Award winner);
AOM 2013 (International Management division).
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ownership decisions of MNEs (Rodriguez et al., 2005), subsequent research has not
found a statistically significant relationship that empirically validates these propositions
(Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). These results are surprising, particularly given the substantial
evidence that has been garnered which suggests that host market corruption influences
both the global location of foreign direct investment (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008) and an
MNE’s preference for non-equity involvement in markets characterized by heightened
corruption (Luo, 2011; Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). In this Essay, I incorporate insights from
integrative social contracts theory (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994, 1999; Spicer, 2009) to
argue that host market informal institutions, such as government corruption, should be
conceptualized as pluralistic phenomena.
Building on conceptual work that draws a distinction between globally-oriented
hyper norms (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1995) and locally-oriented behavioral norms (Spicer,
2009), I theoretically distinguish between petty corruption and grand corruption to
develop hypotheses pertaining to the relationship between each dimension of corruption
and the foreign entry decisions undertaken by MNEs. Trust and learning provide the
bases for the central mechanisms upon which the hypotheses are developed in Essay 1. It
contributes to the specification of theoretical boundary conditions within and around the
government corruption pervasiveness construct developed by Rodriguez et al. (2005). It
builds on recent international business-oriented business ethics research which has called
for the active integration of the theoretical and conceptual traditions of international
business strategy scholars and business ethicists, particularly when the research is
grounded in the institutional theoretical tradition (Doh, Husted, Matten, & Santoro,
2010). Taken together, the empirical findings and the associated theory in Essay 1
facilitate the linkage between the concept of informal institutions and the notion of
pluralism. In this regard, my work is consistent with prior conceptual work that has
advocated efforts to pursue theoretical contributions that could emerge from the
investigation of pluralistic phenomena, notwithstanding scholars’ general preference for
parsimony and generalizability in theory-construction (Glynn, Barr, & Dacin, 2000).
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Essay 2
The second essay (Chapter 3) is entitled Public corruption, private corruption and
the structure of equity-based foreign subsidiary investments in emerging markets. It
examines the relationship between the pervasiveness of host market corruption
(Rodriguez et al., 2005) and the strategies that MNEs implement with respect to their
foreign subsidiary investments. This Essay adopts the more comprehensive definition of
corruption (the abuse of authority for personal gain) that has been proposed by Aguilera
and Vadera (2008). In doing so, it extends the scope of corruption-based inquiry to
include aspects of both public sector corruption and private sector corruption through the
introduction of new constructs that categorize the phenomenon of host market corruption
into two dimensions – public corruption pervasiveness and private corruption
pervasiveness. This Essay seeks to answer the question, How do public sector corruption
and private sector corruption impact upon the foreign-entry strategies of multinational
enterprises?

Essay 3
The third essay (Chapter 4) is entitled Corruption pervasiveness, subsidiary
localization strategy and host market exit. It focuses on the MNE’s pursuit of external
legitimacy and the survival implications associated with various strategic initiatives that
are implemented at the subsidiary level to secure legitimacy in increasingly corrupt host
market environments. In this context, the strategic insights proffered by resource
dependence theory (RDT) and institutional theory are characterized by distinct spatial
orientations. RDT predicts that subsidiaries will implement proximal (host marketoriented) localization strategies in which local (host country) partners and employees are
hypothesized to be best-suited to efforts to enhance the subsidiary’s legitimacy and
reduce its likelihood of exit from the host country market. Conversely, institutional
theory suggests that distal (home market-oriented) localization strategies, in which
subsidiaries prefer to engage home country partners and employees in the subsidiary
investment, are better-suited to reducing the likelihood of subsidiary exit from
increasingly corrupt host country market environments. A set of competing hypotheses
based on RDT and institutional theory are developed in Essay 3 in order to examine the
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relationship between host market corruption levels, MNE strategy and the likelihood of
subsidiary exit. The results reveal the relative efficacy of home versus host market-based
localization strategies that are designed to facilitate the survival of subsidiaries in
increasingly corrupt foreign markets.

Conclusion
Collectively, this dissertation research makes the following conceptual and
empirical contributions:
1. Provides empirical and theoretical support for the foundational theory of host market
corruption in international business strategy research (Rodriguez et al., 2005);
2. Extends the conceptualization of host market corruption in terms of its origins (grand
versus petty) and in terms of its sector of origin (public versus private);
3. Advances theory with respect to the relationship between host market corruption and
the subsidiary-level strategies of MNEs;
4. Contributes new tenets to institutional theory by introducing the concepts of informal
institutional pluralism (conceptualizing informal institutions as pluralistic
phenomena), proximal (host market-oriented) localization and distal (home marketoriented) localization;
5. Investigates whether MNEs can implement strategies which reduce the likelihood of
market exit under conditions of more pervasive host market corruption.

Dissertation-Related Presentations
Prior to the submission of this dissertation for final examination, the theory,
constructs and empirical analyses presented within these three essays have evolved
through extensive developmental feedback received from my doctoral supervisor, and
through the presentation of the dissertation’s constituent essays in multiple public forums.
These presentation forums have included doctoral consortiums, academic conferences
and invited scholarly presentations. Following my dissertation proposal’s defense in
April 2013, an overview of my dissertation proposal was presented in Istanbul, Turkey at
the Academy of International Business Annual Meeting in July 2013 where it was
recognized first among 41 other submitted dissertation proposals and awarded the AIBSheth Doctoral Dissertation Proposal Award. Additionally, my dissertation proposal was
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also presented at the Academy of Management Annual Meeting’s doctoral consortium
(International Management division) in Orlando, U.S.A. during August 2013.
With respect to Essay 1 (Chapter 2 of this dissertation), earlier versions have been
presented at the Canadian Business Ethics Research Network’s (CBERN) Winter Ph.D.
Meeting convened at York University in Toronto, Canada during March 2013; at the
Academy of International Business Annual Meeting in a competitive session convened by
the Institutions, Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility interest track in
Istanbul, Turkey during July 2013; at the Strategic Management Society Annual
International Conference in a paper session convened by the Global Strategy track in
Atlanta, U.S.A. during October 2013; at the Institutional Capacity and Corruption
Symposium co-convened by the Darla Moore School of Business and the School of Law
at the University of South Carolina through the Rule of Law Collaborative during April
2014; and, the Essay has recently been accepted for presentation at the Academy of
Management Annual Meeting in a paper session being convened by the International
Management division in Philadelphia, U.S.A. during August 2014.
An earlier version of Essay 2 (Chapter 3 of this dissertation) was presented at the
Academy of International Business Annual Meeting in a competitive session convened by
the Institutions, Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility interest track in
Nagoya, Japan during July 2011.
Finally, an earlier version of Essay 3 (Chapter 4 of this dissertation) has been
presented at the Academy of International Business Annual Meeting in a competitive
session convened by the Institutions, Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility
interest track in Washington, D.C. during July 2012. More recently, the Essay has been
accepted for presentation at the Academy of Management Annual Meeting in a paper
session being convened by the International Management division in Philadelphia,
U.S.A. during August 2014.

Grammatical Style and References
While Chapters 1 and 5 of this dissertation have been written using first person
singular pronouns (“I”, “my”), Chapters 2, 3 and 4 have been written using first person
plural pronouns (“we”, “our”). This difference in grammatical style was implemented as
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a matter of convenience for myself, as I anticipate that it is likely that I will pursue
publication of these essays in peer-reviewed academic journals with one or more coauthors in the future. This difference in grammatical style should not be taken to imply
anything other than this entire dissertation being my own work. I am the sole author of
this thesis. Consistent with this, each of the presentations listed under the DissertationRelated Presentations section of this chapter were presentations of single-authored
manuscripts.
This dissertation has been prepared using the Integrated-Article format specified
by the School of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies (SGPS) at Western University, rather
than using the Monograph format. In this regard, the Chapters are integrated through
theory, empirics, concepts and materials that provide logical connections between the
chapters. Consistent with SGPS’ Thesis Regulation 8.3 which allows thesis chapters to
include unpublished work, in Chapter 3, I have cited the research that I present in Chapter
2. Similarly, in Chapter 4, I have cited the research that I present in both Chapters 2 and
3.
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CHAPTER 2
Institutional Pluralism: Host Market Government Corruption and the EquityBased Foreign Entry Strategies of Multinational Enterprises

The question of how firms…manage when faced with public sector
corruption continues to be among the most important and elusive
research areas. (Rodriguez, Siegel, Hillman, & Eden, 2006: 736)

INTRODUCTION
The macroeconomic consequences of corruption are widely documented in the
academic literature. Corruption has been found to adversely impact the flow of foreign
direct investment (FDI) into global markets that are perceived to be more corrupt (Habib
& Zurawicki, 2002). Further, while Mauro (1995) determined that corruption impaired
national development and undermined economic growth, Gupta, Davoodi and AlonsoTerme (2002) concluded that it also distorts the distribution of national income and
perpetuates poverty. Notwithstanding these advances regarding the detrimental effects of
corruption at the national level, less is known about the relationship between corruption
and multinational enterprise (MNE) strategy.
While extant theory has used the terms government corruption and public sector
corruption interchangeably (Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, & Eden, 2005; Uhlenbruck,
Rodriguez, Doh, & Eden, 2006), in the interest of consistency, we adopt the term
government corruption in our work. We investigate the impact of host market
government corruption on the strategic foreign entry decisions of MNEs. Rodriguez et al.
(2005) proposed that more pervasive government corruption in host markets will shape
the equity-based ownership decisions of foreign-investing MNEs. However, efforts to
empirically validate this proposition through the analysis of an MNE’s foreign entry
mode (joint venture (JV) versus wholly-owned subsidiary (WOS)) did not find a
statistically significant relationship between the pervasiveness of host market corruption
and an MNE’s equity-based foreign entry strategy (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). These
results are surprising when juxtaposed against subsequent work which determined that
host market corruption influences the investment behavior of MNEs (Cuervo-Cazurra,
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2008b), and exacerbates the pressure on foreign subsidiaries to engage in host market
bribery (Spencer & Gomez, 2011). In an effort to reconcile their non-significant
empirical results with the foundational theory advanced by Rodriguez et al. (2005),
Uhlenbruck et al. (2006: 411) conjectured that “…there may be underlying constructs
behind pervasiveness that have conflicting effects on the firm’s choice between joint
venture and wholly-owned subsidiary. Further exploration of the institutional
underpinnings of the pervasiveness of corruption is an important next step for corruption
researchers.” Building on this proposition, we develop more fine-grained theory to extend
the conceptualization of corruption pervasiveness and employ it to test the
aforementioned theory developed by Rodriguez et al. (2005) with respect to the
relationship between host market government corruption and the equity-based entry
strategies of foreign-investing MNEs.
Institutional theory holds that institutions include both the written rules and the
norms of behavior that evolve in order to reduce uncertainty (North, 1990). While strong
institutions attenuate uncertainty and facilitate efficient exchange, weak formal
institutions in a host market precipitate the formation of institutional voids (North, 1990)
which may be filled by informal institutions such as corruption (Puffer, McCarthy, &
Boisot, 2010). In this respect, institutions can be a source of uncertainty and risk for
internationalizing MNEs. Scholars have routinely formulated theory pertaining to MNE
strategies under conditions of heightened institutional uncertainty by employing two
constructs (North, 1990). Formal institutions are written rules, regulations and laws.
Informal institutions are norms of behavior, values, practices, conventions and codes of
conduct. Given the manifold regulatory regimes and systems of behavioral norms that
MNEs encounter, international business strategy scholars frequently enlist the notion of
institutional pluralism or, “the situation faced by an organization that operates within
multiple institutional spheres” (Kraatz & Block, 2008: 243). However, this body of work
has primarily concentrated on institutional pluralism across geographic space,
highlighting the institutional diversity that exists between countries (Chan & Makino,
2007), between regions (Arregle, Miller, Hitt, & Beamish, 2013) or between the MNE
and its global network of subsidiaries (Kostova & Roth, 2002). We extend this research
tradition by focusing further on the concept of institutional pluralism, placing particular

20
emphasis upon the institutional diversity that exists within individual institutions that
prevail in the host country market. A central premise of our work is that host market
institutions that have been traditionally recognized as discrete institutions (such as
“government corruption”) in the academic literature (Rodriguez et al., 2005) and the
business press (The Economist, 2006, 2008), can be conceptualized as pluralistic
institutional phenomena constituted by distinct dimensions which are disparate both in
their origin and their impact on the foreign entry strategy of MNEs.
Our theory synthesizes insights from institutional theory and integrative social
contracts theory, building on conceptual work by Doh, Husted, Matten and Santoro
(2010). Institutional theory (IT) suggests that the uncertainty precipitated by informal
institutions such as corruption in the host market environment will compel MNEs to
implement strategic foreign entry decisions that are designed to attenuate the perceived
level of uncertainty that the MNE encounters in the foreign market (Sartor & Beamish,
2014). Integrative social contracts theory (ISCT) proposes that a hierarchy of norms
should be used by managers to guide their ethical decision-making. More specifically,
ISCT has distinguished between globally-oriented hyper norms (Donaldson & Dunfee,
1994; Spicer, Dunfee, & Bailey, 2004) and locally-oriented behavioral norms (Spicer,
2009). We leverage this hierarchy of norms framework to inform our institutionallyoriented research. While scholars have traditionally conceptualized and operationalized
government corruption as a broad, uniform construct (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006), we
contend that this comprehensiveness might be masking more nuanced relationships
between host market corruption and the equity-based entry strategies of MNEs.
Consistent with this perspective, surveys of industry executives have revealed a more
multifaceted conceptualization of the construct, drawing a distinction between grand and
petty forms of corruption (Hardoon & Heinrich, 2011). We believe that this distinction is
highly relevant to the work of scholars who are endeavoring to enhance our
understanding of the relationship between corruption and firm strategy.
As such, our work is motivated by both: (1) a theoretical question: Can discrete
host market institutions be conceptualized as pluralistic phenomena?; and, (2) an
empirical question pertaining more specifically to the phenomenon of host market
government corruption: Do the different dimensions of government corruption (grand
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corruption versus petty corruption) each exert a distinct impact upon the equity-based
foreign entry strategies of MNEs? Our work is developed in two stages. First, we
theoretically distinguish between grand corruption and petty corruption in order to
formulate hypotheses pertaining to the relationship between each dimension of
government corruption and three strategic entry decisions that confront an MNE –
namely, its foreign entry strategy (nonequity-based entry versus equity-based entry), its
equity entry strategy (JV versus WOS) and its partnering strategy (traditional JV versus
crossnational JV). Second, we test these hypotheses with a sample of 727 subsidiaries
established in 32 host countries. We find that the results lend general support to our
theory that host market institutions can be conceptualized as pluralistic phenomena
characterized by distinct dimensions that exert differential impacts on various aspects of
an MNE’s foreign entry strategy.
Our research makes both theoretical and empirical contributions. Principal among
these is our extension of the conceptual domain of institutional pluralism. More
specifically, while prior work has focused on the strategic relevance of institutional
pluralism precipitated by geographic space, we develop theory which proposes that
discrete institutions within a host market can themselves be characterized as pluralistic
institutional phenomena, constituted by distinct dimensions that each exert a unique
impact upon the strategies of foreign-investing MNEs. Empirically, we independently
replicate an important component of Uhlenbruck et al.’s (2006) findings, providing
further support for the theory which proposed that MNEs would be more likely to favor
nonequity-based entry over equity-based entry under conditions of more pervasive host
market government corruption. However, we also present new theory that disaggregates
the concept of government corruption pervasiveness into two distinct dimensions (grand
corruption pervasiveness and petty corruption pervasiveness). Employing this refined
conceptualization, we shed new light on the relationship between the equity-based foreign
entry strategy of MNEs and the pervasiveness of government corruption, presenting three
new insights. First, we find that more pervasive grand corruption increases the likelihood
that foreign-investing MNEs will engage in JV investments with host country partners.
Second, an increase in the pervasiveness of petty corruption was found to prompt the
opposite outcome. Namely, under conditions of more pervasive petty corruption, firms
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that chose to invest through a JV were found to be more likely to engage a partner from
the foreign-investing MNE’s home country. Third, an increase in the pervasiveness of
petty corruption was found to attenuate the hypothesized increase in the likelihood that
MNEs would invest in JVs with host country (local) partners under conditions of more
pronounced grand corruption pervasiveness.

LITERATURE REVIEW
The Dimensions of Government Corruption
In order to advance understanding with respect to the relevance of host market
corruption to the strategy of foreign-investing MNEs, scholars have routinely employed
the theoretical paradigm which conceptualizes host market government corruption in
terms of its pervasiveness, or the likelihood of encountering corruption in normal
interactions with state officials (Rodriguez et al., 2005: 385). Leveraging this theory,
firms have been found to pay larger bribes to government officials in host markets
plagued by more pervasive corruption (Lee, Oh, & Eden, 2010). In turn, MNEs have
learned to expect heightened costs in markets characterized by more pervasive corruption
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008a) because corruption has become a regular part of business
practices in those countries (Kwok & Tadesse, 2006). As previously indicated, efforts to
empirically validate Rodriguez et al.’s (2005) theoretical framework found that an
increase in the pervasiveness of host market corruption heightens the likelihood that
foreign-entering MNEs will choose nonequity modes (arm’s-length or contract-based
modes of internationalization, such as management contracts and turnkey projects) over
equity modes of entry (JV and WOS) (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). However, the
pervasiveness of host market corruption has not been found to be a significant predictor
of the entry mode (JV versus WOS) executed by MNEs that engaged in equity-based
foreign investments (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). Motivated by their equivocal empirical
results, we endeavor to build on Uhlenbruck et al.’s (2006: 411) concluding proposition
that “…there may be underlying constructs behind pervasiveness that have conflicting
effects on the firm’s choice between joint venture and wholly-owned subsidiary.”
Consistent with this perspective, Mezias and Mezias (2010: 284) have argued that
acknowledging the dimensionality of corruption is required “to enhance understanding of
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how firms adapt to global institutional realities.” We use the general definition of
government corruption (the abuse of public power or public office for private benefit)
that has emerged from research in the adjacent fields of economics, law and political
science (Bardhan, 1997; Oldenburg, 1987; Treisman, 2000). Among the early studies that
encouraged scholars to employ a multidimensional approach in efforts to build on this
definition of government corruption, Husted (1999) suggested distinguishing between
different instances of corruption based upon factors including, among others, the
monetary amount involved in corrupt transactions, and the social or occupational status
of the transactions’ recipients. This recommendation is consistent with the language
employed by industry executives, non-governmental organizations, governments,
parliamentarians and the media when describing government corruption. More
specifically, in developing a dictionary of terms used by these diverse public and private
sector stakeholders to describe “corruption”, among the principal criteria used by
Transparency International to classify the multiple manifestations of government
corruption have been “the amount of money lost and…where it occurs” (2009: 14).
Accordingly, our work incorporates a consideration of the dimensionality of corruption
pervasiveness that is based on the distinction between grand corruption and petty
corruption. To do so, we employ Hardoon & Heinrich’s (2011: 18) definitions of grand
corruption (improper contributions made to political parties or to high-ranking officials
and politicians to achieve influence), and petty corruption (improper payments to lowlevel officials to facilitate or speed up administrative processes).
Economists, legal theorists and business ethicists have generally embraced this
dichotomization of government corruption (grand versus petty) in their research. Aidt,
Dutta and Sena (2008) have found that in countries characterized by stronger political
institutions, grand corruption has a more pronounced negative impact on growth than in
countries with weaker political institutions. Similarly, Rose-Ackerman (2002) observed
that grand corruption produces serious distortions and undermines productive
efficiencies such that the national competitiveness of more corrupt countries is reduced
substantially. In the case of petty corruption, scholars have focused on the adverse
corporate effects associated with allowing small disbursements to public officials.
Facilitating payments create a culture of corruption in the firm, damage the company’s
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reputation and foster the misperception among employees that sustainable competitive
advantages can be secured through continued payments to low-level officials
(Argandoña, 2005). Moreover, while a facilitation payment is typically small in quantum,
in aggregate, petty corruption can be costly to firms (Jordan, 2010). In addition to the
costs associated with navigating a complex international web of legislation and
conventions, some of which prohibit facilitation payments (or, petty bribes) and some of
which permit these disbursements, companies that pay petty bribes often become a target
for industrious bribe-takers who escalate the frequency and amount of their demands for
payment (Argandoña, 2005).
While extant literature supports our two-dimensional conceptual extension of the
corruption pervasiveness construct, our expectation that each dimension will exert a
disparate impact on the equity-based strategy of foreign-investing MNEs is based upon
the belief that unique mechanisms underpin the relationship between each dimension of
government corruption and MNE strategy. In turn, the uncommon nature of these
mechanisms can be attributed to the distinct origins associated with each dimension of
corruption pervasiveness (grand and petty). To explicate these distinct origins, we
leverage theoretical insights from ISCT pertaining to the existence of a hierarchy of
norms (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994, 1999). In doing so, our efforts build upon conceptual
work by Doh et al. (2010) who advocate constructive engagement between the
international business and business ethics literatures, as well as the active integration of
the disciplines’ conceptual and theoretical traditions. Given the growing prominence of
the institutional context in international business strategy scholarship, they propose that
ISCT is particularly well-suited to enriching our understanding with respect to the
strategic relevance of phenomena such as government corruption.

Integrative Social Contracts Theory: The Hierarchy of Norms
Scholars maintain that ISCT can be theoretically distinguished from strategyoriented research on the grounds that ISCT is a normative theory, rather than a predictive
theory (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1995). Nonetheless, we believe that the tenets of ICST
pertaining to the origins of norms (Donaldson & Dunfee, 2000) or, the hierarchy of
norms (hyper norms and behavioral norms), can be leveraged to structure new theory that
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facilitates the execution of more fine-grained analyses with respect to the relationship
between the foreign-entry strategies of MNEs and host market corruption. Our
epistemological perspective is consistent with recent conceptual work by Donaldson
(2012) who proposed that predictive management theories can be developed by
integrating principles derived from both positivist and normative traditions. In this
regard, while ISCT may not be directly useful to our efforts to predict or explain strategic
corporate behavior, the theory does offer the potential to enhance our understanding of
the context within which host market corruption and MNE foreign entry strategies
intersect.
ISCT is concerned with “economic ethics” or principles that delineate the
boundaries governing proper behavior in the context of production and exchange
(Donaldson & Dunfee, 1999). The theory endeavors to explain the origins of norms,
values, behaviors and standards that prevail in communities (Nichols, 2009). According
to the precepts of ISCT, host market countries can be assumed to enjoy moral free space
or, the freedom to establish moral rules applicable to the constituents in the host market.
Donaldson and Dunfee (1999: 38) contend that the moral rules adopted by a community
“reflect the community’s particular goals, environments, resources, experiences
and…specify boundaries for economic behavior, while reflecting the moral preferences
of the members of the community.”
Norms that are generated within a host market’s moral free space are known as
authentic norms. An authentic norm exists when a community garners a strong consensus
with respect to the ethicality of a particular behavior, as well as a strong expectation that
community members will act according to the specified behavior (Donaldson & Dunfee,
1999; Spicer, 2009). Locally-oriented authentic norms permit particular behaviors or
standards to persist in the community. However, ISCT scholars have struggled to
reconcile the notion that patently negative behaviors could be characterized as authentic,
such as when certain acts of corruption become “normalized” in a community (Ashforth
& Anand, 2003). Consequently, ISCT theorists have refined the conceptualization of
authentic norms and introduced the concept of behavioral norms. Spicer (2009: 836) has
suggested that behavioral norms exist when “community members have strong collective
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expectations that a certain type of behavior is likely to be displayed, even if there is little
consensus that such behavior is ethically desirable.”
It is important to note that the moral free space that communities enjoy is not
unbounded. ISCT introduces an important qualification to the notion of moral free space
and a community’s authority to generate behavioral norms that permit the persistence of
particular moral standards or behaviors in the community (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994).
More specifically, globally-oriented hyper norms exist to establish boundaries that
operate as ethical constraints around a community’s moral free space (Donaldson &
Dunfee, 1999). Hyper norms are fundamental principles that constitute the standards by
which behavioral norms are to be judged (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1999). In this regard,
hyper norms represent a global convergence of beliefs and values (Dunfee & Donaldson,
2002). Hyper norms that prohibit specified behaviors effectively preclude the existence of
any behavioral norms that are formulated in an effort to permit or legitimize behaviors
that are prohibited by hyper norms (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994, 1999).

Grand Corruption and Petty Corruption: Hyper Norms or Behavioral Norms?;
Permissive or Prohibitive?
In support of our theory-building efforts, we engage in a more rigorous analysis of
our two-dimensional conceptualization of the government corruption pervasiveness
phenomenon using the ISCT theoretical prism. To reiterate, the tenets of ISCT hold that
both hyper norms and behavioral norms can operate to either prohibit or permit the
legitimization of specified behaviors in a host market. However, the existence of a
prohibitive hyper norm precludes the existence of a permissive behavioral norm that
could conflict with the prohibitive hyper norm (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994, 1999). Prior
conceptual work by ISCT scholars who study corruption has concluded that a global
hyper norm prohibiting grand corruption does exist (Dunfee & Donaldson, 2002;
Fritzsche et al., 1995; Nichols, 1996). Conversely, no global hyper norm exists which
proactively permits grand corruption in host countries (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1999), nor
does a global hyper norm exist that permits petty corruption in host countries (Donaldson
& Dunfee, 1999). Finally, an application of the core precepts of ISCT suggests that the
existence of the aforementioned global hyper norm prohibiting grand corruption
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precludes the existence of any local behavioral norms that can be relied upon to permit or
to legitimize grand corruption in host country markets (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994,
1999). Table 1 summarizes extant theory with respect to the existence or absence of
global hyper norms or local behavioral norms that either prohibit or permit grand
corruption and petty corruption in host markets.
Table 1 also illustrates that, notwithstanding the considerable theoretical insights
proffered by this prior work, four key questions remain unresolved in the corruptionoriented ISCT literature to date (Dunfee & Donaldson, 2002). First, does a global hyper
norm exist to prohibit petty corruption? Second, absent this, do local behavioral norms
exist to prohibit petty corruption in host markets? Third, do local behavioral norms exist
to permit petty corruption in host markets? Fourth, to what extent do local behavioral
norms prohibiting grand corruption exist to reinforce the global hyper norm prohibiting
grand corruption? These four unanswered questions are denoted in Table 1 as
“unresolved.”

TABLE 1
Summary of the Tenets of ISCT with Respect to the Existence or Absence of
Global Hyper Norms or Local Behavioral Norms that Either Prohibit or Permit
Grand Corruption and Petty Corruption in Host Markets
Grand corruption
Yes
(Fritzsche et al., 1995; Nichols, 1996; Dunfee &
Donaldson, 2002 )

Petty corruption

Permissive

No
(Donaldson & Dunfee, 1999 )

No
(Donaldson & Dunfee, 1999 )

Prohibitive

Unre solved

Unresolved

Permissive

No
(Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994; 1999 )

Unresolved

Prohibitive
Global hyper
norms

Local behavioral
norms

Unresolved

To address these four questions, we are mindful that “the debate over what
constitutes a hyper norm has impeded the application of ISCT in real-world empirical
settings” (Doh et al., 2010: 488). Despite the inherent challenge that this poses to the
work of ISCT theorists, Frederick’s (1991) study is methodologically instructive in
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guiding researchers’ efforts to determine whether other global hyper norms and local
behavioral norms exist. To ascertain the existence of a global hyper norm pertaining to
employee health and safety standards, Frederick (1991) scrutinized the written content of
intergovernmental conventions and compacts. Notably, extant theory explicitly supports
this practice of surveying the formal institutional environment (i.e., written rules, laws
and regulations) to garner insights into the informal institutions (i.e., norms of behavior,
values, practices) that prevail in a host market. More specifically, the core precepts of
institutional theory hold that norms and values (or, informal institutions) are
manifestations or elaborations of formal written laws and regulations (North, 1990: 40).
Similarly, Ralston’s (2008) crossvergence theory of values evolution in societies
proposes that the formal legal system is one of the key drivers of the values and business
ideologies that prevail in host markets. Accordingly, we expect that the content of
existing national legislative provisions and international conventions will provide an
indication of the norms that can be expected to prevail in host markets. As such,
leveraging Frederick’s (1991) methodology, we reviewed both national legislation and
international conventions that establish formal rules and laws with respect to corrupt
transactions in order to ascertain whether it is plausible to assume either the existence or
absence of the global hyper norms and local behavioral norms that are unconfirmed in
the four quadrants of Table 1 (namely, a global hyper norm prohibiting petty corruption,
as well as local behavioral norms permitting petty corruption, prohibiting petty
corruption and prohibiting grand corruption).
Appendix A lists the legislative standards that prevail in the 32 countries included
in our study, as well as two intergovernmental conventions governing the execution of
corrupt transactions. Consistent with the theory of Dunfee and Donaldson (2002),
Fritzsche et al. (1995) and Nichols (1996), Appendix A provides general support for the
prior recognition of a global hyper norm prohibiting grand corruption, as well as
supporting Donaldson and Dunfee’s (1994, 1999) theory that the existence of this global
hyper norm precludes the existence of any local behavioral norms that permit or
legitimize grand corruption. Nearly all of the host markets listed in Appendix A have
enacted some form of local legislation that expressly prohibits all acts of grand
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corruption. By deduction, the existence of these national standards also lends support to
the widespread existence of local behavioral norms that prohibit grand corruption.
Conversely, the contents of Appendix A also suggest that there does not appear to
be a global hyper norm prohibiting petty corruption. However, it could be argued that
local behavioral norms that either prohibit or permit petty corruption do exist among the
32 countries that we study. While our legislative review determined that laws exist in
22% of these countries which could be expected to permit petty corruption in foreign
markets, 16% of the 32 have not enacted any relevant legislation, while the balance have
formally prohibited petty corruption. The intergovernmental conventions listed in
Appendix A also offer modest support for the existence of local behavioral norms that
permit petty corruption. Our conclusions are consistent with recent conceptual work by
Spicer (2009) who has suggested that the anecdotal observation of wide-spread, low-level
bribery in some host markets might reflect the existence of behavioral norms permitting
these transactions. In our effort to propose answers to the four unresolved theoretical
questions, we present Table 2 which extends the summary of extant theory that we
presented in Table 1, by incorporating the findings that emerged from our legislative
review for the 32 countries.
TABLE 2
Proposed Extensions to the Tenets of ISCT with Respect to the Existence or Absence
of Global Hyper Norms or Local Behavioral Norms that Either Prohibit or Permit
Grand Corruption and Petty Corruption in Host Markets

Grand corruption
Ye s
(Fritzsche et al., 1995; Nichols, 1996; Dunfee &
Donaldson, 2002 )

Petty corruption

Pe rmissive

No
(Donaldson & Dunfee, 1999 )

No
(Donaldson & Dunfee, 1999 )

Prohibitive

Ye s

Yes

Pe rmissive

No
(Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994; 1999 )

Yes
(Spicer, 2009 )

Prohibitive
Global hype r
norms

Local be havioral
norms

No
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
While institutional theorists maintain that institutions are intended to bring order
and efficiency to economic exchange (North, 2005), weak institutions heighten
uncertainty for MNEs and increase the costs associated with transacting in foreign
markets that lack a strong institutional foundation (Murrell, 2005). Consequently, MNEs
will endeavor to execute strategies that are designed to attenuate this institutional
uncertainty (Santangelo & Meyer, 2011). However, weak institutions do not exert a
uniform impact upon the strategy of foreign-investing MNEs. In fact, the specific type of
uncertainty garnered by informal institutions such as corruption is an important
determinant of an MNE’s strategic foreign entry decisions (Sartor & Beamish, 2014).
North (1990: 43) has indicated that scholars should leverage the tenets of transaction cost
theory (TCT) in order to more fully comprehend informal institutions because “informal
institutions are not directly observable.” TCT postulates the existence of two central
types of uncertainty. While behavioral uncertainty is conceptualized as uncertainty
related to the behavior of transaction partners (Griffith, Harmancioglu, & Droge, 2009),
environmental uncertainty is the inability to predict the external environment within
which the MNE and its subsidiaries are situated. One type of environmental uncertainty
that is especially relevant to our research context, response uncertainty, is “the inability
to predict the likely consequences of a response choice” and is expected to be particularly
salient “when there is a perceived need to act because a pending event or change is
perceived to pose a threat or to provide some unique opportunity to the organization”
(Milliken, 1987: 137). While an increase in behavioral uncertainty has been found to
prompt firms to prefer vertical integration, under conditions of heightened environmental
uncertainty, firms will choose hybrids (Geyskens, Steenkamp, & Kumar, 2006).
Our literature review pertaining to the dimensionality of government corruption
has suggested that grand and petty corruption can be distinguished qualitatively on the
basis of the substantiveness of corrupt transaction payments and the social or
occupational status of a transaction’s recipient. The two dimensions can also be
substantiated theoretically. Our ISCT-motivated legislative review suggests that the
origin of the norms that either permit or prohibit grand corruption and petty corruption in
host markets are distinct. In fact, Table 2 reveals that the origin of the overarching
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attitude towards grand corruption is predominantly global in its orientation, while
attitudes and values toward petty corruption vary more widely across countries. As such,
two key assumptions emerge from Table 2. First, a global hyper norm prohibiting
corruption does exist. Second, local behavioral norms exist which both permit and
prohibit petty corruption, depending upon the country under consideration.
This theoretical distinction operates as the foundation for the mechanisms
(Bromiley & Johnson, 2005; Davis & Marquis, 2005) through which we expect that the
equity-based strategies of foreign-investing MNEs will differ under conditions of more
pervasive grand corruption versus more pervasive petty corruption. Uncertainty in the
context of corruption is a complex and multifaceted construct (Søreide, 2009). To briefly
summarize our theory, we propose that the distinct origins of the norms pertaining to
grand corruption and petty corruption effectively precipitate different types of
uncertainty (environmental and behavioral) for foreign-investing MNEs which, in turn,
motivate MNEs to vary their equity-based entry strategies. More precisely, under
conditions of more pervasive grand corruption, we expect that the primary source of
uncertainty will be environmental (response) uncertainty, while behavioral uncertainty
will predominate under conditions of heighted petty corruption pervasiveness. As such,
we theorize that the relationship between petty corruption pervasiveness and equity-based
foreign entry strategy will be grounded in trust-based mechanisms due to the fact that
petty corruption garners more pronounced behavioral uncertainty in the host market.
Conversely, in the case of grand corruption, learning-based mechanisms will govern
because grand corruption generates heightened environmental (response) uncertainty.
Figure 3 provides an illustrative overview of our theory, which we present in comparison
to our depiction of extant theory in Figure 2.
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FIGURE 2
Extant Conceptualization of Host Market Institutions
(Using the Example of Government Corruption)

Uniform origin of host
market institutions

Host market
norms and values

Uniform strategic impact

Host market
government corruption
(precipitates
institutional
uncertainty)

Strategic foreignentry decisions

• Entry strategy (equity or nonequity):
Uhlenbruck et al. (2006) find that foreign-investing
MNEs are more likely to engage in nonequity entry
when corruption is more pervasive in foreign
markets.
• Equity entry strategy (JV or WOS): Uhlenbruck
et al. (2006) find no significant relationship.

FIGURE 3
Conceptualizing Host Market Institutions as Pluralistic Phenomena
(Using the Example of Government Corruption)
Pluralistic origin of
host market
institutions

Globally-oriented
norms and values
(hyper norms)

Pluralistic strategic impact

Grand corruption
(precipitates
environmental
(response) uncertainty)
Host market
government
corruption

Locally-oriented
norms and values
(behavioral norms)

Petty corruption
(precipitates
behavioral
uncertainty)

• Entry strategy (equity or nonequity): Preference
for nonequity investment hypothesized when grand
corruption interacts with petty corruption.
Strategic foreignentry decisions

Learning-based mechanism

Strategic foreign
entry decisions

Trust-based mechanism

• Equity entry strategy (JV or WOS): Preference
for JV hypothesized.
• Partnering strategy (home or host counrty
partner): Preference for traditional (host country)
JV partner hypothesized.
• Entry strategy (equity or nonequity):
Preference for nonequity investment hypothesized
when petty corruption interacts with grand
corruption.
• Equity entry strategy (JV or WOS): Preference
for WOS hypothesized.
• Partnering strategy (home or host counrty
partner): Preference for crossnational (home
country) JV partner hypothesized.

Grand Corruption, Petty Corruption and Foreign Entry Strategy (Equity Entry
Versus Nonequity Entry)
Before we present our theory with respect to the impact of grand corruption and
petty corruption upon the equity-based entry strategies of foreign-investing MNEs, we
endeavor to ensure that our conceptual disaggregation of the corruption pervasiveness
construct is theoretically congruent with prior research that motivates our work
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(Rodriguez et al., 2005; Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). While we are not aware of any
theoretical basis upon which it could be expected that either grand corruption
pervasiveness or petty corruption pervasiveness would exert a distinct impact upon an
MNE’s choice between nonequity-based foreign market entry and equity-based foreign
market entry, prior findings within this research domain implicitly suggest that the
interaction between grand corruption and petty corruption should precipitate a preference
for nonequity-based entry among internationalizing MNEs. Uhlenbruck et al. (2006)
found that under conditions of more pervasive government corruption in foreign markets,
MNEs were more likely to choose nonequity entry over equity entry. Notably,
Uhlenbruck et al.’s (2006) measurement of government corruption was constituted by
items which we would characterize as providing an indication of both grand corruption
and petty corruption. They argue that whereas equity-based entry exposes the MNE to
more frequent and longer-term interaction with potentially corrupt government officials
and bureaucrats, nonequity-based entry provides the firm with three things - greater
flexibility in more corrupt countries, the opportunity to minimize interaction with corrupt
foreign governments and lower exit barriers from these markets when corruption levels
are perceived to be too costly. Accordingly, we hypothesize that,
Hypothesis 1: The interaction of grand corruption pervasiveness and petty
corruption pervasiveness increases the likelihood that a foreign entrant
will engage in nonequity entry.

Grand Corruption and Equity Entry Strategy (JV Versus WOS)
We have assumed that the worldwide moral, ethical and legal proscription against
engaging in grand corruption is buttressed by the globally-oriented hyper norm that
prohibits acts of grand corruption. When subsidiaries either receive or extend overtures
to engage in grand corruption in foreign markets, the parent MNE can expect exposure to
a number of positive and negative outcomes. In addition to the increased likelihood of
access to potentially lucrative business opportunities and commercial benefits such as
monopoly rights or exclusive supplier agreements (Søreide, 2009), another possible result
is that a wide range of negative repercussions and sanctions, including adverse
reputational effects (Metzger, Dalton, & Hill, 1993), civil penalties and criminal
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liabilities may be levied against the firm and its executives (Koehler, 2012). In short,
given that grand corruption is associated with a wide range of potentially positive and
negative results, these transactions are characterized by substantial outcome uncertainty
(Søreide, 2009). As such, we expect that foreign entrants into host markets characterized
by more pervasive grand corruption will perceive more pronounced environmental
(response) uncertainty which will complicate strategic decision-making and increase the
costs of transacting in more corrupt host markets. While this uncertainty can make
investing abroad difficult for MNEs, learning how to minimize the likelihood of exposure
to the negative repercussions of grand corruption and learning how to handle grand
corruption properly (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002) can contribute to attenuating this
uncertainty. Foreign subsidiaries become compelled to learn in order to improve their
performance (March, 1991) under conditions of more pronounced grand corruption
pervasiveness. JV partners are an important source of learning and knowledge for MNEs
that choose to enter foreign markets (Inkpen, 2000). Intermediaries such as equity
partners who are experienced with grand corruption provide the MNE with valuable
opportunities to learn how to execute these high risk transactions and to increase the
probability of achieving positive outcomes. This learning improves the subsidiary’s
competence with respect to engaging in these acts of corruption (Ashforth & Anand,
2003; Rodriguez et al., 2005). Further, these intermediaries offer the added benefits of
enhancing the enforceability and efficiency of these more costly corrupt transactions, as
well as providing the MNE with a degree of exculpability (Lambsdorff, 2013).
Accordingly, we hypothesize that,
Hypothesis 2: A foreign-investing MNE is more likely to engage in joint
ownership (JV) of a foreign subsidiary investment under conditions of
more pervasive grand corruption.
Grand Corruption and Partnering Strategy (Home Country Partner Versus Host
Country Partner)
Given the hypothesized willingness of MNEs to share ownership under conditions
of more pervasive grand corruption, foreign MNEs have at least two options with respect
to their choice of partner - a host country (local) partner or a home country partner
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(Makino & Beamish, 1998). Based on our theory, we anticipate that MNEs will be more
likely to select a local partner because a local partner is expected to offer the MNE a
better opportunity to attenuate the risks associated with the heightened environmental
(response) uncertainty precipitated by more pronounced grand corruption pervasiveness.
Observing local partners engage in corruption contributes to vicarious learning within the
foreign subsidiary (Mezias & Mezias, 2010). Local partners are deeply embedded in local
social and business networks, in addition to being more intimately familiar with
government officials (Meschi, 2009). Consequently, local partners are a particularly
potent source of learning for the foreign subsidiary and they may be able to shield foreign
subsidiaries from more arbitrary acts of grand corruption (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). As
such, we expect that foreign-investing MNEs will prefer to engage local partners in order
to gain access to local resources that are needed to navigate the web of host market grand
corruption more effectively and efficiently (Doh, Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, Collins, &
Eden, 2003) and to overcome the liability of foreignness attendant with these transactions
(Eden & Miller, 2004). The network ties or reputation of local equity partners can
constitute intangible strategic assets for the subsidiary (Chen & Hennart, 2002). Foreign
MNEs can employ these assets to comply with corrupt norms, while at the same time
reducing the costs associated with the liability of foreignness which generally increases
when government corruption is more pervasive (Doh et al., 2003; Meschi, 2009).
Accordingly, we hypothesize that,
Hypothesis 3: A foreign-investing MNE is more likely to engage a host
country (local) partner, rather than a home country partner, in a foreign
subsidiary investment under conditions of more pervasive grand
corruption.
Petty Corruption and Equity Entry Strategy (JV Versus WOS)
We have assumed that, unlike the global hyper norm that prohibits grand
corruption in host markets, local behavioral norms that either prohibit or permit petty
corruption vary widely across countries. Local behavioral norms that contribute to the
persistence of petty corruption in host markets permit these transactions to become
institutionalized and a regular part of commercial activity (Anand, Ashforth, & Joshi,
2004). This precipitates substantial institutional uncertainty for foreign-investing MNEs.
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Host markets characterized by more pervasive levels of petty corruption endure
significantly lower levels of trust in government institutions (Doig & Theobald, 1999). In
addition to exerting a corrosive impact on trust in administrative procedures (Argandoña,
2005), when petty corruption is a common practice in a host market, it causes transaction
costs to increase in an unpredictable manner (Kaufman & Wei, 1999) and undermines the
efficiency of the business environment. As an example of the cost and inefficiency bred
by more pervasive petty corruption in foreign markets, British-based multinational
alcohol conglomerate Diageo was recently reported as having one of its Guinness
delivery trucks stopped at “roadblocks” 47 times during a 500 kilometer trip in the
African country of Cameroon (The Economist, 2012).
Behavioral uncertainty prevails when lower levels of trust exist in host markets
(Brouthers & Brouthers, 2003). Trust has been identified as an important consideration
for firms when formulating their market-entry strategies (Beamish & Banks, 1987;
Buckley & Casson, 1998). Among the many strategic decisions facing MNEs that
establish subsidiaries in foreign markets, the choice of entry mode is contingent upon the
level of trust, with an increase in trust precipitating an increase in the use of JVs
(Erramilli, 1996). Trust fosters greater certainty with respect to a prospective partner’s
anticipated behavior (Madhok, 1995). The existence of trust can attenuate the need for
formal controls as a means to enhancing confidence in a partner’s behavior (Das & Teng,
1998). However, behaviorally-based control mechanisms such as trust take time to
develop and the effectiveness of these informal control mechanisms may be reduced
when cultural differences are more pronounced (Woodcock, Beamish, & Makino, 1994).
Similarly, the costs associated with formally monitoring and enforcing property rights in
the context of shared governance are significant, particularly when institutions such as
those prohibiting petty corruption are routinely violated (Reuer & Tong, 2005).
Consequently, absent the ability to trust local partners, MNEs will prefer to retain full
ownership (Dikova & van Witteloostuijn, 2007). Accordingly, we hypothesize that,
Hypothesis 4: A foreign-investing MNE is more likely to engage in a
wholly-owned foreign subsidiary (WOS) investment under conditions of
more pervasive petty corruption.
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Petty Corruption and Partnering Strategy (Home Country Partner Versus Host
Country Partner)
Notwithstanding an MNE’s hypothesized preference for retaining full ownership
under conditions of more pervasive petty corruption, some MNEs might still choose to
engage a partner in the foreign subsidiary investment. As such, the MNE must select an
acceptable partner. We have theorized that trust-based mechanisms undergird the
relationship between the pervasiveness of petty corruption in the host market and the
equity-based entry strategies of foreign-investing MNEs. Consistent with political
scientists’ conceptualization of trust as being “ultimately dependent on certain
characteristics of the (individual or group being) trusted” (Nannestad, 2008: 415),
theorists have distinguished between generalized trust and particularized trust. While
particularized trust or, in-group trust, is “trust only in people like yourself” (Uslaner,
2005: 77), generalized trust or, “trust in people one does not know” (Nannestad, 2008:
418) refers to a broader social trust that includes out-group members.
Trustworthiness has been found to decline when partners hail from different
nationalities or races (Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, & Soutter, 2000). Moreover, Li and
Wu (2010) have concluded that as the level of corruption in a country increases,
generalized trust declines and particularized trust becomes paramount. Taken together,
we would expect that when MNEs invest through JVs in foreign markets under
conditions of more pervasive petty corruption, a home country partner will be preferred
over a host country (local) partner. This strategy seems well advised. JV partners have
been found to be more opportunistic when host market institutions are weaker (Luo,
2007). Further, heightened levels of corruption in host markets have been found to
amplify the pressure that foreign subsidiaries face to engage in host market bribery,
particularly when the parent MNE invests with a local partner (Spencer & Gomez, 2011).
As such, we hypothesize that,
Hypothesis 5: A foreign-investing MNE is more likely to engage a home
country partner, rather than a host country (local) partner, in a foreign
subsidiary investment under conditions of more pervasive petty
corruption.
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The Interaction Between Grand Corruption Pervasiveness and Petty Corruption
Pervasiveness
The allocation of organizational attention between competing institutions has
become a fertile area of debate for management scholars who research the plurality of
institutions (Dunn & Jones, 2010; Molina, 2012). While this discourse has sometimes
revolved around an assessment of the relative primacy of competing institutional logics,
our theory pertaining to institutional pluralism in the context of increasingly corrupt host
foreign market environments is couched in the tradition of transaction cost (TC)
scholarship. While TC theory has traditionally been more concerned with the
organizational structure that results from the interaction between asset specificity and
uncertainty (Williamson, 1985), more recently, scholars have advocated the need to
develop theory and investigate the interaction effects that result from different types of
uncertainty (Cuypers & Martin, 2009; Miller, 1993). In examining the equity-based entry
strategies (or, organizational control decisions) of MNEs that engaged in innovation
offshoring, Sartor & Beamish (2014) found that weak informal institutions which
precipitate behavioral uncertainty effectively moderate the impact of weak informal
institutions that induce environmental (demand) uncertainty on the foreign entry
strategies of MNEs. We have proposed that while an increase in the pervasiveness of
grand corruption in the host market precipitates more pronounced environmental
(response) uncertainty for foreign-investing firms, an increase in petty corruption
pervasiveness heightens behavioral uncertainty. As such, applying the theory of Sartor &
Beamish (2014), we would expect that the effects of petty corruption would predominate
over those of grand corruption when the two dimensions of corruption interact.
Accordingly, we hypothesize that,
Hypothesis 6: The positive relationship between grand corruption
pervasiveness and the likelihood that a foreign-investing MNE will engage
in joint ownership (JV) of a foreign subsidiary investment is weakened as
petty corruption pervasiveness increases.
Hypothesis 7: The positive relationship between grand corruption
pervasiveness and the likelihood that foreign-investing MNEs will invest
through a JV with a host country (local) partner is weakened as petty
corruption pervasiveness increases.
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METHODS
Data Sources and Key Variables
We tested our hypotheses using a sample of 727 subsidiaries established in 32
countries1 between 2004 and 2007. Our study period was determined by the availability
of country data pertaining to the pervasiveness of petty corruption and grand corruption
in the host foreign markets. Information pertaining to the foreign subsidiary investments
was gathered from the 2004-2007 editions of the Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyou Souran, a
compendium of Japanese global FDI that has been shown to be close to the population of
foreign affiliates of public and private Japanese companies (Hennart, 1991; Yamawaki,
1991). Observations pertaining to the dependent variables in our study were lagged by
one year relative to the observations pertaining to the measures of petty corruption and
grand corruption.
Building on Rodriguez et al.’s (2005: 385) extant conceptualization of host
market corruption in terms of its pervasiveness or, “the likelihood of encountering
corruption in normal interactions with state officials”, we have proposed that the concept
of government corruption should be disaggregated according to the extensiveness of the
payment and the status of the recipient. In order to develop measures for both grand
corruption (improper contributions made to political parties or to high-ranking officials
and politicians to achieve influence), and petty corruption (improper payments to lowlevel officials to facilitate or speed up administrative processes) (Hardoon & Heinrich,
2011: 18), we selected items from the Global Competitiveness Reports (GCR). The GCR
collects executive opinion survey data to gauge the perceptions of international business
executives with respect to the prevailing economic and business environment in host
markets around the world. Based on our theory, data pertaining to five different
indicators of the pervasiveness of host market government corruption were taken from
the GCR surveys and subjected to factor analysis. We executed a principal components
analysis with an orthogonal (varimax) rotation which suggested a two factor solution
1

The number of subsidiary investments in each country is in brackets: Argentina (2), Australia (4),
Austria (1), Belgium (9), Brazil (5), Canada (2), China (348), Czech Republic (7), France (8), Germany
(12), Hong Kong (22), Hungary (2), India (20), Indonesia (13), Italy (2), Korea (38), Luxembourg (1),
Malaysia (6), Mexico (8), Netherlands (13), New Zealand (2), Philippines (9), Poland (7), Russia (8),
Singapore (18), South Africa (2), Spain (3), Switzerland (1), Taiwan (21), Thailand (58), United Kingdom
(11), United States (64).
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(using an eigenvalue cutoff of 1), the results of which are presented in Table 3.
Consistent with our theory, three items (irregular payments in public utilities; irregular
payments in loan applications; and, irregular payments in tax collection) were found to
load in a manner that reflected our adopted definition of petty corruption (improper
payments to low-level officials to facilitate or speed up administrative processes). Only
one item (the prevalence of illegal political donations) was found to be related to the
definition of grand corruption (improper contributions made to political parties or to
high-ranking officials and politicians to achieve influence). The fifth and final item in our
factor analysis (irregular payments in government policymaking) exhibited a high crossloading on both the factor indicating petty corruption (0.75) and on the grand corruption
factor (0.62). Given the high cross-loading, we dropped the item from the composition of
the petty corruption latent construct. However, given the definition of grand corruption
that we adopted (improper contributions made to political parties or to high-ranking
officials and politicians to achieve influence), we reasoned that the item which
demonstrated a high cross-loading (irregular payments in government policymaking)
exhibited a degree of face validity which made it plausible that the item could be an
indicator of grand corruption. As such, we developed two measures to operationalize
grand corruption in our regression models. First, grand corruption was constituted as a
dual-item latent construct (incorporating both the prevalence of illegal political
donations, and irregular payments in government policymaking). Second, we also
operationalized grand corruption as a single-item construct (using the prevalence of
illegal political donations indicator alone). Although both the single-item construct and
the dual-item construct were developed to operationalize grand corruption in our
regression models, to avoid any confusion, we refer to the dual-item construct as grand
corruption, while the single-item construct is referred to as illegal political donations.
One benefit associated with constituting the grand corruption variable both as a singleitem latent construct, and also as dual-item construct, is that it provides a built-in
robustness check of our regression estimations with respect to grand corruption. The
Cronbach’s alpha for petty corruption (0.97) and the dual-item measure of grand
corruption (0.75) both exceeded the 0.70 cutoff specified by Nunnally & Bernstein
(1994).
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TABLE 3
Factor Analysis Results

Construct and associate d ite ms

Factor loading

Pe tty corruption pe rvasive ne ss:

Cronbach's alpha: 0.97

Irregular payments in public utilities

In your industry, how commonly would
you estimate that firms make
undocumented extra payments or bribes
when getting connected to public utilities
(eg, telephone or electricity)? (1 =
common, 7 = never occurs).

0.97

Irregular payments in loan applications

In your industry, how commonly would
you estimate that firms make
undocumented extra payments or bribes
connected with loan applications? (1 =
common, 7 = never occurs).

0.97

Irregular payments in tax collection

In your industry, how commonly would
you estimate that firms make
undocumented extra payments or bribes
connected with annual tax payments? (1
= common, 7 = never occurs).

0.94

Grand corruption pe rvasive ne ss:

Cronbach's alpha: 0.75

Prevalence of illegal political donations

Irregular payments in government
policymaking

How common are illegal donations to
political parties in your country? (l =
common, 7 = never occurs).

0.99

In your industry, how commonly would
you estimate that firms make
undocumented extra payments or bribes
connected with influencing laws and
policies, regulations, or decrees to favor
selected business interests? (1 = common,
7 = never occurs).

0.62
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Given that the petty corruption and grand corruption constructs were based upon
raw data in which higher scores indicate lower levels of corruption, to enhance the ease
of interpreting our results, we reverse-coded the raw data so that more pervasive petty
corruption and grand corruption would be indicated by higher scores. Furthermore, our
measures of petty corruption and grand corruption provide an indication of the absolute
level of each type of corruption in the host market, consistent with leading conceptual
and empirical strategy work pertaining to corruption (Rodriguez et al., 2005; Uhlenbruck
et al., 2006).

Dependent Variables
We tested the impact of more pervasive host market petty corruption and grand
corruption upon three strategic decisions executed by MNEs with respect to their
subsidiary investments – foreign entry strategy, equity entry strategy and partnering
strategy.
Foreign Entry Strategy. Foreign entry strategy captures the MNE’s choice
between nonequity-based foreign market entry and equity-based foreign market entry (JV
or, WOS). While nonequity foreign market entry has been recognized in the literature as
including transactions such as exporting, licensing and franchising, the measurement of
nonequity entry is made more difficult by the shortage of statistical data pertaining to
nonequity transactions (UNCTAD, 2011). In addition to the lack of data, the
measurement of nonequity entry is also complicated by the fact that “…the web of
directly-owned, partially-owned, contract-based and arm’s-length forms of international
operation…is tangled and some of the distinctions between the different modes are
blurred” (UNCTAD, 2011: 130). In the absence of the relevant statistics needed to
measure nonequity entry, UNCTAD (2011) has advocated the use of estimates pertaining
to the scale and scope of nonequity transactions. Pan & Tse (2000: 539) have noted that
equity entry can be distinguished from nonequity entry on the basis of “resource
commitment, risk, return, (and) control.” Similarly, Uhlenbruck et al. (2006: 404) suggest
that equity entry, unlike nonequity entry, can be evidenced by a degree of “ownership and
control involving a long-term commitment to the country.”
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In order to gauge the degree of ownership and control that an MNE exercises with
respect to a foreign subsidiary investment, extant research has employed measures
pertaining to the MNE’s commitment of equity capital (Malhotra & Gaur, 2014) and
human capital to the investment (Caligiuri & Stroh, 1995; Shay & Baack, 2004). When a
MNE retains less than 5% of the equity in a foreign corporate entity, researchers have
routinely regarded this more nominal commitment of equity capital as a portfolio
investment by the MNE, rather than as an equity-based foreign subsidiary investment
(Brouthers, 2002; Dhanaraj & Beamish, 2004). Similarly, subsidiaries which employ
fewer than twenty individuals are more likely to be sales offices or sales agencies
designed to facilitate export sales, and are less likely to be equity-based foreign
subsidiary investments (Beamish & Inkpen, 1998). Building on Uhlenbruck et al.’s
(2006) conceptualization of equity entry as including foreign investments characterized
by a degree of ownership and control that indicates a long-term commitment to the host
country, in addition to the body of work that has specified threshold levels of equity
capital and human capital that are pertinent to the distinction between equity entry and
nonequity entry, we operationalized nonequity entry as those foreign entries in which the
focal MNE owned less than 5% of the equity and fewer than twenty employees were
enlisted to staff the overseas office associated with the investment. Based on this
operationalization, 74 (10.2%) of the 727 entry events in our sample were categorized as
nonequity entries, while 653 (89.8%) were equity entries.
Equity Entry Strategy. Equity entry strategy captures the MNE’s choice between
a JV and a WOS when making an equity-based foreign investment. This distinction was
defined according to two conventions employed in the literature. We estimated models
using both an 80 percent equity ownership cutoff and a 95 percent equity ownership
cutoff to distinguish JVs from WOSs (Yiu & Makino, 2002). Employing both definitions
in our estimations provided us with an opportunity to test the robustness of our results.
While the regression models that we report in the regression tables employ the dependent
variable that is based on the 80 percent equity ownership cutoff, we also report the results
using the 95 percent cutoff in the footnotes at the end of the Results section. Utilizing the
80 percent equity ownership cutoff to distinguish between JVs and WOSs, 432 (66.2%)
of the 653 equity entries were categorized as WOSs and 221 (33.8%) were JVs
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(compared to 397 (60.8%) and 256 (39.2%) respectively using the 95 percent cutoff). We
integrated the measurement of both of the aforementioned strategic decisions (foreign
entry strategy and equity entry strategy) by employing a trichotomous dependent variable
which included nonequity, joint venture and wholly-owned subsidiary as the three
possible outcomes.
Partnering Strategy. The taxonomy of JV partnerships developed by Makino and
Beamish (1998) was utilized to measure the partnering strategy employed by firms that
organized their foreign entry through a JV ownership structure. As such, each JV in our
sample was categorized as either a cross-national JV (a JV in which the MNE engages a
home country equity partner) or a traditional JV (in which the MNE engages a host
country equity partner). Makino and Beamish’s (1998) taxonomy includes a third
category of JV - trinational JV (a JV in which the MNE engages a partner from a foreign
country other than the MNE’s home country). Consistent with their observation that the
trinational JV occurs less frequently (constituting only 2.4% of the JVs in their study),
only 4.5% of the JVs in our sample were trinational JVs (10 investments). As such, our
models with respect to the partnering strategy dependent variable focused on the
distinction between traditional JVs and cross-national JVs. Employing the 80 percent
cutoff, 171 (81.1%) of the remaining 211 JVs were categorized as traditional JVs and 40
(18.9%) were categorized as crossnational JVs, while 193 (78.5%) and 53 (21.5%) were
categorized as traditional JVs and crossnational JVs respectively using the 95 percent
cutoff.

Control Variables
We included variables in our study to control for country, regional, temporal,
industry, parent MNE and subsidiary-level effects. We controlled for subsidiary size and
subsidiary capitalization using data pertaining to, respectively, the total number of
employees in the subsidiary and the subsidiary’s total capitalization. Several parent
MNE-level variables, including firm size (Boyacigiller, 1990; Stopford & Wells, 1972),
leverage (Reuer & Ragozzino, 2006), profitability and international experience (Johanson
& Vahlne, 1977; Makino & Delios, 1996), have also been found to influence the
decisions of MNEs with respect to elements of firm strategy such as entry strategy and
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partner choice. Size was measured using the parent’s total sales while leverage was
measured using the difference between total assets and total debt as a percentage of total
assets to control for slack financial resources (Reuer & Ragozzino, 2006). We controlled
for profitability using the parent’s return on assets. We measured experience in terms of
the number of subsidiary years of prior experience in the same host market. Given that a
firm’s status as a service industry constituent has been found to predict its foreign entry
strategies (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2003; Erramilli & Rao, 1993), we employed a dummy
variable to control for industry effects by categorizing firms as either service or nonservice entities. Annual exchange rates for Japanese currency (JPY/USD) were used to
control for temporal effects (Klein & Rosengren, 1994). We controlled for regional
effects (Rugman & Verbeke, 2004) using a dummy variable which we used to distinguish
subsidiaries hosted in Asian countries from subsidiaries established in other regions. Prior
studies have also revealed that the economic, institutional and cultural environment
impacts MNEs’ strategic entry decisions. Host market size was measured using a host
country’s total gross domestic product (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). FDI restrictions in the
host market (Gomes-Casseres, 1990) were measured using data from the Heritage
Foundation’s Investment Freedom Index where a higher score indicates a less restrictive
investment regime. The degree of infrastructure development (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006),
in the host country was based on data from IMD’s World Competitiveness Yearbooks.
The dependent variable was lagged by one year relative to the annual observations with
respect to these covariates. Cultural distance was calculated between Japan and the host
countries using Hofstede’s scores (2001) and Kogut & Singh’s (1988) cultural distance
measure. Skewed control variables (subsidiary size, subsidiary capitalization, parent size
and host market size) were log transformed before we tested our hypotheses (Tabachnick
& Fidell, 2007).

Estimation Methods
To investigate the effects of grand corruption pervasiveness and petty corruption
pervasiveness on a MNE’s foreign entry strategy (nonequity entry versus equity entry),
we executed multinomial logistic regression models in which nonequity entry was
designated as the reference group that was compared to two other possible outcomes in
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the dependent variable (JV or, WOS). The hypotheses pertaining to an MNE’s equity
entry strategy (JV versus WOS) and partnering strategy (traditional JV partnership
versus crossnational JV partnership) were tested using binary logistic regression. While
the regression models in Table 5 test Hypothesis 1 which predicts that MNEs will be
more likely to engage in nonequity entry under the combined effect of more pervasive
grand corruption and petty corruption, the models in Table 6 test Hypotheses 2, 4 and 6
pertaining to both the main effects and interaction effect of grand and petty corruption on
a firm’s equity entry strategy (JV or, WOS). Finally, Table 7 presents the results of the
regression models that were executed to test Hypotheses 3, 5 and 7 with respect to the
main and interaction effects associated with the two dimensions of host market corruption
on an MNE’s partnering strategy. Before investigating the effects of any of the
interaction terms in our models, the focal independent variables (petty corruption and
grand corruption) were centered about the mean (Aiken & West, 1991).

RESULTS
Descriptive statistics for our sample are presented in Table 4. Tables 5, 6 and 7
present the results of the regression estimations conducted in order to test our hypotheses.
Our conclusion that multicollinearity was not a concern in our models is supported by the
fact that all of the variance inflation factor (VIF) scores reported for our models in Tables
5-7 are less than the maximum VIF (10) that is prescribed in global strategy research for
regression analyses (Reuer & Leiblein, 2000). Further, none of the correlations for
variables in the same models exceed the recommended cutoff of 0.70 (Tabachnick &
Fidell, 2007).
In each of Tables 5-7, we first present a base model which excludes the effects of
the focal corruption variables, along with models that introduce the effects associated
with grand and petty corruption.2 Table 5 illustrates the results of the multinomial
logistic regression models that were executed to test Hypothesis 1 pertaining to foreign
2

The regression results reported in Tables 5-7 employ the 80 percent cutoff convention used to distinguish
between JVs and WOSs. The results using the 95 percent cutoff (Yiu & Makino, 2002) were largely
similar, with the primary exceptions being that the interaction effect in Model 1F, the main effect of grand
corruption in Model 3 and the main effect of petty corruption in Model 3C and 3E became non-significant.
In all cases, the focal independent variables became only marginally non-significant. Further, the signs of
each of these coefficients continued to be consistent with our theory.
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TABLE 4
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Variable
1 Foreign entry strategy

a

b

Mean

S.D.

-

-

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

2 Partnering strategy
3 Subsidiary size (log)

-

-

0.91

1.13

0.70

0.32

0.31

4 Subsidiary capitalization (log)

2.29

1.00

0.12

0.11

0.14

5 Parent size (log)

5.23

0.91

0.16

0.11

0.27

0.12

6 Parent profitability (ROA)

0.06

0.08

0.02

0.02

-0.05

-0.05

0.02

7 Parent leverage

0.83

0.12

-0.09

-0.08

-0.11

-0.06

-0.45

0.26

173.94

499.02

0.15

0.12

0.12

0.03

0.58

-0.05

-0.46

-

-

-0.05

-0.07

-0.11

0.00

0.05

-0.03

-0.25

0.12

10 Exchange rate

0.01

0.00

-0.01

-0.02

0.01

0.00

0.01

0.02

0.00

-0.03

-0.01

11 Region dummy

-

-

0.19

0.17

0.20

0.17

-0.05

-0.02

0.03

-0.10

0.03

12 Host market size (log)

3.05

0.55

-0.06

0.01

0.02

-0.07

-0.06

-0.06

-0.06

0.07

0.04

13 Infrastructure development

5.42

1.43

-0.14

-0.10

-0.18

-0.15

-0.13

-0.02

0.07

-0.01

-0.06

8 Parent experience
9 Industry dummy

14 FDI restrictions

5.19

2.57

-0.11

-0.13

-0.20

-0.16

0.00

-0.02

0.02

0.02

-0.09

15 Cultural distance

2.69

0.61

0.01

0.03

-0.01

0.03

0.06

-0.04

-0.04

0.04

0.10

16 Petty corruption

1.92

0.76

0.17

0.17

0.25

0.17

0.09

0.00

-0.06

-0.02

0.08

17 Grand corruption

2.33

0.77

0.09

0.05

0.09

0.07

0.16

0.02

-0.03

0.03

0.02
-0.01

18 Illegal political donations

2.36

1.01

0.05

-0.01

0.02

0.02

0.14

0.02

-0.01

0.02

19 Petty corruption x grand corruption

0.30

0.81

-0.13

-0.09

-0.13

-0.04

0.06

0.00

-0.04

0.06

0.04

20 Petty corruption x illegal political donations

0.18

0.91

-0.10

-0.07

-0.10

0.00

0.08

0.00

-0.06

0.06

0.06

10

11

12

13

14

Variable

15

16

17

18

11 Region dummy

0.04

12 Host market size (log)

0.03

13 Infrastructure development

0.15

-0.11

-0.02

14 FDI restrictions

-0.02

-0.43

-0.29

15 Cultural distance

0.04

0.00

-0.08

0.19

-0.20

16 Petty corruption

-0.05

0.55

0.09

-0.69

-0.59

-0.10

17 Grand corruption

-0.08

0.08

-0.24

-0.61

0.16

-0.35

18 Illegal political donations

-0.05

-0.07

-0.32

-0.45

0.36

-0.38

0.24

0.94

19 Petty corruption x grand corruption

-0.04

-0.25

-0.34

0.28

0.14

0.50

-0.40

-0.29

-0.19

20 Petty corruption x illegal political donations

-0.07

-0.17

-0.34

0.17

0.09

0.54

-0.25

-0.21

-0.18

19

-0.25
0.40

a

Trichotomous dependent variable: Non-equity entry , joint venture or wholly-owned subsidiary .

b

Dichotomous dependent variable: Traditional joint venture or crossnational joint venture .

0.53

Correlations with an absolute value greater than 0.08 are statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level. All are two-tailed tests.

0.96
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TABLE 5
Results of Regression Analyses of Grand Corruption Pervasiveness and Petty Corruption
Pervasiveness on Foreign Entry Strategy

Fore ign Entry Strate gy a
Base Mode l
Variable s
Intercept

Inte raction Effe ct

Inte raction Effe ct

Mode l 1A
Wholly-owne d

Mode l 1B
Joint ve nture

Mode l 1C
Wholly-owne d

Mode l 1D
Joint ve nture

Mode l 1E
Wholly-owne d

Mode l 1F
Joint ve nture

2.77

0.83

2.22

1.61

2.25

1.46

(4.69)

(5.15)

(4.75)

(5.22)

(4.74)

(5.22)

Subsidiary effects
Subsidiary size (log)
Subsidiary capitalization (log)

1.03

(0.28)

-0.07

(0.16)

***

1.69

(0.29)

0.13

(0.17)

***

1.03

(0.28)

-0.07

(0.16)

***

1.68

(0.29)

0.12

(0.17)

***

1.04

(0.28)

-0.07

(0.16)

***

1.68

(0.29)

0.13

(0.17)

***

Parent effects
Parent size (log)

-0.65

(0.21)

Parent profitability (ROA)

2.48

(1.54)

Parent leverage

0.67

(1.32)

Parent experience

0.00

(0.01)

0.99

(0.31)

0.59

(4.87)

-0.69

(0.36)

**

t

-0.41

(0.23)

2.41

(1.98)

-0.38

(1.46)

0.00

(0.01)

0.76

(0.34)

1.03

(5.31)

-1.37

(0.42)

t

**

**

-0.64

(0.21)

-0.38

(0.23)

2.45

(1.54)

2.41

(2.01)

0.77

(1.34)

-0.50

(1.48)

0.00

(0.01)

0.00

(0.01)

0.99

(0.31)

0.73

(0.35)

1.10

(4.91)

0.59

(5.38)

-0.77

(0.47)

-1.04

(0.52)

t

**

**

-0.65

(0.21)

-0.38

(0.23)

2.47

(1.54)

2.42

(2.01)

0.76

(1.33)

-0.49

(1.47)

0.00

(0.01)

0.00

(0.01)

0.99

(0.31)

0.74

(0.35)

t

**

Industry effects
Industry dummy

**

*

**

*

**

*

Temporal effects
Exchange rate

b

113.37 (493.34)

54.69 (539.7)

Region effects
Region dummy

t

***

t

*

-0.82

(0.46)

t

-1.09

(0.52)

*

Country effects
Host market size (log)
Infrastructure development

-0.23

(0.27)

-0.14

(0.31)

0.01

(0.12)

-0.23

(0.13)

-0.15

(0.31)

-0.42

(0.36)

-0.10

(0.31)

-0.37

(0.36)

-0.03

(0.17)

-0.22

(0.19)

-0.01

(0.17)

-0.24

(0.19)

FDI restrictions

-0.09

(0.08)

0.02

Cultural distance

0.39

(0.25)

0.34

(0.09)

-0.06

(0.09)

-0.02

(0.11)

-0.08

(0.09)

0.00

(0.1)

(0.28)

0.31

(0.28)

0.59

(0.32)

0.26

(0.29)

0.56

(0.33)

Petty corruption

0.06

(0.42)

-0.10

(0.46)

-0.04

(0.35)

0.01

(0.39)

Grand corruption

-0.12

(0.35)

0.00

(0.39)
-0.01

(0.22)

-0.01

(0.25)

0.17

(0.21)

-0.39

(0.24)

t

t

t

Main effects

Illegal political donations
Interaction effects
Petty corruption x grand corruption

0.12

(0.25)

-0.52

Petty corruption x illegal political donations
Variance inflation factor range


2

R (R
2

a

(0.28)

t

1.04 - 2.28

1.05 - 5.94

1.05 - 4.31

175.05 ***

190.20 ***

190.46 ***

0.26

0.28 (0.02)

0.28 (0.02)

The reference group in the multinomial logistic regression models is non-equity entry which is compared to two other possible outcomes in the foreign entry strategy dependent
variable: wholly-owned subsidiary and joint venture .
b

-2

Rescaled by a factor of 10 .
n = 727.
t

p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
All are two-tailed tests. Standard errors are in parentheses.

t
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TABLE 6
Results of Regression Analyses of Grand Corruption Pervasiveness and Petty Corruption
Pervasiveness on Equity Entry Strategy

Equity Entry Strate gy
Base Mode l

a

Main Effe cts

Mode l 2A

Mode l 2B

Inte raction Effe cts

Mode l 2C

Mode l 2D

Mode l 2E

Variable s
Intercept

-3.15

(3.24)

0.63

(0.14)

-3.27

(3.29)

0.63

(0.14)

-3.25

(3.29)

0.63

(0.14)

-1.20

(3.32)

0.62

(0.14)

-1.40

(3.32)

0.61

(0.14)

0.21

(0.09)

0.25

(0.14)

Subsidiary effects
Subsidiary size (log)
Subsidiary capitalization (log)

***
*

0.21

(0.09)

0.23

(0.14)

(1.68)

-0.05

(0.96)

-1.07
0.00

(0.01)

(0.23)

0.25

0.46

(3.22)

0.72

(0.31)

0.21

(0.09)

0.23

(0.14)

Parent profitability (ROA)

-0.06

Parent leverage

-1.03
0.00

(0.01)

0.25

***
*

0.21

(0.09)

0.23

(0.14)

(1.68)

-0.05

(0.97)

-1.06
0.00

(0.01)

(0.23)

0.25

0.35

(3.23)

0.74

(0.36)

***
*

***
*

0.20

(0.09)

0.24

(0.14)

(1.68)

0.02

(1.69)

0.01

(1.69)

(0.97)

-1.27

(0.98)

-1.22

(0.97)

0.00

(0.01)

0.00

(0.01)

(0.23)

0.28

(0.24)

0.29

(0.24)

0.35

(3.24)

-0.75

(3.3)

-0.86

(3.31)

0.73

(0.36)

0.30

(0.38)

0.31

(0.37)

***
*

Parent effects
Parent size (log)

Parent experience

t

t

t

t

t

t

t

t

t

t

Industry effects
Industry dummy
Temporal effects
Exchange rate

b

Region effects
Region dummy

*

*

*

Country effects
Host market size (log)
Infrastructure development

0.15

(0.23)

-0.24

(0.09)

FDI restrictions

0.12

(0.06)

Cultural distance

-0.02

(0.18)

**
*

0.18

(0.25)

-0.22

(0.12)

t

0.18

(0.25)

-0.23

(0.12)

t

-0.18

(0.27)

-0.18

(0.27)

-0.20

(0.13)

-0.23

(0.13)

0.10

(0.08)

0.10

(0.07)

0.05

(0.08)

0.10

(0.07)

0.00

(0.19)

0.00

(0.19)

0.30

(0.21)

0.32

(0.21)

Petty corruption

-0.08

(0.29)

-0.04

(0.25)

-0.15

(0.29)

0.05

(0.26)

Grand corruption

0.11

(0.25)

0.11

(0.26)
-0.01

(0.16)

-0.55

(0.16)

t

Main effects

Illegal political donations

0.06

(0.16)

Interaction effects
Petty corruption x grand corruption

-0.64

(0.18)

Petty corruption x illegal political donations
Variance inflation factor range


2


R (R 
2

a
b

1.04 - 2.41

1.04 - 5.88

1.05 - 4.24

1.05 - 5.92

1.06 - 4.24

96.97 ***

97.16***

97.12***

111.83 ***

111.94 ***

0.19

0.19 (0.00)

0.19 (0.00)

0.22 (0.03)

0.22 (0.03)

The dependent variable equity entry strategy is coded as follows: 0: wholly-owned subsidiary; 1: joint venture .
-2

Rescaled by a factor of 10 .
n = 653.

t

***

p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
All are two-tailed tests. Standard errors are in parentheses.

***
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TABLE 7
Results of Regression Analyses of Grand Corruption Pervasiveness and Petty Corruption
Pervasiveness on Partnering Strategy

Partnering Strategy
Base Model

a

Main Effe cts

Mode l 3A

Mode l 3B

Interaction Effects

Model 3C

Model 3D

Mode l 3E

Variables
Intercept

-3.68

(7.02)

-4.21

(7.53)

-4.79

(7.48)

-3.66

(7.49)

-3.35

(7.45)

Subsidiary size (log)

-0.09

(0.29)

-0.20

(0.29)

-0.20

(0.29)

-0.21

(0.29)

-0.21

(0.3)

Subsidiary capitalization (log)

-0.17

(0.19)

-0.20

(0.19)

-0.20

(0.19)

-0.20

(0.19)

-0.20

(0.2)

Subsidiary effects

Parent effects
Parent size (log)

-0.34

(0.28)

-0.36

(0.31)

-0.37

(0.29)

-0.36

(0.29)

-0.37

(0.3)

Parent profitability (ROA)

1.31

(4.14)

2.27

(4.41)

2.24

(4.39)

2.27

(4.39)

2.26

(4.39)

Parent leverage

1.71

(2.18)

1.80

(2.22)

1.72

(2.21)

1.81

(2.22)
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(2.23)
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0.00

(0.01)

0.00

(0.01)

0.00

(0.01)

0.00

(0.01)

0.00

(0.01)

-0.40

(0.53)

-0.49

(0.56)

-0.51

(0.55)

-0.49

(0.56)

-0.50

(0.55)

0.15

(0.69)

0.21

(0.71)

0.26

(0.71)

0.20

(0.72)

0.21

(0.72)

-0.81

(0.68)

-1.71

(0.89)

-1.74

(0.89)

-1.73

(0.94)

-1.92

(0.93)

1.03

(0.55)

0.77

(0.59)

0.75

(0.59)

0.76

(0.61)

0.69

(0.6)

0.01

(0.22)

-0.04

(0.28)

0.00

(0.28)

-0.05

(0.29)

-0.06

(0.3)

FDI restrictions

-0.05

(0.13)

0.24

(0.19)

0.18

(0.18)

0.24

(0.19)

0.19

(0.18)

Cultural distance

-0.14

(0.48)

-0.20

(0.52)

-0.22

(0.52)

-0.18

(0.56)

-0.08

(0.58)

1.83

(0.73)

1.36

(0.64)

1.82

(0.73)

1.39

(0.65)

-0.79

(0.42)

-0.32

(0.56)

Industry effect
Industry dummy
Temporal effects
Exchange rate

b

Region effects
Region dummy

t

*

t

*

Country effects
Host market size (log)
Infrastructure development

t

Main effects
Petty corruption
Grand corruption

-1.31

(0.66)

Illegal political donations

*

*

*

-1.32
-0.72

(0.39)

(0.67)

t

*

*

*
t

Interaction effects
Petty corruption x grand corruption

-0.05

(0.59)

Petty corruption x illegal political donations
Variance inflation factor range


2


R (R 
2

1.06 - 2.85

1.07- 4.42

1.07 - 3.86

1.07 - 4.47

19.60

27.43 *

26.64 **

27.43 *

27.01 *

0.14

0.20 (0.06)

0.19 (0.05)

0.20 (0.06)

0.19 (0.05)

a

1.08 - 3.87

The dependent variable partnering strategy is coded as follows: 0: traditional joint venture (with a host country / local partner); 1: crossnational joint venture (with
a home country partner).

b

-3

Rescaled by a factor of 10 .
n = 211.
t

p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
All are two-tailed tests. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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entry strategy. The results of Models 1D and 1F are both consistent with and lend further
support to the theory and empirical findings of Uhlenbruck et al. (2006) who found that
MNEs were more likely to engage in nonequity-based foreign entry rather than equitybased foreign entry under conditions of more pervasive host market government
corruption. To reiterate, we believe that their broad measure of government corruption
effectively incorporated indicators pertaining to both petty corruption and grand
corruption. As such, we replicated Uhlenbruck et al.’s (2006) results by investigating the
how the interaction between grand corruption and petty corruption impacted upon an
MNE’s choice between nonequity-based and equity-based entry. Model 1D (χ2 = 190.20,
p < 0.001, R2 = 0.28) suggests that MNEs are more likely to engage in nonequity entry
than equity entry via a JV investment when petty corruption interacts with our twoindicator measure of grand corruption (β = -0.52, p < 0.10). Further, Model 1F (χ2 =
190.46, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.28) also suggests that interaction effect between grand and
petty corruption will precipitate an increased likelihood that MNEs will choose
nonequity- over equity-based entry when grand corruption is measured using only the
pervasiveness of illegal political donations in the host market (β = -0.39, p < 0.10).
Notably, the results of Model 1C (β = 0.12, p > 0.05) and Model 1E (β = 0.17, p > 0.05)
indicate that the interaction between grand and petty corruption does not exert a
significant effect upon an MNE’s choice between nonequity-based foreign entry and
equity entry via a WOS. As such, we find partial support for Hypothesis 1.
Table 6 presents the results of the regression models that were executed to test the
hypotheses pertaining to an MNE’s equity entry strategy (JV or, WOS). While the signs
of the coefficients for the main effects of grand and petty corruption in Models 2B and
2C are consistent with our theory, the results indicate that these main effects do not exert
a statistically significant impact upon the choice of equity-based foreign entry mode.
However, the results reported in Model 2D (χ2 = 111.83, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.22) and Model
2E (χ2 = 111.94, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.22), which introduce the interaction effects, indicate
that the combined effect of the two dimensions of government corruption in the host
market is significant. More precisely, the interaction effect in Model 2D (β = -0.64, p <
0.001), in which grand corruption is operationalized as a two-indicator measure, reveals
that the increased likelihood of an MNE engaging in a JV under conditions of more
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pervasive grand corruption is weakened by an increase in the pervasiveness of petty
corruption in the host market environment. Similar results were observed for Model 2E
(β = -0.55, p < 0.001), in which grand corruption is measured using only the
pervasiveness of illegal political donations in the host market. Figure 4 illustrates the
interaction effect between grand and petty corruption pervasiveness on an MNE’s equity
entry strategy (Aiken & West, 1991; Dawson, 2014). The Figure suggests that at lower
levels of petty corruption, MNEs are increasingly likely to engage in a JV in host markets
under conditions of more pervasive grand corruption. However, this likelihood is
diminished as petty corruption becomes more pervasive.
Finally, Table 7 reports the results of our regression analyses with respect to the
main and interaction effects associated with grand and petty corruption upon an MNE’s
partnering strategy. While the interaction effects in Model 3D and Model 3E were not
significant, the results reported for the main effects of grand and petty corruption
pervasiveness in Model 3B (Grand: β = -1.31, p < 0.05; Petty: β = 1.83, p < 0.05; R2 =
0.20), Model 3C (Grand: β = -0.72, p < 0.10; Petty: β = 1.36, p < 0.05; R2 = 0.19), Model
3D (Grand: β = -1.32, p < 0.05; Petty: β = 1.82, p < 0.05; R2 = 0.20) and Model 3E
(Grand: β = -0.79, p < 0.10; Petty: β = 1.39, p < 0.05; R2 = 0.19) were all highly
consistent with our theory. These results support our contention that an increase in the
pervasiveness of grand corruption bolsters the likelihood that an MNE will engage a host
country (local) partner in a traditional JV investment, while an increase in petty
corruption pervasiveness heightens the likelihood that an MNE will engage a home
country partner through a crossnational JV arrangement (if the MNE chooses to invest
through a JV).
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FIGURE 4
Interaction Effect of Grand Corruption Pervasiveness and Petty Corruption
Pervasiveness on Equity Entry Strategy a
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High Petty and Low Petty refer to petty corruption pervasiveness one standard deviation
above and below the mean for petty corruption pervasiveness. Likewise, High Grand and
Low Grand refer to grand corruption pervasiveness one standard deviation above and
below the mean for grand corruption pervasiveness.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Government corruption is a prominent example of an informal institution
operating within a host market’s borders (Calhoun, 2002; Eden & Miller, 2004). Our
work has been motivated by both a theoretical question (Can discrete host market
institutions be conceptualized as pluralistic phenomena?), and an empirical question
pertaining more specifically to the phenomenon of host market government corruption
(Do the different dimensions of government corruption (grand corruption versus petty
corruption) each exert a distinct impact upon the equity-based foreign entry strategies of
MNEs?). In developing this research, we have responded to the enduring challenge posed
by Glynn, Barr and Dacin (2000: 726) whose work reminds scholars of the need to
consciously balance the competing demands of parsimony and accuracy in theorybuilding efforts when they observe that “the focus in much…theorizing is to homogenize
what is essentially a pluralistic world...the result has been to overlook the variety
embedded in plurality…To capture a more accurate and nuanced view of the
world…scholars need to incorporate more explicitly diversity…” Consistent with this
perspective, researchers in the neighboring academic disciplines of economics and law
have cautioned against the development of theory which suggests that firms respond
uniformly to all dimensions of corruption and instead, they contend that different types of
government corruption might have different implications for firm strategy (Søreide,
2009). To this end, institutional theorists have suggested that whereas some “researchers
consider corruption to be just another application of preexisting theories without
sufficiently considering their adequacy...we may fail to understand corruption without
considering its intrinsic dynamics and logic. Applying old theories then falls short of an
adequate understanding of the phenomenon” (Lambsdorff, 2007: 1).
Our work makes a number of conceptual contributions, both through the
introduction of new theory and through the validation of prior theory. First, we have
theorized that discrete informal institutions (such as government corruption) can be
conceptualized as pluralistic phenomena characterized by distinct dimensions that exert
differential impacts on various aspects of an MNE’s equity-based foreign entry strategy.
We have facilitated this extension to IT by synthesizing insights from ISCT which
advocates the recognition of a hierarchy of norms. Leveraging this theory, we concluded
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that the origin of the overarching prohibition against grand corruption is predominantly
global in its orientation, while attitudes and values toward petty corruption vary more
widely across countries. Given this, we proposed that the distinct origins of the norms
pertaining to grand corruption and petty corruption effectively precipitate different types
of uncertainty (environmental and behavioral) for foreign-investing MNEs which, in
turn, motivate MNEs to vary their equity-based entry strategies. More precisely, under
conditions of more pervasive grand corruption, we theorized that the primary source of
uncertainty will be environmental (response) uncertainty, while behavioral uncertainty
will predominate under conditions of heightened petty corruption pervasiveness. As such,
we proposed that the relationship between petty corruption pervasiveness and equitybased foreign entry strategy would be grounded in trust-based mechanisms due to the fact
that petty corruption induces more pronounced behavioral uncertainty in the host market.
Conversely, in the case of grand corruption, learning-based mechanisms should
predominate because grand corruption generates heightened environmental (response)
uncertainty.
Our results reveal that government corruption is, in fact, more nuanced than has
been previously recognized in the literature. We found that an increase in the
pervasiveness of grand corruption and petty corruption precipitated distinctly different
strategic responses from foreign-investing MNEs. More specifically, while the
heightened pervasiveness of grand corruption increased the likelihood that foreigninvesting MNEs would engage in JV investments with host country partners, an increase
in the pervasiveness of petty corruption was found to precipitate the opposite outcome.
Namely, under conditions of more pervasive petty corruption, firms that chose to invest
through a JV were found to be more likely to engage a partner from the foreign-investing
MNE’s home country. Further, an increase in the pervasiveness of petty corruption was
found to reduce the hypothesized increased likelihood that MNEs would invest in JVs
under conditions of more pronounced grand corruption pervasiveness. Our conceptual
disaggregation of the government corruption pervasiveness construct has yielded
empirical results that are theoretically relevant and cast new light on the relationship
between the pervasiveness of corruption in the host market and the equity-based entry
strategies of MNEs. Upon finding that the pervasiveness of government corruption was
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not a statistically significant predictor of an MNE’s equity-based foreign investment
strategy, Uhlenbruck et al. (2006) speculated that the government corruption construct
may be multidimensional. Our work effectively presents evidence in support of their
proposition’s validity.
Second, our finding that the interaction between more pervasive levels of grand
corruption and petty corruption would increase the likelihood that MNEs would choose
nonequity entry over equity-based (joint venture) entry independently replicates the
results proffered by Uhlenbruck et al. (2006). They found that MNEs were more likely to
invest through nonequity modes when government corruption was more pervasive in the
host market. As such, our work provides further empirical support for the theory of
Rodriguez et al. (2005) which first introduced the corruption pervasiveness construct.
Third, while scholars have frequently enlisted the broad notion of institutional
pluralism, their work has primarily focused upon institutional pluralism across
geographic space, highlighting the institutional diversity that exists between countries,
between regions or between the MNE and its expansive subsidiary network. We have
extended this research tradition by examining the concept of institutional pluralism more
narrowly, focusing specifically on the institutional diversity that exists within a discrete
institution that prevails in the host country market. In doing so, we provide the impetus
for further inquiry into the strategic relevance of pluralistic host market institutions, both
formal and informal. Our theory suggests that similarly nuanced strategic responses
might be expected when MNEs encounter equally complex, potentially-pluralistic host
market institutions such as political power which emanates from the local, provincial and
national domains of the host market, as one example (Kozhikode & Li, 2012).
Fourth, by integrating conceptual insights from IT and ISCT to inform our theorybuilding efforts, we have not only advanced the corruption-oriented international
business strategy research agenda, we have also contributed to the business ethics
research domain. More specifically, in Table 1, we identified four questions that had yet
to be resolved with respect to the existence or absence of hyper norms and behavioral
norms pertaining to corruption. Our review of the prevailing legislative standards
pertaining to acts of corruption in the countries that we studied presented evidence that
supports the recognition of the existence of local behavioral norms that prohibit grand
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corruption, as well as local behavioral norms that either permit or prohibit petty
corruption, depending upon the country under consideration. Further, our legislative
review also suggested that a global hypernorm prohibiting petty corruption does not
exist. These findings should be of interest to scholars whose business ethics research
assumes a global focus, particularly given that approximately 80% of worldwide FDI
flows during our period of study terminated in either Japan or one of the 32 host countries
included in our study (UNCTAD, 2004-2007). In this regard, our research supports Doh
et al.’s (2010: 483) contention that “IB (international business) and its disciplinary
antecedents may usefully inform BE (business ethics) research.”
Finally, our work also extends recent theory developed by Sartor and Beamish
(2014) with respect to informal institutions. In their effort to develop a theoretical
framework that could be used to enhance scholars’ comprehension of informal
institutions, they argue that the type of uncertainty precipitated by informal institutions is
central to understanding the impact of these institutions on the organizational control
decisions of foreign-investing MNEs. Motivated by their concern that informal
institutions are frequently aggregated and characterized as being conceptually
synonymous with culture, they disaggregated the informal institutions construct and
proposed that informal institutions should be categorized based on the uncertainty that
they generate – behavioral or environmental (technological or demand). We extend the
scope of their theory by employing it to disaggregate and identify distinct dimensions
(grand corruption and petty corruption) within an informal institution that has
traditionally been recognized as a discrete informal institution (“government
corruption”). More specifically, in explicating the mechanisms behind the relationships
that we hypothesized, we proposed that grand corruption and petty corruption would
generate more pronounced environmental (response) uncertainty and behavioral
uncertainty respectively. Our empirical findings were broadly supportive of this theory.

Limitations and Future Directions
Notwithstanding the contributions that emanate from our work, we acknowledge
several limitations. First, our empirics are based on a sample of firms that originate from
a single home country. Future work should seek to confirm our findings with a sample
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constituted by MNEs that are headquartered in one or more countries other than Japan.
Second, while Rodriguez et al.’s (2005) foundational theory with respect to the
relationship between host market government corruption and the foreign entry strategies
of MNEs introduced theory pertaining to both the pervasiveness and the arbitrariness of
host market corruption, we lacked sufficient data to develop and test theory pertaining to
the arbitrariness of each dimension of corruption that we studied. However, future
research should seek to build and test theory with respect to grand corruption
arbitrariness and petty corruption arbitrariness, focusing particularly on the interaction
between the two constructs, as well as between the pervasiveness and arbitrariness of
both grand and petty corruption.
Our work also poses implications for future research that should be considered
within the domain of corruption-oriented international business scholarship. Following
the stock market collapses in 2000 and 2008, parliamentarians, non-governmental
organizations and business ethicists (Aguilera & Vadera, 2008; Aldrighi, 2009;
Andriyanto, 2011; Argandoña, 2003; Gopinath, 2008) have all become increasingly
concerned with another type of corruption that exists without the involvement of
bureaucrats or government officials – private sector corruption. Notwithstanding the need
to better understand this phenomenon, the work of international business strategy
scholars has continued to focus on public sector corruption (or, government corruption)
to the exclusion of private sector corruption. Our theory pertaining to the pluralistic
nature of discrete host market informal institutions such as corruption provides the
theoretical foundation upon which an even more robust conceptualization of “host market
corruption”, construed more broadly to include private sector corruption, could be
cultivated. Developing theory pertaining to the impact of host market private corruption
on the strategic behavior of foreign-investing MNEs would provide an opportunity to
unpack the corruption pervasiveness concept further. Finally, building on our work
pertaining to a host market’s informal institutions, researchers should also investigate the
prevalence of institutional plurality within the domain of a host market’s formal
institutions. Each of these research endeavors could contribute to ameliorating scholars’
concerns that “pluralism, if undefined and unquestioned, will continue to compromise the
accuracy of organizational theories” (Glynn et al., 2000: 732).
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APPENDIX A
Summary of National Legislative Provisions and Intergovernmental Conventions Used to Evaluate the Existence or Absence of
Laws Either Prohibiting or Permitting Grand Corruption or Petty Corruption Towards Public Sector Officials

Grand Corruption

Pe tty Corruption

Country

Pe rmissible
Towards Dome stic
Public Officials?

Pe rmissible
Towards Fore ign
Public Officials?

Re le vant Legislation

International

No

No

OECD Convention

International

No

No

Argentina
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Brazil

No
No
No
No
No

No
No
No
No
No

Canada

No

No

China

No

No

a

United Nations Convention
b

Against Corruption
National Penal Code
Criminal Code Act
Criminal Code
Criminal Code
Criminal Code
Corruption of Foreign Public
Officials Act; Criminal Code
Criminal Law; Foreign Bribery
Article

Czech Republic

No

No

Criminal Code; Commercial
Code; Accounting Act; Conflict
of Interests Act; Capital
Markets Act

France

No

No

Criminal Act; French Penal
Code; French Code of Criminal
Procedure

a

OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.

b

United Nations Convention Against Corruption.

Pe rmissible
Towards Dome stic
Public Officials?

Pe rmissible
Towards Fore ign
Public Officials?

No

Yes (but policy
change pending)
(Jordan, 2010).

No
No
No
No
No

Defers to national
laws.
No
Yes
No
No
No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

No
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APPENDIX A (continued)

Grand Corruption

Pe tty Corruption

Country

Pe rmissible
Towards Dome stic
Public Officials?

Pe rmissible
Towards Fore ign
Public Officials?

Re le vant Le gislation

Pe rmissible
Towards Dome stic
Public Officials?

Pe rmissible
Towards Fore ign
Public Officials?

Germany

No

No

Criminal Code; EU Corruption
Act; International Corruption
Act

No

No

Hong Kong

No

No

Prevention of Bribery
Ordinance; Local bribery laws.

No

No

Hungary

No

No

Criminal Code

No

No

No

Not explcitly
prohibited by law.

No

Not explcitly
prohibited by law.

India

No

No

Indonesia

No

No

Italy

No

No

Japan

No

No

Prevention of Corruption Act;
Foreign Contribution Regulation
Act; Central Vigilance
Commission Act
Criminal Code; Eradication of
the Criminal Act of Corruption;
Anti-Corruption Law
(forthcoming)
Criminal Code
Penal Code; Unfair
Competitition Prevention Act

No
No

No
Only if the payment
results in illicit gains
to the official.
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Grand Corruption

Pe tty Corruption

Country

Pe rmissible
Towards Dome stic
Public Officials?

Pe rmissible
Towards Fore ign
Public Officials?

Korea

No

No

Luxembourg

No

No

Malaysia

No

No

Mexico

No

No

Netherlands

No

No

New Zealand

No

No

Philippines

No

Not explcitly
prohibited by law.

Poland

No

No

Russia

No

No

Singapore

No

Not explcitly
prohibited by law.

Pe rmissible
Towards Dome stic
Public Officials?

Pe rmissible
Towards Fore ign
Public Officials?

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

Revised Penal Code; Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act

No

Not explcitly
prohibited by law.

Criminal Code

No

No

No

No

No

No

Re le vant Le gislation
Criminal Code; Specific
Economic Crimes Act; AntiCorruption Act;
Penal Code
Malaysian Anti-Corruption
Commission Act; Customs Act;
Anti-Money
Laundering and Anti-Terrorism
Financing Act
Federal Criminal Code; Federal
Law on Administrative
Accountability of Public
Officials
Criminal Code
Crimes Act; Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials Act

Criminal Code; Federal Law on
Counteraction Against
Corruption
Penal Code; Prevention of
Corruption Act
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Grand Corruption

Pe tty Corruption

Country

Pe rmissible
Towards Dome stic
Public Officials?

Pe rmissible
Towards Foreign
Public Officials?

Pe rmissible
Towards Dome stic
Public Officials?

Pe rmissible
Towards Fore ign
Public Officials?

South Africa

No

No

No

No

Spain

No

No

No

No

Switzerland

No

No

No

Yes

Taiwan

No

No

No

No

Thailand

No

Not explcitly
prohibited by law.

Criminal Code

No

Not explcitly
prohibited by law.

United Kingdom

No

No

Bribery Act; Anti-Terrorism,
Crime and Security Act

No

Law is uncertain.

United States

No

No

United States Code (Title 18 Federal Crimes); Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act

No

Yes (facilitation
payments)

Re le vant Legislation
Prevention and Combating of
Corruption Act
Criminal Code
Penal Code; Unfair Competition
Act
Criminal Code; Corruption
Punishment Statute; Money
Laundering Control Act;
Political Donations Act;
Lobbying Act
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CHAPTER 3
Public Corruption, Private Corruption and the Structure of
Equity-Based Foreign Subsidiary Investments in Emerging Markets

INTRODUCTION
While corruption has received considerable attention as an imposing force that
influences the level and global directionality of foreign investment (Cuervo-Cazurra,
2008a; Habib & Zurawicki, 2002), less attention has been given to the impact of
corruption on multinational enterprise (MNE) strategy (Mezias & Mezias, 2010). We
investigate the foreign entry strategies of MNEs under conditions of more pervasive host
market corruption, focusing specifically on the experience of developed market MNEs
that invest in emerging markets. In 2012, foreign direct investment (FDI) flows into
developing economies exceeded the inflows to developed economies for the first time
ever (UNCTAD, 2013). Given the growing prominence of emerging markets as a global
destination for FDI from developed markets (UNCTAD, 2012), and in light of the
endemic nature of corruption in these host markets presumed by both academics (Khanna
& Palepu, 2010; Sharma, 2010) and the business media (Barchfield, 2014), a strong
imperative exists to enhance our comprehension of the impact of corruption upon the
strategic decisions of MNEs that enter into emerging markets (Rodriguez, Siegel,
Hillman, & Eden, 2006).
To date, our understanding of the relationship between corruption and firm
strategy has been characterized as embryonic (Rodriguez et al., 2006) for two principal
reasons. First, although theoretically-motivated studies of corruption have primarily
employed two perspectives - institutional theory (IT) and transaction cost economics
(TCE), more often, corruption-based studies have used an empirically-driven, atheoretical
lens (Judge, McNatt, & Xu, 2010). Second, while scholarly efforts to advance the
conceptualization of corruption have prompted international strategy researchers to focus
on manifestations of public sector corruption (Doh, Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, Collins, &
Eden, 2003; Uhlenbruck, Rodriguez, Doh, & Eden, 2006), international business ethics
scholars have increasingly advocated the need to incorporate considerations of private
sector corruption (Aguilera & Vadera, 2008; Argandoña, 2003; Gopinath, 2008).
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Coincident with this divergence in the stream of corruption research, Rodriguez et al.
(2006: 739) have suggested that “scholarship on corruption would benefit from more
attention to definitions. Corruption is still most commonly defined to preclude private
corruption.”
As such, we build on extant MNE theory that conceptualizes host market
corruption and its impact on MNE strategy in terms of the pervasiveness of corruption
(Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, & Eden, 2005) and we introduce two more explicit latent
constructs – public corruption pervasiveness and private corruption pervasiveness. Our
conceptual work is grounded in recent research within the domain of corruption-oriented
international business scholarship (Sartor, 2014) which has built on the notion of
institutional pluralism or, “the situation faced by an organization that operates within
multiple institutional spheres” (Kraatz & Block, 2008: 243) While international business
research has traditionally focused on the strategic relevance of institutional pluralism
precipitated by the geographic space that exists between countries (Chan & Makino,
2007), between regions (Arregle, Miller, Hitt, & Beamish, 2013) and even between the
MNE and its global network of subsidiaries (Kostova & Roth, 2002), more recently,
researchers have proposed that discrete institutions within a host market can themselves
be characterized as pluralistic institutional phenomena “constituted by distinct
dimensions….which are disparate both in their origin and their impact on the foreign
entry strategy of MNEs” (Sartor, 2014). In finding that an increase in the pervasiveness
of grand corruption and petty corruption precipitated distinctly different strategic
responses from foreign-investing MNEs, Sartor (2014) determined that government
corruption is more nuanced than has been previously recognized in the international
business strategy literature. His results and the associated theory lend support to the
proposition advanced by Uhlenbruck et al. (2006: 411) who suggested that their own nonsignificant findings with respect to the relationship between government corruption and
MNE strategy might be attributable to “underlying constructs behind (government
corruption) pervasiveness that have conflicting effects on the firm’s choice between joint
venture and wholly-owned subsidiary.”
Building on this theoretical foundation, and motivated by Uhlenbruck et al.’s
(2006: 411) suggestion that “further exploration of the institutional underpinnings of the
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pervasiveness of corruption is an important…step for corruption researchers”, we
develop more fine-grained theory to further extend the conceptualization of corruption
pervasiveness. Moreover, we employ our theory to introduce new insights into the
relationship between host market corruption (which we conceptualize as including both
public sector corruption and private sector corruption) and the equity-based entry
strategies of foreign-investing MNEs. To do so, we focus on explicating the theoretical
mechanism that substantiates our expectation that each dimension of corruption (public
and private) will exert a disparate impact on the strategies of foreign-investing MNEs.
More specifically, we draw upon the research tradition in which a MNE’s foreign market
entry and ongoing operations have been conceptualized in terms of its bargaining power
in the host country (Fagre & Wells Jr, 1982; Kobrin, 1987). Subsequent conceptual
advances in bargaining power theory by joint venture and alliance scholars have extended
this theory to elaborate two primary types of bargaining power (Ren, Gray, & Kim, 2009;
Yan & Gray, 2001). While context-based bargaining power focuses on the power that an
MNE derives from possessing outside alternatives during a negotiation, resource-based
bargaining power focuses on the power that an MNE obtains from both its financial and
noncapital resources. When MNEs enter into foreign markets, they routinely engage in
both public sector transactions (or, transactions with the government) and private sector
transactions (transactions with private entities, companies and individuals) (Teegen, Doh,
& Vachani, 2004). We propose that the primary type of bargaining power upon which an
MNE relies may differ for its public sector transactions and its private sector transactions.
More precisely, we theorize that an MNE’s reliance on different sources of bargaining
power functions as the mechanism through which public corruption and private
corruption impact upon the foreign entry strategy of the MNE. Consequently, despite the
fact that we anticipate that the two types of corruption will be highly correlated, we
expect that MNEs will employ different entry strategies under conditions of more
pronounced public versus private corruption pervasiveness in foreign host markets.
Employing these two new corruption constructs, we explore the impact of
heightened host market corruption upon three foreign market entry decisions considered
by an MNE – its foreign entry strategy, equity entry strategy and partnering strategy. Our
theory predicts that when public corruption in the host market is more pervasive, MNEs
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will be more likely to enter through a joint venture (JV) with a host country partner,
rather than a home country partner. Conversely, heightened private corruption
pervasiveness will precipitate entry via a wholly-owned subsidiary (WOS). Further, given
that public and private corruption are widely regarded as existing simultaneously in host
markets (Rodriguez et al., 2006), we theorize that the interaction effect between both
types of corruption should result in an MNE’s preference for shared ownership with host
country partners under conditions of heightened public corruption pervasiveness being
moderated by an increase in the pervasiveness of private corruption.
In addition to refining the conception of corruption to incorporate both its public
and private sector dimensions, our empirical analysis provides support for and extends
extant theory pertaining to the relationship between host market corruption and firm
strategy (Rodriguez et al., 2005). Further, by focusing on the role of a firm’s bargaining
power in shaping its strategic foreign entry decisions under conditions of more pervasive
host market corruption, our work contributes to efforts to more closely integrate market
and nonmarket strategy research. More specifically, we draw attention to an important
theoretical mechanism that could also be used to bridge the institutionally-oriented and
resource-oriented perspectives that have been advocated by strategy theorists as a means
to enhance our understanding of the strategic relevance of contemporary nonmarket
phenomena such as corruption (Doh, Lawton, & Rajwani, 2012).

LITERATURE REVIEW
Conceptualizing Corruption: Public and Private Corruption Pervasiveness
Extant research in economics, law and political science (Bardhan, 1997;
Oldenburg, 1987; Treisman, 2000) has defined corruption as the abuse of public power or
public office for private benefit. While the received definition of corruption is
parsimonious, it has limited the scope of strategy-based inquiry to purely public realms
(Argandoña, 2003; Gopinath, 2008; Husted, 1994). The failure to incorporate
considerations of private sector corruption into strategy scholarship risks muting the
more fine-grained insights that can be garnered by corruption-oriented research
(Milliken, 1987). In this regard, our efforts to theoretically and empirically extend the
construct to include private sector corruption are motivated, in part, by Kurer (2005) who
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has lamented the lack of theoretical progress in defining and measuring corruption during
the past 40 years.
Given that “corruption involves expropriating what rightfully belongs to others”
(Uslaner, 2005: 77), we conceptualize corruption as an informal institutional constraint
that undermines property rights (Eden & Miller, 2004; North, 1990) and heightens the
degree of uncertainty encountered by internationalizing MNEs (Miller, 1992). Informal
institutional pluralism is a concept that has been developed to describe the properties of
informal institutions that have been traditionally recognized as discrete institutions within
a host market (such as “corruption”). More specifically, pluralistic informal institutions
are informal institutions in host markets that are constituted by distinct dimensions which
are disparate both in their origin and their impact on the foreign entry strategy of MNEs
(Sartor, 2014). Our research focuses on two distinct dimensions of corruption that
emanate from two disparate sectors in the host market institutional environment – the
public sector and the private sector.
We build on Aguilera and Vadera’s (2008) broader conceptualization of
corruption (the abuse of authority for personal gain) to define public corruption as the
abuse of public authority or trust for personal gain, and private corruption as the abuse
of private authority or trust for personal gain. Using these definitions, we extend prior
theory that conceptualizes host market corruption in terms of its pervasiveness to
introduce two new latent constructs – public corruption pervasiveness which we define as
the average firm’s likelihood of encountering corruption in its normal interactions with
public officials (Rodriguez et al., 2005: 385), and private corruption pervasiveness (the
average firm’s likelihood of encountering corruption in its normal interactions with
private entities, companies and individuals).
In support of our theory’s face validity and to ensure that our theorizing is
relevant to practice, we align our decomposition of the corruption construct with the
policy orientation of international legislative initiatives (Argandoña, 2003). The United
Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) (2004) has encouraged its member
states to enact national criminal legislation designed to prohibit the most rampant forms
of both “private sector corruption” and “public sector corruption.” As one example of the
commitment to the UNCAC’s recognition of the importance of private sector corruption,
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the United Kingdom’s recently enacted Bribery Act (2010) implicitly prohibits payments
that induce improper performance by individuals employed in the private sector, in
addition to prescribing penalties for acts of public sector corruption, including bribing
either domestic or foreign public officials and government employees. At the same time,
Transparency International (2009a) has also begun to decompose corruption on a
sectorial basis. In defining “corruption”, it has recently suggested that corruption should
be classified on the basis of the sector (public or private) within which it occurs.
Notably, when compared to the task of defining corruption, measuring the
institution has proven to be more difficult (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008b) due to the need to
rely on perceptual measures. While data with respect to the perceived level of public
sector corruption in host markets is widely available (Svensson, 2005), private sector
corruption continues to be under-researched by management scholars, primarily due to a
dearth of information and aggregate data with respect its constituent elements
(Argandoña, 2003; Faria, Morales, Pineda, & Montesinos, 2012). Despite these
challenges, in order to study private sector corruption, our research conceptualizes the
phenomenon in terms of the prevalence of insider trading, tax evasion and organized
crime or racketeering in host markets. Economists, finance scholars and legal theorists
have explicitly recognized insider trading (Argandoña, 2003; Mills & Weisberg, 2007),
tax evasion (Christensen, 2011) and racketeering or organized crime (Rose-Ackerman,
1999) as manifestations of private sector corruption. Racketeering is a legal term
encompassing a range of corrupt activities found to occur in the private sector, including
the payment of bribes to the employees of potential customers to secure contracts
(“kickbacks”), extortion and the embezzlement of property in the private sector (Beare,
2007), activities that have been highlighted as some of the most prevalent forms of
private sector corruption by the UNCAC (2004). Historically, countries have enacted
anti-racketeering laws to combat the existence of organized crime. However, beginning
in the 1980s (Bratton & Levitin, 2012), the purview of anti-racketeering laws has been
extended to encompass a wider range of corrupt activities occurring in the private sector
(Cove, 1983). As recent examples, racketeering laws have been employed to prosecute
several publicly-traded MNEs, including a pharmaceutical company for fraudulent
marketing and an oil and gas corporation for misleading its investors (Coppola &
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DeMarco, 2012), as well as a global investment bank for manipulating interest rates
(Scheiner & Broda, 2012). Therefore, despite the data-driven challenges to date
associated with operationalizing the private sector corruption construct (Argandoña,
2003; Faria et al., 2012), we contend that the prevalence of racketeering-associated
activities such as kickbacks and embezzlement, as well as insider trading and tax evasion
in host markets provide an appropriate indication of the pervasiveness of private
corruption pervasiveness within a country.

THEORY AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Entering Foreign Markets: Institutions and Bargaining Power
Strong institutions and legal rules are designed to reduce uncertainty and facilitate
efficient exchange (North, 1990). Emerging markets have been characterized as having
relatively weaker institutional environments (Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson, & Peng,
2005). When a host market’s formal institutions are weak, institutional voids form
(North, 1990) which may be filled by informal institutions such as corruption (Puffer,
McCarthy, & Boisot, 2010). In fact, corruption is more rampant in emerging markets
primarily due to ineffective institutional systems (Doh et al., 2003). Our theory is
impartial with respect to whether MNEs will prefer to partake in, or avoid, acts of public
corruption and private corruption in host foreign markets. Prior research has advanced
arguments that favor both perspectives on the propensity and willingness of MNEs to
initiate or participate in foreign market corruption. While engaging in corruption may be
strategically advantageous to some MNEs (Boddewyn, 1988; Boddewyn & Brewer,
1994), potential legal ramifications (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008b), moral apprehension
(Robertson & Watson, 2004) and adverse financial effects (Wei, 2000) operate as potent
disincentives to corrupt behavior.
Either way, heightened levels of corruption operate as an informal institutional
constraint that exacerbates information asymmetries (Argandoña, 2005; Calhoun, 2002),
reduces trust (Uslaner, 2008) and undermines legal contract enforcement (Lambsdorff,
2002b), all of which increase the risks and costs associated with entering into and
operating within more corrupt host market environments (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, &
Wright, 2000; Williamson, 1985). Despite these heightened risks and costs, MNEs are
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not always willing or able to defer investment in these countries (Bray, 2005; Doh et al.,
2003). Our theory proposes to explain how the structure of equity-based foreign
subsidiary investments is impacted by the pervasiveness of public corruption and private
corruption in host markets. When an MNE enters into a market characterized by higher
levels of corruption, it can be expected to structure its investment in a manner that is
designed to attenuate information asymmetries in order to reduce the uncertainty and
costs associated with its ongoing operations in that country (Brouthers, 2002; Rodriguez
et al., 2005). An MNE’s ongoing operations in a host country will be constituted by both
its public sector transactions (or, transactions with the government) and its private sector
transactions (transactions with private entities, companies and individuals) (Teegen et al.,
2004). The tradition of conceptualizing an MNE’s foreign entry and ongoing operations
as a negotiation or bargain between the MNE and the host country (Fagre & Wells Jr,
1982; Kobrin, 1987) has persisted in contemporary international business strategy
research pertaining to host market corruption. Business ethicists and corruption scholars
who work at the intersection of IT and TCE in order to advance the anti-corruption
research agenda have studied the relationship between firms and governments by drawing
upon elements of bargaining power theory. An MNE’s bargaining power has been found
to dictate its ability to successfully manage the risks and costs associated with operating
in increasingly corrupt host markets (Lee, Oh, & Eden, 2010).
Bargaining power has been defined as the ability of one party to influence a
negotiation in its own favor (Argyres & Liebskind, 1999). Alliance scholars studying the
relationship between bargaining power and the distribution of management control in JVs
have proposed that an MNE’s bargaining power derives from two different sources.
Context-based bargaining power is a function of the stakes (or, the bargainer’s
dependence on the outcome of a negotiation), as well as the availability of alternatives
(or, “other parties with whom to negotiate or, other channels through which to
accomplish the same mission that is to be achieved”) (Yan & Gray, 1994: 1492). An
MNE that is less dependent upon the outcome of a bargain and that has more alternatives
available to it enjoys greater context-based bargaining power, while an MNE that is more
dependent upon the outcome of a particular negotiation by virtue of a lack of alternatives
wields less context-based bargaining power (Inkpen & Beamish, 1997). Resource-based
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bargaining power is a function of both a negotiator’s capital-based bargaining power
(power attributable to a bargainer’s financial or physical assets) and its noncapital-based
bargaining power (power attributable to a bargainer’s tacit resources such as local
knowledge and expertise, political clout or relational networks) (Yan & Gray, 2001).
Notably, if an MNE experiences a deficiency in its context-based bargaining power, it
will be more difficult for the firm to achieve its goals and, consequently, the firm will be
more likely to engage in strategic decisions that are designed to increase its resourcebased bargaining power (Ren et al., 2009). Consistent with this perspective, in order to
attenuate the costs of opportunism associated with transacting with government officials
in more corrupt countries, firms have been found to engage in strategies designed to
enhance the firm’s power (Lambsdorff, 2002a).

Public Corruption Pervasiveness: Equity Entry Strategy (JV or WOS) and
Partnering Strategy (Home or Host)
MNEs with operations in emerging markets routinely report pressure from
government officials to engage in corrupt transactions (Spencer & Gomez, 2011). As
such, when an MNE enters into increasingly corrupt host markets, it will endeavor to
structure its subsidiary investments in a manner that attenuates the information
asymmetries that it expects to encounter in its ongoing public sector transactions
(Brouthers, 2002; Rodriguez et al., 2005). We theorize that under conditions of more
pervasive public corruption, the firm’s resources are likely to be a more prominent
source of bargaining power in its public sector transactions, when compared to the
bargaining power that the firm derives from its context (or, other alternatives). Prior
research has found that when a host government is involved in a negotiation, an MNE’s
alternatives can become significantly restricted (Yan & Gray, 1994). Indeed, the tradition
of conceptualizing an MNE’s foreign entry and ongoing operations as a negotiation or
bargain between the MNE and the host country’s government has resulted in extensive
scholarly attention being given to framing an MNE’s resources and capabilities as its
primary source of bargaining power when negotiating with the government (Moon &
Lado, 2000). This is because when an MNE enters into a foreign market, it often
possesses a constrained range of alternatives with respect to the issues that it needs to
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resolve or the resources that it needs to secure through transactions and negotiations with
the government (i.e., procurement contracts, licenses, utilities, customs clearances, tax
abatements and favorable regulatory rulings or judicial decisions) (Boddewyn, 1988;
Rose-Ackerman, 1997). In these situations, we would expect that an MNE which is
motivated to commence operations in the host market will expect to be relatively
dependent upon the outcome of these ongoing transactions and negotiations. Taken
together, this suggests that in the case of public sector transactions, an MNE is less likely
to possess the degree of context-based bargaining power that it needs to reduce more
pronounced information asymmetries in increasingly corrupt host markets. Consequently,
the MNE can be expected to engage in efforts to increase its resource-based bargaining
power (Ren et al., 2009). More precisely, we believe that efforts to augment an MNE’s
noncapital-based bargaining power through the addition of resources such as local
knowledge and relational networks represents an important opportunity to reduce the
heightened information asymmetries that it may encounter during the course of its public
sector transactions in increasingly corrupt host markets.
Public corruption can be highly unpredictable, given that government officials
possess the power to change policies and procedures at any time (Lambsdorff, 2002b). As
such, an equity partner can enhance the resource-based bargaining power of the MNE and
assist efforts to lessen the information asymmetries that the MNE encounters in its public
sector transactions in at least three important ways. First, a partner can reduce or even
eliminate the need for the MNE to interact with the government directly (Doh et al.,
2003). Second, the MNE can access the partner’s knowledge of the local environment
(Tsang, 2002). More specifically, an equity partner can teach the MNE how to bargain
with government agents more effectively (Rodriguez et al., 2005). Finally, a partner can
provide an MNE with access to local networks (Meyer, Wright, & Pruthi, 2009).
Inclusion in these networks enhances the bargaining power of the MNE because the
repeated transactions and reputation that characterize these networks are resources that
can be leveraged to contain the costs associated with bargaining with government
officials in more corrupt host markets (Lambsdorff, 2002a).
In addition to determining whether to structure these subsidiary investments as JVs
or WOSs, foreign MNEs must also determine whether to invest with host country (local)
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partners, home country partners or third country partners (Makino & Beamish, 1998). A
major risk associated with local partners in more corrupt host markets is that they may
cheat, expose the foreign firm to blackmail or, cause the foreign firm to overpay in
corrupt transactions (Bray, 2005). However, local partners can also enhance the resourcebased bargaining power of MNEs in ways that foreign partners cannot. Relying on a local
partner’s knowledge of corrupt institutions prevailing in the host country can position a
foreign-investing firm to reduce its transaction costs (Meschi, 2009). Local partners can
help with local knowledge and local access once the MNE enters into the host country,
both of which are critical factors that contribute to the improved performance of a JV
(Makino & Beamish, 1998). This is because local partners enjoy a more precise
knowledge of and intimate familiarity with the host market’s bureaucratic stakeholders
and business networks (Meschi, 2009). A local partner is more socially embedded in the
host market’s business culture and, as such, these trusted social relationships can be
employed to attenuate information asymmetries (Lambsdorff, 2002b). Given that the host
government and local firms are more culturally similar relative to the degree of cultural
similarity between the government and foreign firms, host firms enjoy an advantage over
these foreign firms because they have a better understanding of the nature and culture of
public corruption in the host market (Calhoun, 2002). As such, given the lower level of
context-based bargaining power that the MNE is likely to exercise under conditions of
more pervasive public corruption in the host market, the benefits associated with
enhancing the firm’s resource-based bargaining power through efforts to engage a local
JV partner are expected to outweigh the risks of partnering. Accordingly, we hypothesize
that,
Hypothesis 1: A foreign-investing MNE is more likely to invest through a
JV with a host country (local) partner under conditions of heightened
public corruption pervasiveness.
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Private Corruption Pervasiveness: Equity Entry Strategy (JV or WOS) and
Partnering Strategy (Home or Host)
We theorize that in the case of its private sector transactions within a host
country, the firm’s context or, the availability of alternatives within the host country, is
likely to be a more prominent source of bargaining power than it is in the case of its
public sector transactions. While it is possible that an MNE might encounter private
sector monopolies when executing some of its private sector transactions, a host market’s
private sector tends to offer a broad range of counterparties with whom a firm may
transact, including suppliers, customers, employees and other private sector stakeholders
(Calhoun, 2002). Expanded bargaining alternatives provide the MNE with an important
source of context-based bargaining power in host markets characterized by more
pervasive private corruption. While we have proposed that partnering can enhance the
MNE’s efforts to reduce information asymmetries under conditions of more pervasive
public corruption, we theorize that the MNE will not be compelled to engage a partner
when private corruption is more pervasive. This is because the MNE’s ability to
negotiate with multiple private sector counterparts in the host market will provide the
MNE with an opportunity to reduce information asymmetries on its own, without having
to share ownership or profits. Seeking information and generating alternatives can
improve a party’s bargaining position and the outcome of its transactions by reducing
information asymmetries (Kim, Pinkley, & Fragale, 2005). When information
asymmetries are lower, the MNE’s transactions will be more open and competitive such
that special safeguards, including partnering, are less useful or necessary (Husted, 1994).
Furthermore, since corruption fosters information asymmetries, it also positions
local partners to take advantage of foreign partners (Doh et al., 2003). In fact, weak legal
institutions in emerging markets have been found to stimulate partner opportunism (Luo,
2007). Partners that are more embedded in local networks tend to be approached more
frequently by corrupt agents and are more inclined to comply with their demands
(Meschi, 2009) which would effectively undermine an MNE’s context-based bargaining
power in its private sector transactions. As such, the MNE would have less control over
corrupt negotiations and thus, the MNE may continue to be exposed to the risks and costs
of information asymmetries as it is pressured by local partners to comply outright with
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corrupt overtures in the private sector (Bray, 2005). As such, given that the MNE can
expect that its context-based bargaining power in the private sector will provide it with an
opportunity to attenuate more pronounced information asymmetries that exist under
conditions of more pervasive private corruption, there may be fewer benefits for the
MNE to gain in exposing itself to the potential risks and costs that may result from
partnering. As such, we hypothesize that,
Hypothesis 2: A foreign-investing MNE is more likely to invest through a
WOS under conditions of heightened private corruption pervasiveness.
The Interaction Between Public Corruption Pervasiveness and Private Corruption
Pervasiveness
Public and private corruption are not mutually exclusive in host country
environments (Husted, 1994). In fact, Rodriguez et al. (2006: 739) maintain that “it is
clear that government corruption and private corruption often go hand in hand.” Our
conceptual disaggregation of the host market corruption construct into its public and
private components, in addition to our theory regarding the distinct impact of each upon
MNE entry strategy, implicitly suggests the possibility that an interaction effect between
the two types of corruption may influence the entry decisions of MNEs that invest in
more corrupt host emerging markets.
Doh et al. (2003) has argued that heightened government corruption in emerging
markets should motivate an MNE to engage a local JV partner rather than investing
through a WOS because local partners can help MNEs to learn how to mitigate the risks
of host market corruption. Subsequent conceptual work has proposed the opposite
outcome, namely, that more pronounced government corruption would increase the
likelihood that an MNE would enter into an emerging market via a WOS rather than with
a local JV partner (Rodriguez et al., 2005; Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). The authors
suggested that, not only do partners not reduce the costs of confronting corruption but,
local partners might take advantage of foreign firms by exploiting the local firm’s more
extensive experience with weak institutions. Collectively, this research highlights a
tension in the literature with respect to perceptions regarding the utility versus the
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riskiness of local partners in emerging markets under conditions of heightened public
sector corruption.
We suggest that host market corruption is more nuanced than previously
recognized. We have hypothesized that more pervasive public corruption in the host
market will increase the likelihood that MNEs will invest via JVs with local partners,
while more pervasive private corruption will prompt MNEs to invest through WOSs.
Paradox theorists have noted that when a firm engages in decisions with respect to how to
structure its operations, contradictory pressures on the firm become increasingly salient
(Smith & Lewis, 2011). The conflicting demands of public corruption and private
corruption in the host market complicate an MNE’s efforts to devise its foreign entry
strategy and illuminate competing concerns with respect to the utility and the riskiness of
local partners in more corrupt host markets.
Ultimately, we believe that an MNE will resolve these opposing pressures
associated with its foreign entry strategy by considering the implications for its
bargaining power in the host market and its ability to reduce information asymmetries.
While transaction cost theorists have traditionally assumed that firms are risk neutral
(Williamson, 1985), scholars have subsequently proposed that a firm’s decisions with
respect to its governance are based upon variable risk preferences and the firm’s
perceptions pertaining to the trustworthiness of a prospective partner (Chiles &
McMackin, 1996). While we have theorized that a local JV partner may improve the
MNE’s noncapital resource-based bargaining power under conditions of heightened
public corruption, we have not theorized that the decision to retain full ownership (WOS)
under heighted public corruption would further undermine the MNE’s resource-based
bargaining power in its public sector transactions. Conversely, under conditions of
heightened private corruption, we have explicitly theorized that the decision to take on a
local partner does risk undermining the MNE’s context-based bargaining power and, as
such, the MNE will be more likely to retain full ownership (WOS) upon entering into the
host emerging market. Our theory is consistent with both Rodriguez et al.’s (2005) and
Uhlenbruck et al.’s (2006) base contention that local partners threaten to exploit the
MNE’s foreignness in more corrupt host market environments. These concerns are wellfounded in light of recent findings that JV partners in emerging markets are more
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opportunistic when legal institutions are weaker (Luo, 2007). As such, an increase in the
pervasiveness of private corruption is expected to negatively moderate the likelihood that
an MNE will engage in a JV with a local partner under conditions of more pervasive
public corruption. Accordingly, we hypothesize that,
Hypothesis 3: The positive relationship between public corruption
pervasiveness and the likelihood that a foreign-investing MNE will invest
through a JV with a host country (local) partner is weakened as private
corruption pervasiveness increases.
Public Corruption, Private Corruption and Foreign Market Entry Strategy
(Nonequity or Equity Entry)
While firms may consider deferring entry into foreign markets characterized by
more pervasive corruption, an MNE is not always willing or able to defer investment in
these countries, particularly when its competitors are not deferring entry (Bray, 2005;
Doh et al., 2003). The unprecedented growth in the prominence of emerging markets as a
global destination for FDI provides anecdotal evidence in support of this position
(UNCTAD, 2013). Consequently, firms may choose to implement alternative measures to
manage the risks and costs associated with investments in more corrupt foreign markets.
Among the most prominent alternative measures, firms have been found to adjust their
entry mode, implement anti-corruption corporate codes of conduct, provide anticorruption training to both expatriate employees and local market employees, as well as
engaging in social contributions or public donations in the host country that are designed
to forestall corrupt overtures from public officials (Doh et al., 2003).
Although our research focuses on the equity-based entry strategies of foreigninvesting MNEs, we recognize that some MNEs may choose to engage in nonequity
modes of entry into more corrupt emerging market countries. Indeed, extant theory has
proposed that under conditions of more pervasive host market corruption, foreigninvesting MNEs from a home country with anti-corruption laws will be more likely to
engage in nonequity modes of entry which involve a local agent producing or distributing
the MNE’s good or services in the host country (Rodriguez et al., 2005). Subsequent
efforts to empirically validate this proposition found that an increase in the pervasiveness
of government corruption in host emerging markets heightens the likelihood that MNEs
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will

choose

nonequity

modes

(arm’s-length

or

contract-based

modes

of

internationalization such as management contracts and turnkey projects) over equity
modes of entry (JV and WOS) (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). Further, when government
corruption was disaggregated into grand corruption and petty corruption, although the
main effects associated with each type of corruption did not exert a statistically
significant impact on the choice between nonequity- and equity-based entry, the
interaction between more pervasive grand and petty corruption did precipitate an
increased likelihood that MNEs would choose nonequity- over equity-based (JV) entry
(Sartor, 2014). By extension, although public and private corruption are distinct
dimensions constituting the host market corruption phenomenon, the interaction between
both types of corruption could also be expected to prompt MNEs to prefer nonequity
entry over equity entry. Accordingly, we hypothesize that,
Hypothesis 4: The interaction of public corruption pervasiveness and
private corruption pervasiveness increases the likelihood that a foreign
entrant will engage in nonequity entry.
METHODS
Data Sources and Key Variables
Our work endeavors to explain how the structure of equity-based foreign
subsidiary investments is impacted by the pervasiveness of public corruption and private
corruption in host emerging markets. As such, our hypotheses were tested with a sample
of 665 subsidiaries established in 16 emerging market countries.1 This sample of market
entries was taken from the 1998-2005 editions of the Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyou Souran
which reports on the worldwide investment activity of Japanese MNEs. To ensure that
our observations with respect to the dependent variable were lagged by one year relative
to the observations with respect to our measures of public and private corruption in the
host markets, the starting date for our study period was 1998 because 1997 was the first

1

The number of subsidiary investments in each host country is indicated in brackets: Argentina (2), Brazil
(11), China (424), Czech Republic (12), Hungary (6), India (17), Indonesia (19), Korea (53), Malaysia (15),
Mexico (8), Philippines (15), Poland (7), Russia (4), South Africa (5), Thailand (65), Turkey (2). Host
countries were identified as “emerging markets” based upon the definition utilized by Michigan State
University’s Center for International Business Education and Research (CIBER) which has published an
annual Market Potential Index for Emerging Markets covering the period 1996-2013.
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year for which some of the indicators were available to measure the private corruption
construct using the data sources that we describe below. The end date for our study
period (2005) was determined by similar limitations on the availability of data.
Motivated by Rodriguez et al.’s (2005) conceptualization of corruption in terms of
its pervasiveness, our measures for the focal independent variables in our study (public
corruption and private corruption pervasiveness) were derived from data which provide
an indication of the degree to which public and private sector corruption are a “regular
and meaningful part of commercial activity in a given country” (Rodriguez et al., 2005:
385). Researchers have acknowledged that levels of corruption vary significantly among
emerging market countries (Gray & Kaufmann, 1998; Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). The
development of our independent variables is informed, in part, by extant studies that have
been conducted to test the foundational conceptual framework within the realm of
corruption-oriented

international

business

research

(Rodriguez

et

al.,

2005),

notwithstanding the fact that these prior studies have yielded mixed results. More
specifically, Uhlenbruck et al. (2006) did not find a statistically significant relationship
between host market corruption and the equity-based entry strategies (JV versus WOS) of
developed market MNEs that entered into emerging markets. However, disaggregating
“government corruption” into grand corruption and petty corruption, Sartor (2014)
hypothesized that MNEs would be more likely to engage in JVs under conditions of more
pervasive grand corruption, and WOSs when petty corruption was more pervasive in
both developed and emerging host markets. Subjecting these hypotheses to empirical
scrutiny, they found that an increase in the pervasiveness of petty corruption attenuated
the hypothesized increased likelihood that MNEs would invest in JVs under conditions of
more pronounced grand corruption pervasiveness. The mixed results generated by these
two studies are surprising in light of Spencer and Gomez’s (2011) recent emerging
market-based findings which revealed the existence of a positive relationship between the
level of host country corruption and the pressure that foreign subsidiaries face to engage
in corruption in emerging markets.
We speculate that there may be at least two possible reasons why Sartor (2014)
finds that government corruption (or, the interaction between grand and petty corruption)
exerts a statistically significant impact on an MNE’s choice between JV and WOS, while

87
Uhlenbruck et al.’s (2006) finds a non-significant relationship. First, consistent with the
recommendation of Uhlenbruck et al. (2006: 411), Sartor (2014) theoretically
decomposes government corruption (which has traditionally been conceptualized as a
discrete institution) into two distinct dimensions (grand and petty corruption). Second,
each study employs a different data source to measure government corruption. While
Uhlenbruck et al. (2006) operationalize government corruption pervasiveness using data
from the World Business Environment Survey (WBES), Sartor’s (2014) dual measures of
pervasiveness employ data from the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness
Reports (GCR).
Accordingly, consistent with the work of Spencer and Gomez (2011), we employ
a broader-based measure of host market public corruption which is based upon multiple
data sources (including the GCR) and has been found to be very highly correlated with
the WBES (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). More precisely, we measured public corruption
pervasiveness using Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI).
The CPI provides a comprehensive measure of the perceived level of public corruption in
countries around the world. Collected since the mid-1990’s, the Index is arguably the
most widely used indicator of host market public sector corruption by industry executives
and government officials (Svensson, 2005), as well as by academics who have regularly
employed the CPI to measure public corruption in international business and strategic
management research (see, as examples, Brouthers, Gao, & McNicol, 2008; Chen, Ding,
& Kim, 2010; Steensma, Tihanyi, Lyles, & Dhanaraj, 2005).
Although aggregate data with respect to the perceived level of private corruption
in host countries does not currently exist in the form of a comprehensive index similar to
the CPI (Faria et al., 2012), Transparency International (2009b) has recommended that
the measurement of private corruption should incorporate a consideration of activities
such as insider trading, tax evasion, corporate embezzlement and commercial bribery
(‘kickbacks’). Insider trading has been explicitly recognized as an act of private
corruption in which corporate insiders with preferential access to corporate information
through their position of authority act on this information to the detriment of other
stakeholders (Aldrighi, 2009; Argandoña, 2003; Mills & Weisberg, 2007). Tax evasion
generally involves the under-reporting of income, or the over-reporting of expenses, and
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has been affiliated with other instances of private sector corruption such as corporate
fraud and embezzlement (Argandona, 1999). This is because tax offences are
“intrinsically linked with other (private sector) financial crimes…such as…investment
fraud, extortion...(and) embezzlement” (OECD, 2013: 7). In fact, high levels of tax
evasion have been associated with more pronounced levels of corruption (Uslaner, 2007).
Racketeering is a legal term that subsumes a wide range of corrupt activities found to
occur in the private sector, including the payment of bribes to the employees of potential
customers to secure contracts (‘kickbacks’), extortion and the embezzlement of property
in the private sector (Beare, 2007). These activities have been highlighted as some of the
most prevalent forms of private sector corruption by the United Nations Convention
Against Corruption (2004). Historically, countries have enacted anti-racketeering laws to
combat the existence of organized crime. However, beginning in the 1980s (Bratton &
Levitin, 2012), the purview of anti-racketeering laws has been extended to encompass a
wider range of corrupt activities occurring in the private sector, including the
manipulation of interest rates (Scheiner & Broda, 2012) and misleading investors
(Coppola & DeMarco, 2012), to name a few.
Accordingly, in order to develop a measure of private sector corruption, our
research leverages perceptual data pertaining to the prevalence of insider trading,
racketeering and tax evasion in host markets. We operationalized private corruption
utilizing data from IMD’s World Competitiveness Yearbooks (WCY) pertaining to insider
trading and tax evasion, in addition to using data from the World Economic Forum’s
Global Competitiveness Reports pertaining to racketeering / organized crime. A principal
components analysis was conducted with an orthogonal (varimax) rotation and an
eigenvalue cutoff equal to 1, using a holdout sample of subsidiaries that were established
in the same emerging market countries during the period 1998-2005. This analysis
suggested a one factor solution which was theoretically expected. Table 8 presents the
factor loadings for each indicator on the private corruption pervasiveness construct. We
also conducted a reliability analysis and concluded that the Cronbach’s alpha for these
three indicators (0.71) was sufficient to establish internal consistency (Nunnally &
Bernstein, 1994).
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Given that both our public and private corruption constructs were based upon raw
data in which high scores indicate lower levels of corruption, for ease of interpretation
with respect to our results, we reverse-coded the raw data so that more pervasive public
corruption and private corruption for the host emerging market countries in our study
would be indicated by higher scores. Consistent with leading conceptual and empirical
strategy research pertaining to corruption (Rodriguez et al., 2005; Uhlenbruck et al.,
2006), our measures of public corruption pervasiveness and private corruption
pervasiveness provide an indication of the absolute level of each type of corruption in the
host market.
TABLE 8
Factor Analysis Results

Late nt construct and associate d items

Factor loading

Private corruption pe rvasivene ss a:

a

Tax evasion

Tax evasion is (1 = a common practice,
10 = not a common practice) in your
country.

0.81

Insider trading

Insider trading is (1 = common in the
stock market, 10 = not common in the
stock market).

0.77

Prevalence of racketeering & extortion

(Racketeering & extortion) in your
country (1 = imposes significant costs on
business, 7 = does not impose significant
costs on business).

0.81

Cronbach's alpha = 0.71

Dependent Variables, Control Variables and Estimation Methods
We investigate the impact of heightened host market corruption upon three
strategic foreign entry decisions that MNEs consider – foreign entry strategy (nonequity
entry versus equity entry), equity entry strategy (JV versus WOS) and partnering strategy
(host country partner versus home country partner). Foreign entry strategy captures the
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MNE’s choice between nonequity-based foreign market entry and equity-based foreign
market entry (JV or WOS). Notably, the measurement of nonequity entry has traditionally
been complicated by the fact that “…the web of directly-owned, partially-owned,
contract-based and arm’s-length forms of international operation…is tangled and some of
the distinctions between the different modes are blurred” (UNCTAD, 2011: 130).
Therefore, consistent with both Uhlenbruck et al.’s (2006) and Pan and Tse’s (2000)
conceptualization of equity entry as including foreign investments characterized by a
degree of ownership, control and resource deployment that indicates a long-term
commitment to the host country, we utilize the measure of nonequity entry employed by
Sartor (2014) who operationalized nonequity entry as including those foreign entries in
which the focal MNE owned less than 5% of the equity and fewer than twenty employees
were enlisted to staff the office associated with the investment. Based on this
operationalization, 65 (10%) of the 665 entry events in our sample were categorized as
nonequity entries, while 600 (90%) were equity entries.
Equity entry strategy captures the MNE’s choice between JV and WOS modes of
entry. Models were estimated using both the 80 percent equity ownership cutoff
convention and the 95 percent cutoff to distinguish between JVs and WOSs (Yiu &
Makino, 2002). While 373 (62%) of the 600 subsidiary investments were categorized as
WOSs and 227 (38%) as JVs using the 80 percent cutoff, pursuant to the 95 percent
cutoff, 335 (56%) and 265 (44%) were categorized as WOSs and JVs respectively.
Partnering strategy is based on the taxonomy of JV partnerships developed by Makino
and Beamish (1998). Each JV arrangement was categorized as either a traditional JV (a
JV in which the MNE engages a host country (local) equity partner in the subsidiary
investment) or a cross-national JV (in which the MNE engages a home country partner).
While Makino and Beamish’s taxonomy also includes tri-national JVs (in which the
MNE engages a third country partner), these JVs constituted only 2% (14 investments) of
the subsidiaries in our study and were not included in our empirical analyses.
Accordingly, using the 80 percent cutoff, 187 (88%) of the remaining 213 JVs were
categorized as traditional JVs and 26 (12%) were categorized as cross-national JVs.
Using the 95 percent cutoff, 206 (82%) and 45 (18%) were categorized as traditional JVs
and cross-national JVs respectively.
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To investigate the effects of public corruption pervasiveness and private
corruption pervasiveness on the three strategic foreign entry decisions in our study, two
estimation techniques were utilized. Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 pertaining to an MNE’s equity
entry strategy and partnering strategy were tested in Models 1A-1F. We integrated the
measurement of both the equity entry and partnering strategic decisions by employing a
trichotomous dependent variable that included WOS, traditional JV and cross-national JV
as the possible outcomes. As such, these models were estimated using multinomial
logistic regression in which WOS was designated as the comparison group. Hypothesis 4
pertaining to an MNE’s foreign entry strategy (nonequity entry versus equity entry) was
tested in Models 2A-2C using binary logistic regression.
Variables were included to control for country, regional, temporal, industry,
parent MNE and subsidiary effects, all which have been found to influence a firm’s
decisions with respect to its foreign market entry strategies. These control variables are
summarized in Appendix B.

RESULTS
Table 9 provides descriptive statistics for the sample. Table 10 presents the results
of the multinomial logistic regression estimations conducted in order to test Hypotheses
1, 2 and 3, while Table 11 presents the results of our test of Hypothesis 4. We concluded
that multicollinearity was not a concern in our models for two reasons. First, the highest
variance inflation factor (VIF) score reported for our models (3.27) in Tables 10 and 11 is
substantially less than the maximum VIF (10) that is routinely prescribed for multivariate
regression analyses in strategy research (Reuer & Leiblein, 2000). Second, none of the
correlations presented in Table 9 between variables that are included in the same
regression models exceed the recommended 0.70 cutoff (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).
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TABLE 9
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Variable
1 Foreign entry strategy

a

b

-

-

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

-

0.55

1.30

0.68

0.25

0.34

4 Subsidiary capitalization (log)

2.17

1.06

0.03

0.08

0.04

5 Parent size (log)

5.40

0.83

-0.02

0.12

0.20

0.10

6 Parent profitability (ROA)

0.04

0.06

-0.08

-0.05

-0.01

-0.02

-0.04

7 Parent leverage

0.80

0.12

-0.01

-0.10

-0.06

-0.11

-0.46

0.32

8 Parent experience

11.18

23.70

-0.04

0.03

0.04

0.05

0.55

-0.13

-0.37

-

-

-0.06

-0.01

-0.17

-0.02

0.09

-0.05

-0.21

0.09

0.01

0.00

0.03

-0.01

-0.02

0.06

0.08

0.04

0.02

0.01

-

-

0.10

0.09

0.09

-0.07

-0.14

-0.04

0.04

-0.17

2.85

0.46

0.04

-0.01

0.00

0.08

-0.10

0.02

-0.01

-0.10
-0.09

9 Industry dummy
10 Exchange rate
11 Region dummy
12 Host market size (log)
13 Infrastructure development

4.70

0.86

0.04

0.00

-0.07

-0.10

-0.10

-0.06

0.07

14 FDI restrictions

4.95

1.25

-0.03

0.00

-0.05

-0.09

0.14

0.00

-0.03

0.11

15 Cultural distance

2.63

0.55

0.09

0.11

0.06

0.09

-0.07

-0.03

0.01

-0.12
-0.06

16 Public corruption

6.53

0.54

0.02

0.11

0.14

0.08

0.00

0.05

0.00

17 Private corruption

5.03

0.50

-0.05

-0.03

0.03

0.08

-0.01

0.09

-0.04

0.03

18 Public corruption x private corruption

0.13

0.38

0.03

0.01

-0.09

-0.06

0.01

0.02

0.04

-0.03

9

10

13

14

Variable

b

S.D.

-

2 Equity entry strategy
3 Subsidiary size (log)

a

Me an

11

12

15

16

10 Exchange rate

0.05

11 Region dummy

0.04

12 Host market size (log)

0.03

0.08

0.38

13 Infrastructure development

-0.05

0.04

0.35

0.00

14 FDI restrictions

-0.06

-0.15

-0.59

-0.67

15 Cultural distance

0.04

0.03

0.43

-0.01

0.18

-0.34

16 Public corruption

0.05

0.03

0.25

0.14

-0.48

-0.29

0.28

17 Private corruption

0.01

-0.11

-0.12

0.29

-0.62

-0.19

-0.04

0.48

18 Public corruption x private corruption

0.02

0.09

0.04

-0.32

0.22

0.15

0.34

-0.43

17

0.01

-0.09

-0.39

Dichotomous dependent variable: Nonequity entry or equity entry .
Trichotomous dependent variable: Wholly-owned subsidiary , traditional JV or cross-national JV .

N = 665.
Correlations with an absolute value equal to or greater than 0.08 are statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level. All are two-tailed tests.
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TABLE 10
Results of Multinomial Logistic Regression Analyses of
Public Corruption and Private Corruption on Equity Entry Strategy a
Equity Entry Strate gy and Partne ring Strate gy
Base Mode l
Variable s
Intercept

Mode l 1A
Traditional JV
-2.83

Mode l 1B
Crossnational JV

(2.84)

-8.85

a

Main Effe cts

(5.67)

Mode l 1C
Traditional JV
-2.91

(4.04)

Inte raction Effe ct

Mode l 1D
Crossnational JV

Mode l 1E
Traditional JV

-11.98

-1.37

(7.91)

Mode l 1F
Crossnational JV

(2.99)

-9.05

(6.03)

0.42

(0.33)

0.19

(0.21)

Subsidiary effects
Subsidiary size (log)

1.03

(0.17)

Subsidiary capitalization (log)

0.27

(0.09)

***
**

0.45

(0.33)

1.01

(0.17)

0.20

(0.21)

0.27

(0.09)

***
**

0.44

(0.33)

1.06

(0.17)

0.21

(0.21)

0.28

(0.09)

***
**

Parent effects
Parent size (log)

t

t

0.30

(0.16)

0.27

(0.35)

0.27

(0.16)

0.24

(0.35)

0.25

(0.17)

0.26

(0.36)

Parent profitability (ROA)

-1.79

(1.74)

2.67

(4.75)

-1.44

(1.77)

2.57

(4.72)

-1.71

(1.77)

2.66

(4.78)

Parent leverage

-1.50

(1.07)

-0.18

(2.45)

-1.61

(1.08)

-0.25

(2.45)

-1.74

(1.09)

-0.09

(2.47)

0.00

(0.01)

-0.02

(0.03)

0.00

(0.01)

-0.02

(0.03)

0.00

(0.01)

-0.02

(0.03)

1.47

(1.05)

Parent experience
Industry effects
Industry dummy

-0.61

*

(0.26)

1.44

(1.05)

-0.57

*

(0.27)

1.47

(1.05)

-0.56

(0.27)

*

Temporal effects
Exchange rate

-366.99 (197.82)

t

366.14 (417.96)

-474.41 (203.53)

*

320.86 (424.82)

-589.75 (210.42)

**

353.48 (429.85)

Region effects
Region dummy

-1.87

(0.64)

0.14

(0.34)

0.14

(0.13)

**

0.91

(0.88)

-1.27

(0.68)

-0.24

(0.61)

0.33

(0.35)

-0.03

(0.27)

0.17

(0.19)

t

1.20

(0.94)

-0.96

(0.68)

-0.20

(0.62)

0.55

(0.36)

0.15

(0.39)

0.37

(0.21)

1.04

(0.99)

Country effects
Host market size (log)
Infrastructure development
FDI restrictions

0.31

(0.15)

Cultural distance

0.31

(0.23)

*

-0.14

(0.26)

0.29

(0.15)

0.32

(0.39)

0.24

(0.23)

*

-0.11

(0.27)

0.26

(0.15)

0.23

(0.44)

-0.22

(0.31)

0.49

(0.56)

1.20

(0.39)

-0.09

(0.59)

-0.53

(0.31)

t
t

-0.35

(0.64)

0.04

(0.42)

-0.14

(0.27)

0.46

(0.52)

Main effects
Public corruption

0.57

(0.27)

Private corruption

-0.58

(0.31)

*
t

**
t

0.28

(0.59)

-0.14

(0.63)

-0.78

(0.83)

Interaction effect
Public corruption x private corruption
Variance inflation factor range
χ
2

2
2

R (∆R )
a

1.06

(0.46)

*

1.07 - 2.79

1.08 - 2.85

1.08 - 3.27

120.07 ***

127.42 ***

134.68 ***

0.23

0.25 (0.02)

0.26 (0.03)

The reference group in the multinomial logistic regression models is wholly-owned subsidiary (WOS) which is compared to two other possible outcomes in the equity entry strategy
dependent variable: traditional joint venture (with a host country / local partner) and crossnational joint venture (with a home country partner).
n = 586.
t

p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
All are two-tailed tests. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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TABLE 11
Results of Binary Logistic Regression Analyses of
Public Corruption and Private Corruption on Foreign Entry Strategy a

Foreign Entry Strate gy a
Variables
Intercept

Base Mode l

Main Effects

Interaction Effe ct

Model 2A

Model 2B

Mode l 2C

-6.59

(3.92)

Subsidiary size (log)

1.82

(0.29)

Subsidiary capitalization (log)

0.11

(0.14)

-0.41

(0.25)

t

-1.25

(5.41)

1.85

(0.29)

0.11

(0.14)

-0.43

(0.25)

-5.38

(4.02)

1.85

(0.29)

0.12

(0.14)

-0.44

(0.25)

-8.72

(3.29)

Subsidiary effects
***

***

***

Parent effects
Parent size (log)
Parent profitability (ROA)

-8.82

(3.28)

Parent leverage

0.77

Parent experience

t
**

t
**

-8.55

(3.27)

(1.44)

0.75

(1.44)

0.75

(1.44)

0.00

(0.01)

0.00

(0.01)

0.00

(0.01)

-0.17

(0.35)

-0.18

(0.35)

-0.19

(0.35)

t
**

Industry effects
Industry dummy
Temporal effects
Exchange rate

328.28 (268.78)

275.34 (272.61)

254.46 (276.58)

Region effects
Region dummy

0.59

(0.64)

0.59

(0.68)

0.84

(0.43)

-0.20

(0.26)

0.36

(0.19)

0.50

(0.69)

0.88

(0.44)

-0.15

(0.28)

0.34

(0.19)

0.57

(0.44)

Country effects
Host market size (log)
Infrastructure development

0.72

(0.41)

0.05

(0.19)

FDI restrictions

0.39

(0.19)

Cultural distance

0.45

(0.32)

t

*

*

t
t

0.66

(0.39)

Public corruption

-0.29

(0.45)

-0.16

(0.52)

Private corruption

-0.48

(0.41)

-0.45

(0.42)

0.29

(0.64)

*

t

Main effects

Interaction effect
Public corruption x private corruption
Variance inflation factor range
χ
2

2
2

R (∆R )

1.06 - 2.76

1.07 - 2.81

1.08 - 3.18

72.19 ***

74.62 ***

74.84 ***

0.22

0.23 (0.01)

0.23 (0.01)

a

The dependent variable foreign entry strategy is coded as follows: 0: nonequity-based entry , 1: equity-based entry .
n = 665.
t

p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
All are two-tailed tests. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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In both Tables 10 and 11, we present a base model which excludes the effects of
the two focal corruption variables, along with models that include the main effects and
interaction effect associated with the two dimensions of corruption that we studied. The
estimates reported in Table 10 are based upon the 80 percent equity ownership
convention used to distinguish between a JV and a WOS.2 Consistent with our theory, the
results with respect to Models 1C and 1D (which tests Hypothesis 1) reveal that the
public corruption pervasiveness construct was a significant predictor of an MNE’s
equity-based entry strategy and partner choice (χ2 = 127.42, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.25). The
results suggest that firms are more likely to invest in a JV with a local partner than they
are to invest through a WOS (Model 1C: β = 0.57, p < 0.05) when entering into host
emerging markets under conditions of heightened public corruption pervasiveness. The
results for Hypothesis 2, which was also tested in Models 1C and 1D, were also
consistent with our theory. More specifically, heightened private corruption
pervasiveness was found to predict an increased likelihood that an MNE would invest
through a WOS (Model 1C: β = -0.58, p < 0.10) rather than through a traditional JV
partnership. Notably, the analyses presented in Model 1D which tested the likelihood of
an MNE choosing to invest through a crossnational JV rather than a WOS under
conditions of more pervasive public corruption and more pervasive private corruption
did not yield statistically significant results. This result is consistent with Roy & Oliver
(2009) who found that host country corruption does not influence partnering.
Before investigating the effect of the interaction term, the focal independent
variables (public corruption pervasiveness and private corruption pervasiveness) were
centered about the mean (Aiken & West, 1991). The results associated with Models 1E
and 1F (χ2 = 134.68, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.26) which tests Hypothesis 3 reveal that the
interaction effect between public corruption pervasiveness and private corruption
pervasiveness does have a significant impact upon the equity-based foreign strategies of
MNEs (Model 1E: β = 1.06, p < 0.05). The coefficients reported for the main effects in
Model 1E continue to indicate that more pervasive public corruption (Model 1E: β =
1.20, p < 0.01) and private corruption (Model 1E: β = -0.53, p < 0.10) will increase the

2

The results using the 95 percent equity ownership cutoff (Yiu & Makino, 2002) were substantially
similar.
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likelihood that an MNE will invest through a JV with local partners and through a WOS,
respectively. In order to explore the nature of the moderation effect more fully, Figure 5
plots the interaction estimated in Model 1E. The Figure indicates that although MNEs are
more likely to invest via a JV with a local partner under conditions of more pronounced
public corruption pervasiveness in the host market, an increase in the pervasiveness of
private corruption negatively moderates this relationship. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is
supported. As such, for any given level of public corruption pervasiveness, an increase in
the pervasiveness of private corruption reduces the likelihood that the MNE will enter
via a JV with a local partner.
FIGURE 5

Probability of traditional joint venture
when reference group is WOS

Interaction Effect of Public Corruption Pervasiveness and
Private Corruption Pervasiveness on Equity Entry Strategy
(the Choice Between Wholly-Owned Subsidiary and Traditional Joint Venture) a b

1
0.8
0.6

Low
Private

0.4

High
Private

0.2
0
Low Public

High Public

a

High Private and Low Private refer to private corruption pervasiveness one standard
deviation above and below the mean for private corruption pervasiveness. Likewise, High
Public and Low Public refer to public corruption pervasiveness one standard deviation
above and below the mean for public corruption pervasiveness.
b

The dependent variable is the probability of a traditional joint venture (with a host
country / local partner) when the reference group is WOS.
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Finally, the results associated with Model 2C in Table 11 reveal that Hypothesis 4
was not supported. The interaction between more pervasive public corruption and private
corruption did not exert a statistically significant impact upon an MNE’s choice between
nonequity-based entry and equity-based entry. While the interaction coefficient was not
statistically significant, the results are insightful nonetheless because they introduce an
important boundary condition with respect to the relationship between the pervasiveness
of corruption in the host market and the foreign entry strategy (nonequity versus equity
entry) of MNEs. Extant research has found that “government corruption” increases the
likelihood that an MNE will engaged in nonequity entry (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006).
Further, the interaction between grand and petty corruption has been found to have the
same effect (Sartor, 2014). However, the results presented in Table 11 suggest that the
main effects of more pervasive public corruption and private corruption, as well as the
interaction effect between the two dimensions of corruption, do not impact upon a
MNE’s foreign entry strategy when entering into emerging markets.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
While emerging markets have grown dramatically in prominence as a global
destination for FDI (UNCTAD, 2013), our limited understanding of the strategic impact
of corruption in these host markets has precipitated the need for more extensive academic
scrutiny (Rodriguez et al., 2006). When an MNE enters into a foreign market, it can be
expected to structure its investment in a manner that is designed to minimize the costs of
its ongoing operations (Brouthers, 2002) which will be constituted by a combination of
public sector transactions and private sector transactions (Teegen et al., 2004). Our
research has been designed to investigate how the structure of equity-based foreign
subsidiary investments is impacted by the pervasiveness of public corruption and private
corruption in host emerging markets. In doing so, our work makes several contributions.
First, our theory and findings broaden the corruption-oriented international business
strategy literature by bridging the work of strategy scholars and business ethicists whose
work has increasingly emphasized two distinct corruption domains – public sector
corruption and private sector corruption (Argandoña, 2003; Montiel, Husted, &
Christmann, 2012; Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). A number of studies support our contention
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that expanding the scope of corruption-based strategy research to incorporate private
sector corruption bears merit. Private corruption has been argued to engender a wide
range of organizational consequences including, among others, inefficient resource
allocation (Gopinath, 2008) and the deterrence of capability-building (Luo, 2005). In
addition to amplifying the negative social, political and distributional effects of public
corruption (Gopinath, 2008), private corruption has also been implicated for undermining
shareholder value both indirectly, as a consequence of fines and penalties (Bishara &
Schipani, 2009) and, directly through a depreciation in the market capitalization of firms
(Narayanan, Schipani, & Seyhun, 2007).
Second, this study both supports and extends Rodriguez et al.’s (2005)
foundational theory on the relationship between corruption and firm strategy. With
respect to the issue of entry mode strategy, they proposed that an increase in the
pervasiveness of government corruption would motivate MNEs to choose WOS over JV
entry. Subsequent efforts to test this theory did not find a significant relationship between
the pervasiveness of host market corruption and an MNE’s choice between JV and WOS
entry (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). However, motivated by the notion of institutional
pluralism, Sartor (2014), determined that each of the distinct dimensions (grand
corruption and petty corruption) constituting the government corruption construct
exerted a differential impact on an MNE’s market entry strategy. We apply Sartor’s
(2014) theory to support not only our conceptual disaggregation of the host market
corruption phenomenon (public versus private), but also our propositions with respect to
the distinct mechanisms that undergird the relationship between each dimension of
corruption and the equity-based entry strategies of foreign-investing MNEs. Our efforts
to parse the corruption construct into its public and private components have generated
more nuanced and unequivocal results pertaining to equity entry strategy, while also
extending insights into the realm of partner choice when MNEs enter into more corrupt
host market environments. An increase in public corruption pervasiveness was found to
increase the likelihood that MNEs will invest through JV ownership with a host country
(local) partner, while an increase in private corruption pervasiveness was found to
increase the likelihood that MNEs will invest via WOS ownership when entering foreign
emerging markets. Further, an increase in the pervasiveness of private corruption was
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found to negatively moderate the likelihood that MNEs would invest in a JV with a local
partner under conditions of more pervasive public corruption.
Third, we leveraged theoretical insights from the JV and alliance literature
pertaining to the multifaceted nature of an MNE’s bargaining power (Ren et al., 2009;
Yan & Gray, 2001). Juxtaposing this theoretical lens against Rodriguez et al.’s (2005)
general proposition that a relationship exists between the pervasiveness of host market
corruption and an MNE’s equity-based entry strategy, we have introduced a finer-grained
perspective which contends that an MNE’s reliance on different sources of bargaining
power (context-based versus resource-based) in its public and private transactions
functions as the mechanism through which public corruption and private corruption
impact upon the foreign entry strategy of the MNE. In doing so, we have built on the
work of strategy scholars who have advocated the integration of institutionally-oriented
and resource-oriented perspectives in order to advance both the nonmarket strategy
research agenda, and our understanding of contemporary nonmarket phenomena such as
corruption (Doh et al., 2012). Our work contributes to these objectives by elaborating
how bargaining power could be employed as a theoretical mechanism to link the
institutional and resource perspectives. As we hypothesized, the two dimensions of the
informal institution that we studied exerted a disparate impact upon the resource-oriented
foreign market entry strategy of the firms in our study.
Fourth, our research also offers important insights for policy makers. Two key
assumptions have traditionally underpinned the policy recommendations of anticorruption scholars. First, corruption is primarily conceptualized as occurring within
firm-government transactions. Second, engaging a partner is assumed to be a key strategy
employed by firms to manage the increased uncertainty, information asymmetries and
transaction costs precipitated by heightened government corruption. Building on these
assumptions, scholars have formulated policy recommendations that are designed to
reduce the efficacy of the transaction cost-reducing strategies employed by firms to
facilitate corrupt transactions (Lambsdorff, 2002b; Svensson, 2003). However, our
research suggests that policy prescriptions designed to curb MNE engagement in foreign
market corruption must consider the multidimensional nature of the construct in order to
ensure that policy efforts are not misguided. Our findings that public corruption and
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private corruption each exert a distinct impact upon the foreign-investment decisions of
MNEs, coupled with our findings pertaining to the interaction effect between both types
of corruption upon these foreign entry strategies, suggests the need for more nuanced
anti-corruption initiatives.
Despite the increasing recognition that public sector and private sector
manifestations of corruption are distinct (Transparency International, 2011), an important
limitation in our study has been the absence of a comprehensive index to operationalize
the private corruption pervasiveness construct, akin to the Corruption Perceptions Index
that is available to measure public corruption. We hope that our work will stimulate
efforts to collect the data needed to develop and maintain such an index in the longer run.
A second limitation in our study is the use of a sample of firms from a single home
country. While scholars have argued that this approach can be beneficial because it
minimizes the impact of differences between multiple home countries upon the
dependent variables (Coeurderoy & Murray, 2008), future research should consider
opportunities to verify our results with a sample of non-Japanese MNEs. Notwithstanding
these limitations, the patterns that emerge from our work provide additional opportunities
for future research. Corruption clearly exerts a nuanced impact on the structure and
strategic entry decisions of foreign-investing MNEs. Researchers should explore the
subsidiary

survival

implications

associated

with

adopting

different

strategic

configurations in more corrupt host market environments, with particular attention being
given to the multiple dimensions of corruption which have been explicated to date
(public, private, grand and petty). In addition to equity entry strategy and partnering
strategy, future work should also consider the implications associated with expatriate
deployment strategies that are formulated to facilitate entry into and ongoing operations
within more corrupt host market environments. Finally, our theory-building efforts have
focused upon prior scholarship related to the pervasiveness of host market corruption
(Rodriguez et al., 2005). While a consideration of the arbitrariness of corruption
(Rodriguez et al., 2005) was beyond the limits of available data and the theoretical scope
of our work, future research should examine the arbitrariness of both public sector and
private sector corruption, particularly in relation to the three elements of foreign market
entry strategy that we have studied.
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APPENDIX B
Description of Measures for Control Variables

Variable

Description of measure

Rationale for inclusion

Data source

Subsidiary size
Subsidiary capital
Parent size
Parent profitability
Parent experience

Total subsidiary employees (log)
Subsidiary capitalization (log)
Total sales (log)
Return on assets
Prior number of entries by parent
MNE into host market

Parent and subsidiary
characteristics that have been
found to predict foreign entry
strategies (Delios & Beamish,
1999)

Company data
Company data
Company data
Company data

Parent leverage

(Total assets-total debt) / total
assets

Parent’s slack financial resources
(Reuer & Ragozzino, 2006)

Company data

Service industry

Dummy variable (1: service
industry constituent; 0: not)

Industry effects (Brouthers &
Brouthers, 2003)

Company data

Exchange rate

Annual exchange rates for
Japanese currency (JPY/USD)

Temporal effects (Klein &
Rosengren, 1994)

Bank of Japan

Region

Dummy variable (1: subsidiary
established in Asia; 0: not)

Regional effects (Arregle et al.,
2013)

United Nations
Statistics Division

Host market size
FDI restrictions

Total gross domestic product (log)
Managerial perceptions with
respect to restrictiveness of
foreign ownership laws
Managerial perceptions with
respect to the degree of
infrastructure development
Cultural distance values between
the home and host markets

Country effects: Host market’s
economic, institutional and
cultural environment (Henisz &
Delios, 2001; Kogut & Singh,
1988; Uhlenbruck et al., 2006)

World
Competitiveness
Yearbooks and
Hofstede, 2001
data

Infrastructure
development
Cultural distance
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CHAPTER 4
Corruption Pervasiveness, Subsidiary Localization Strategy and Host Market Exit

INTRODUCTION
A foreign subsidiary’s ability to secure legitimacy in host markets that are
characterized by more pronounced levels of corruption is assumed to be vital to the
subsidiary’s continued existence in these environments (Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, & Eden,
2005). A growing body of theoretical and empirical work has examined the relationship
between host market corruption and multinational enterprise (MNE) strategy (CuervoCazurra, 2008a; Doh, Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, Collins, & Eden, 2003; Sartor, 2014a,
2014b; Uhlenbruck, Rodriguez, Doh, & Eden, 2006). However, this research has
provided MNEs with limited insights into the relative efficacy of various strategies
(Mezias & Mezias, 2010) that have been implemented to bolster the continued existence
of subsidiary investments in foreign markets plagued by heightened corruption.
Institutional theorists maintain that weak formal institutions in the form of written
rules, laws and regulations in a host market (North, 1990) precipitate institutional voids
which may be filled by informal institutions (or, norms of behavior, values, practices and
standards of conduct) such as corruption (Puffer, McCarthy, & Boisot, 2010). Goodrick
and Salancik (1996: 4) suggest that informal institutions generate uncertainty when these
norms of behavior or standards of practice are “ambiguous, unknown or inconsistent.”
Given that corrupt transactions are most frequently “sealed in secrecy” and unenforceable
in courts of law (Lambsdorff, 2005: 142), the norms and standards of conduct
surrounding these extralegal transactions in foreign markets can be highly indeterminate
and opaque from the foreign-investing MNE’s perspective. Consistent with this, Fisman
and Gatti (2006: 137) found “that there is substantial variation across countries in the
extent to which firms know the amount of illicit payments necessary to do business.” In
part, this uncertainty can be traced to the wide-ranging variability in attitudes and values
towards corruption both within countries and between countries (Bailey & Spicer, 2007;
Sartor, 2014a; Spicer, 2009). Since organizations may seek legitimacy by conforming to
institutional norms in foreign markets (Eden & Miller, 2004; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999),
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any uncertainty surrounding informal institutions such as corruption threatens to
undermine the firm’s ability to navigate the standards of practice or conduct that are
required to secure legitimacy in the host market. Consequently, a central premise of our
work is that regardless of the MNE’s willingness or reluctance to engage in corrupt
transactions in the host market, and regardless of whether corrupt transactions are
sanctioned or prohibited in the MNE’s home market, corruption encountered in foreign
markets functions as a source of considerable uncertainty for internationalizing MNEs,
particularly in markets characterized by more pervasive corruption. In turn, this poses a
threat to the firm’s legitimacy in these host markets and heightens the likelihood of
market exit.
We investigate the relationship between host market corruption pervasiveness,
MNE strategy and host market exit. Given that foreign expansion offers the MNE a wide
range of benefits including, among others, experience, risk reduction through geographic
diversification, foreign knowledge acquisition, augmented market power and
international scale (Contractor, 2007), our theory conceptualizes market exit as a negative
outcome. This assumption is thematically-consistent with the large body of literature that
has explored the adverse effects of host market corruption on foreign direct investment
flows (Brouthers, Gao, & McNicol, 2008; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008b; Habib & Zurawicki,
2002).
As such, our research is motivated by two closely-related research questions.
First, does the pervasiveness of host market corruption impact the likelihood of market
exit? Second, do strategies implemented by the MNE moderate the impact of host market
corruption on the likelihood of market exit? We anticipate that the answers to these
questions will be made more complex by recent research that suggests that host market
corruption is not a one-dimensional phenomenon. Instead, informal institutions that have
been traditionally recognized as discrete institutions within a host market (such as
“corruption”) have been found to be constituted by distinct dimensions (Sartor, 2014a).
We leverage Sartor’s (2014a) notion of informal institutional pluralism and adopt the
conceptualization of host market corruption which distinguishes between public
corruption pervasiveness and private corruption pervasiveness. In doing so, our work
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endeavors to facilitate a more nuanced understanding of the role of MNE strategy in
moderating the impact of host market corruption pervasiveness on host market exit.
Just as the focal phenomenon in our study has been characterized as pluralistic,
the theoretical foundation that informs our conceptual work can also be regarded as
pluralistic. More specifically, as Hillman, Shropshire and Cannella (2007: 943) have
noted, “resource dependence theory mirrors institutional theory in that legitimacy and
conformity to societal expectations are considered key components to organizational
survival in both theories.” However, the core precepts of resource dependence theory
(RDT) and institutional theory (IT) cast divergent predictions with respect to the strategic
responses that can be expected from an MNE that is endeavoring to secure legitimacy in
more corrupt host markets. While RDT would suggest that an MNE will pursue
legitimacy by undertaking strategic actions to control the subsidiary’s dependence upon
other firms for legitimacy (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003), IT
proposes that an MNE can secure legitimacy through strategic efforts to conform to the
institutional environment (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). Juxtaposing these two theoretical
prisms against one another to study the relationship between corruption pervasiveness,
MNE strategy and host market exit reveals that the two perspectives are characterized by
distinct spatial orientations. More specifically, RDT suggests that subsidiaries will
implement proximal localization strategies (or, host market-oriented localization
strategies) in which host country employees and equity partners (Belderbos & Heijltjes,
2005; Hannon, Huang, & Jaw, 1995; Shan, 1991) are regarded as best-suited to efforts to
enhance the subsidiary’s legitimacy, thereby reducing the likelihood of exit from the host
country market. Conversely, IT predicts that distal localization strategies (or, home
market-oriented localization strategies) in which the MNE engages home country
employees and equity partners (Doh et al., 2003; Mezias & Mezias, 2010) in the
subsidiary investment are better-suited to reducing the likelihood of market exit from
increasingly corrupt host countries. Leveraging this theoretical tension, we develop a set
of competing hypotheses in order to investigate the comparative impact upon market exit
that results from the implementation of proximal versus distal localization strategies in
increasingly corrupt host market environments. Our efforts are consistent with the work
of Van de Ven & Johnson (2006: 816) who remind scholars that “important knowledge
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advances to theory and practice” are more likely to occur “if the study is designed so that
it juxtaposes and compares competing plausible explanations of the phenomenon being
investigated.”
While the MNE’s pursuit of legitimacy in the host market underpins the
mechanisms that we describe, our empirical work does not focus on measuring
legitimacy, nor does it focus on ascertaining whether or not the MNEs in our study
actually secure legitimacy. Instead, we assume that the pervasiveness of corruption in the
host market threatens to undermine the legitimacy of foreign-investing firms in the host
market environment. Consequently, we investigate the efficacy of strategies implemented
by the MNE to attenuate this assumed legitimacy deficiency by investigating how MNE
strategies moderate the relationship between corruption pervasiveness in the host market
and the MNE’s likelihood of host market exit.
We test our hypotheses using a sample of subsidiary investments in 31 countries
during the period between 1998 and 2005 using event history analysis. More specifically,
we test the moderating effect of an MNE’s partnering strategy and expatriate staffing
strategy upon the relationship between host market corruption and host market exit. Our
results reveal an interesting dichotomy. Whereas a proximally-oriented partnering
strategy (i.e., engaging a host country partner rather than a home country partner in the
subsidiary investment) was found to heighten the likelihood of market exit under
conditions of more pervasive host market public corruption, the opposite outcome was
observed in the case of expatriate strategy. More specifically, a distally-oriented
expatriate strategy (i.e., employing a greater proportion of home country nationals in the
subsidiary investment) was found to increase the likelihood of market exit under
conditions of more pervasive public corruption and private corruption. Our research
advances theory by making two principal contributions. First, we explicate two distinct
approaches towards facilitating a subsidiary’s localization into the host country market
(proximal versus distal). Second, we enhance understanding of the veiled relationship
between corruption pervasiveness, MNE strategy and host market exit. In doing so, our
work provides theoretically-grounded and empirically-supported guidance to MNEs that
seek insights with respect to the relative efficacy of various localization strategies that
can be implemented in host markets characterized by heightened corruption.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Subsidiary Localization Strategies: Proximal Versus Distal Orientation
The concept of localization has been researched extensively in the human
resource management realm of the international business strategy field in an effort to
describe the extent to which expatriate managers are replaced by competent host country
employees (Law, Song, Wong, & Chen, 2009). Prior work in this area has focused on the
identification of conditions under which localization efforts can be predicted to succeed
(Fryxell, Butler, & Choi, 2004). More recently, scholars have endeavored to link
successful localization initiatives to enhanced financial performance. In addition to
proposing that localization facilitates reductions in operating costs, it also augments the
transfer of expertise between expatriates and local employees. Moreover, scholars have
maintained that the social ties and networks of local managers foster better
communication with employees, customers and government officials, all of which
contribute to improved financial performance (Law et al., 2009).
We build on this work and extend the notion of localization to conceptualize
subsidiary localization strategies as the portfolio of strategic decisions implemented by
an MNE in order to facilitate its efforts to integrate a subsidiary within the host country
market environment. Our theory with respect to subsidiary localization builds upon extant
scholarship pertaining to an MNE’s embeddedness (Andersson, Forsgren, & Holm, 2002)
which has been identified as an important antecedent of firm survival (Uzzi, 1996).
However, whereas human resource scholars have assumed that successful localization is
contingent upon sourcing human capital from within the host country market, we contend
that a MNE’s portfolio of localization strategies should be evaluated from a broader
spatial orientation. Foreign-investing MNEs make innumerable decisions with respect to
the geographic origin of the equity capital and human capital that they need to establish
and sustain foreign subsidiary operations. As such, scholars have advocated giving more
attention to the spatial orientation of a subsidiary’s strategies (Dunning, 2009; McCann &
Mudambi, 2005) because “aspects of the strategy of MNEs can…be enhanced by a
deeper understanding of spatial issues” (Buckley & Ghauri, 2004: 91). Accordingly, we
define proximal localization strategies as strategies which employ host market equity
capital and human capital to facilitate a subsidiary’s integration within the host country
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market. Conversely, distal localization strategies include strategies which facilitate
integration within the host country market by employing equity capital and human capital
sourced outside of the host country market.

THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Host Market Corruption Pervasiveness and Host Market Exit
Extant theory has conceptualized host market corruption in terms of its
pervasiveness (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008a; Rodriguez et al., 2005; Uhlenbruck et al., 2006).
The concept of informal institutional pluralism suggests that discrete informal institutions
such as “corruption” can be conceptualized as being constituted by distinct dimensions.
Leveraging this theory, scholars have disaggregated the concept of host market
corruption into public corruption pervasiveness or, “the average firm’s likelihood of
encountering corruption in its normal interactions with public officials” (Rodriguez et al.,
2005: 385), and private corruption pervasiveness (“the average firm’s likelihood of
encountering corruption in its normal interactions with private entities, companies and
individuals”) (Sartor, 2014b).
Corruption scholars have defined legitimacy as the “perception…that an
organization’s actions are appropriate within a socially constructed system of norms and
values” (Pfarrer, Decelles, Smith, & Taylor, 2008: 731). Notwithstanding RDT and IT’s
shared conceptualization of “legitimacy” (Hillman et al., 2007), we propose that a distinct
spatial orientation characterizes each theory’s predictions with respect to MNE strategies
that may be implemented in order to secure legitimacy in more corrupt host market
environments. Nevertheless, we do not believe that there is any basis upon which to
propose that either theoretical lens would predict different outcomes with respect to the
direct relationship between corruption pervasiveness and the likelihood of host market
exit. Instead, we expect that as the pervasiveness of both public corruption and private
corruption in the host market increases, the uncertainty that MNEs experience with
respect to the prevailing norms and standards of conduct in the host market will become
more pronounced. In turn, this poses a more pronounced threat to their legitimacy in the
host market and increases the likelihood of market exit. Further, consistent with Husted’s
(1994) observations that host market public corruption and private corruption are not
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mutually exclusive, Rodriguez et al. (2006: 739) concluded that “it is clear that
government corruption and private corruption often go hand in hand.” Accordingly, we
also expect that the interaction between both dimensions of host market corruption will
also increase the likelihood of market exit. As such, we hypothesize that
Hypothesis 1: An MNE is more likely to exit a host market when public
corruption is more pervasive in the market.
Hypothesis 2: An MNE is more likely to exit a host market when private
corruption is more pervasive in the market.
Hypothesis 3: The positive relationship between the pervasiveness of
public corruption in a host market and an MNE’s likelihood of market exit
becomes stronger as the pervasiveness of private corruption increases.

Beyond these general relationships between these two distinct dimensions of
corruption and the likelihood of market exit, we are most interested in exploring the
impact of MNE strategies which might moderate the link between corruption
pervasiveness (both public and private) and market exit. More specifically, we propose
that, under conditions of more pervasive corruption in the host country market, the spatial
orientation of a subsidiary’s strategic decisions will exert a distinct impact upon the
likelihood of market exit. In this regard, we compare the relative efficacy of the proximal
localization strategies that are advocated by RDT with the distal localization strategies
suggested by IT, giving particular attention to an MNE’s expatriate strategy (Hypotheses
4 and 6) and partnering strategy (Hypotheses 5 and 7). In doing so, we propose that the
proximal orientation of an MNE’s localization strategies will be manifest in the firm’s
preference for joint venture (JV) partnership arrangements that engage a host country
equity partner, as well as its preference for a smaller proportion of expatriate employees
in the subsidiary investment. Conversely, the distal orientation of an MNE’s localization
strategies will be evidenced by a preference for JV partnerships that engage a home
country equity partner and a greater proportion of expatriate employees.
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Corruption Pervasiveness, Proximal Localization Strategies and Market Exit
Resource dependence theorists contend that organizations require resources from
their environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003) when they are unable to generate these
resources internally (Pfeffer, 1982). Consequently, organizations experience resource
deficiencies and become interdependent with organizations or entities that control or
influence the supply of the required resource (Pfeffer, 1982). Interdependent
organizations attempt to manage their resource dependencies by engaging in interorganizational efforts to reduce these dependencies (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). More
recently, RDT scholars have extended Pfeffer & Salancik’s (2003) conceptualization of
the interdependency dynamic to suggest that, more precisely, a power imbalance
characterizes the relationship between the resource dependent organization and the entity
controlling the required resources (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005). In this regard, the
resource deficiency operates as a constraint on the organization. As such, when a firm
encounters a resource deficiency, it will engage in actions that are intended to absorb this
constraint (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005).
Legitimacy has been characterized by RDT theorists as a resource that is critical
to firm survival (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002). RDT specifies a number of options that are
available to a firm in its effort to absorb its external constraints (Scott & Davis, 2007),
including among others, the maintenance of alternative suppliers of the resource,
engaging in alliances, JVs or other associations to secure access to the resource or,
managing the dependence through a merger or acquisition of the organization controlling
the resource (Scott & Davis, 2007). Each of these strategies provides the firm with an
opportunity “to have its operations redefined as legitimate by associating…with other
generally accepted legitimate….institutions or individuals” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978:
196). We focus on the role of partnering and staffing strategies in an MNE’s efforts to
secure legitimacy in increasingly corrupt host country markets.
RDT suggests that JV partnering arrangements can have the effect of reducing
environmental uncertainty (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). Similarly, international business
scholars maintain that the opportunity to secure legitimacy under conditions of
heightened environmental uncertainty is one motivation for an MNE’s decision to engage
in an international JV (IJV) (Schuler, 2001) with a foreign partner (i.e., a non-home
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country partner). In IJV partnering arrangements, foreign-investing MNEs have been
found to trade ownership for the opportunity to reduce their resource dependence on the
broader population of firms in the host market (Shan, 1991). Each parent’s share of
control over the IJV is dependent, in part, upon their ability to supply resources that the
IJV requires to survive and thrive in the local environment (Child & Yan, 1999). In an
examination of the resource antecedents of parent control in IJVs, Chen, Park and
Newburry (2009) determined that the contribution of tacit resources predicts each
parent’s degree of control over the IJV.
RDT also suggests that an organization’s human resource practices can bolster the
organization’s ability to manage its dependencies (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). In the
context of foreign subsidiary investments, heightened local resource dependence has been
found to predict an increased use of host market employees by foreign-investing MNEs
(Hannon et al., 1995). Consequently, expatriate deployment to the subsidiary investment
is less likely (Belderbos & Heijltjes, 2005). Similarly, while Boyacigiller (1990) found
that heightened dependence between a subsidiary and its headquarters predicted increased
utilization of expatriates in the foreign subsidiary, she speculated that if the main sources
of dependence were situated within the host country market, then it could be expected
that fewer expatriates would be utilized because host market employees would be better
suited to managing the uncertainty associated with dependencies that arise in the host
country.
We have proposed that both public corruption and private corruption exacerbate
uncertainty with respect to norms and standards of conduct in more corrupt host market
environments, which threatens to undermine the legitimacy of foreign-investing MNEs
and heightens the likelihood of market exit. Under conditions of more pronounced host
market corruption, RDT theorists have suggested that foreign firms suffer from a
legitimacy deficiency (Su, Mitchell, & Sirgy, 2007). Notwithstanding the existence of
this deficiency, firms are able to access resources, including legitimacy, “through illegal,
unethical and / or unconventional actions” (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002: 417). In fact,
previous research has revealed that engaging in corruption may help firms to overcome
uncertainties associated with the political, legal and financial systems in corrupt host
market environments (Zhou & Peng, 2012). Consequently, the foreign firm can be
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expected to engage in coordinated behaviors (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003) designed to
access and secure legitimacy from presumably more powerful firms (prospective host
market equity partners) and individuals (prospective host country employees) that already
possess the legitimacy resource (Steidlmeier, 1999). This is because when a venture
becomes networked with established organizations and host country employees, the
venture becomes identified with these partners and employees in a manner that confers
legitimacy on the new venture (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002).
As such, the strategic prescriptions advanced by the RDT perspective are
characterized by a spatial orientation that envisions the integration of host country (local)
partners and employees into the subsidiary investment in order to bolster the MNE’s
efforts to secure legitimacy and reduce the likelihood of market exit. Accordingly, we
hypothesize that
Hypothesis 4: The positive relationship between the pervasiveness of host
market corruption (public or private) and an MNE’s likelihood of market
exit is weakened by a decrease in subsidiary expatriate intensity.
Hypothesis 5: The positive relationship between the pervasiveness of host
market corruption (public or private) and an MNE’s likelihood of market
exit is weakened when a host country (local) partner is engaged in the JV
subsidiary investment.

Corruption Pervasiveness, Distal Localization Strategies and Market Exit
IT suggests that the strategic actions of firms can be interpreted as being
structured by the institutional environment within which the firm is situated. In this
context, institutions impose restrictions on activity, as well as providing guidelines for
taking action (Scott, 2001). IT suggests that environments characterized by institutional
uncertainty create risk for firms. According to this perspective, the survival of the firm is
contingent upon its ability to respond to the demands and expectations emanating from
the institutional environment (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) and, the ability of the firm to
secure external legitimacy from the environment’s constituents (DiMaggio & Powell,
1983). IT focuses on the efforts of firms to respond to institutional pressures by
acquiescing to local values and norms (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Legitimacy has been
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characterized by IT theorists as the degree of cultural support for an organization
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Meyer & Rowan (1977) maintain that legitimacy is
intertwined with access to resources, stability and enhanced prospects for firm survival.
In this regard, foreign-investing MNEs are able to secure legitimacy through efforts to
conform to the demands of the institutional environment in the host country market
(Kostova & Zaheer, 1999).
Corruption can become so intrinsically embedded in a host market that it becomes
a fundamental component of a country’s institutional environment (Spencer & Gomez,
2011). When firms face uncertainty that is attributable to the institutionalization of
corruption, they tend to conform to the pressures emanating from the institutional
environment (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). Spencer & Gomez (2011) found that more
pronounced host market corruption will heighten a subsidiary’s need to engage in
bribery. Prior conceptual work has proposed that an MNE is more likely to enter foreign
markets via a wholly owned subsidiary when host market corruption is more pervasive
(Rodriguez et al., 2005). Under these circumstances, it has been suggested that MNEs can
secure legitimacy by directly complying with corrupt agents, thereby reducing the need to
integrate into local networks (Rodriguez et al., 2005).
Despite the fact that MNEs might prefer to enter into increasingly corrupt host
market environments via a wholly-owned subsidiary, firms have empirically
demonstrated a preference for partnering when host market corruption is highly arbitrary
(Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). Further, when cultural distance between the home and host
country market is greater, JVs between home country partners have been found to enjoy
heightened survivability when compared to JVs constituted by both home and host
country partners (Makino & Beamish, 1998). Given that local partners are more
embedded in local networks, they tend to be approached more frequently than foreign
partners by corrupt agents (Meschi, 2009). Under these circumstances, foreign partners
are exposed to heightened costs because the foreign partners rarely have input into the
corrupt negotiations and the local partners are more inclined to comply with the demands
of the corrupt agent in a less restricted manner (Rodriguez et al., 2005). A firm lacking
social legitimacy in a host country market will likely select a partner that has proven its
ability to conform to the expectations of institutional constituents with respect to
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appropriate business behavior (Dacin, Oliver, & Roy, 2007). We contend that under
conditions of heightened host market corruption, the MNE is more likely to choose a
partner from the MNE’s home country. A partner from the MNE’s home country is
equally capable of sharing risk and oversight with the foreign-investing MNE (Roy,
2012), as well as providing the MNE with local knowledge and learning (Parkhe, 1993)
with respect to how the MNE can interface most efficiently with corrupt agents.
Given the hypothesized preference for either wholly-owned governance or home
market-oriented JV partnerships in foreign markets under conditions of heightened
corruption pervasiveness, a foreign-investing MNE will require resources from its
headquarters in order to support the subsidiary’s efforts to directly conform to the
institutional environment. Resource support from parent MNEs is often contingent upon
the subsidiary’s efforts to conform to norms dictated by the headquarters (Hillman &
Wan, 2005; Kostova, 1999). Accordingly, we expect that the tension between local
adaptation and global standardization in the subsidiary’s management practices
(Björkman, 2006) will be resolved in favor of global standardization. An increase in the
number of expatriates in a subsidiary has been found to predict heightened
standardization (Rosenzweig & Nohria, 1994). In fact, the presence of expatriates
activates the diffusion of an MNE’s standardized practices within a foreign subsidiary
(Lu & Bjorkman, 1997).
Taken together, the strategic prescriptions advanced by the IT perspective are
characterized by a spatial orientation that envisions the integration of home country
employees and partners into the subsidiary investment in order to bolster the MNE’s
efforts to secure legitimacy and reduce the likelihood of market exit under conditions of
more pervasive host market corruption. Accordingly, we hypothesize that
Hypothesis 6: The positive relationship between the pervasiveness of host
market corruption (public or private) and an MNE’s likelihood of market
exit is weakened by an increase in subsidiary expatriate intensity.
Hypothesis 7: The positive relationship between the pervasiveness of host
market corruption (public or private) and an MNE’s likelihood of market
exit is weakened when a home country partner is engaged in the JV
subsidiary investment.
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METHODS
Data Sources and Key Variables
We tested our hypotheses using a sample of subsidiary investments established in
31 countries1 during the period 1998 through 2005. The sample was taken from annual
editions of the Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyou Souran covering this time period (Toyo Keizai).
This data source reports on the worldwide foreign direct investment (FDI) activity of
Japanese multinational enterprises (MNEs). To avoid left truncation problems, any
subsidiaries for which a founding date was not reported were precluded from the sample.
Japanese MNE parents established 4,399 subsidiaries in these 31 foreign markets
between 1998 and 2005. The number of subsidiaries included in each of the regression
models reported in Tables 14-16 was reduced due to missing values (unreported data),
primarily with respect to parent and subsidiary covariates employed in our study. After
removing subsidiaries that lacked sufficient data to conduct our regression analyses, our
study’s sample was constituted by 5,099 observations for 1,239 subsidiary investments
situated in the 31 countries during the study period. We lagged our observations of the
dependent variable by one year relative to the observations with respect to the measures
of public corruption and private corruption in the host markets. Given that 1997 was the
first year for which some of the indicators were available to measure private corruption
and 2004 was the last year for which data pertaining to one of these indicators was
available, our study period was determined by the availability of country-level data.

Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in our study was a binary measure in which subsidiaries
still in existence at the end of the study period were coded with the value of 0, while
subsidiaries that exited the market before the end of the study period were coded with the
value of 1. Market exit was defined as the disappearance of a subsidiary listed in a
previous edition of the Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyou Souran from the subsequent edition of
1

The number of subsidiary investments in each country is in brackets: Argentina (2), Australia (17),
Austria (1), Belgium (18), Brazil (9), Canada (8), China (371), Czech Republic (8), France (31), Germany
(39), Hong Kong (63), Hungary (5), India (15), Indonesia (18), Korea (47), Malaysia (11), Mexico (6),
Netherlands (22), New Zealand (6), Philippines (14), Poland (7), Russia (4), Singapore (67), South Africa
(4), Spain (9), Switzerland (6), Taiwan (80), Thailand (56), Turkey (2), United Kingdom (52), United
States (241).
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the data source (Chung & Beamish, 2005). In this regard, subsidiaries that were delisted
from the sample were treated as exits because our data source (Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyou
Souran) has previously been recognized as closely approximating the population of
Japanese FDI (Delios & Makino, 2003; Dhanaraj & Beamish, 2004). Further, prior
research has also confirmed that the instances of exit reported in our data source were
authentic instances of exit by comparing exits reported in the data source with externally
reported accounts of exit (Delios & Beamish, 2004). Further, following prior research, we
also treated all instances in which full Japanese ownership of the subsidiary investment
was sold off as an instance of market exit by the parent firm (Dai, Eden, & Beamish,
2013). Subsidiaries that continued in existence at the end of the study period were treated
as right-censored (Cleves, Gould, Gutierrez, & Marchenko, 2008). As such, our data set
provided empirical data indicating the status of each subsidiary at the end of the
observation period (2005), as well as the longevity of those subsidiaries that exited prior
to the end of the observation period, both of which are required to model the likelihood of
market exit (Cleves et al., 2008). In total, we observed 180 exits associated with the
subsidiary investments in our sample during the study period.

Focal Independent Variables
Proximal and distal localization strategies. We elaborated our theory pertaining
to proximal localization strategies and distal localization strategies by focusing on two
different strategies – expatriate strategy and partnering strategy. An MNE’s expatriate
strategy captures the degree to which the MNE deploys expatriate employees to the
subsidiary investment and has routinely been measured in terms of the subsidiary’s
expatriate intensity (or, the ratio of expatriate employees working in the subsidiary to
total employees in the subsidiary). Prior research has found that Japanese MNEs have
demonstrated a tendency to either not use third country employees in subsidiary
investments (Gong, 2003; Tung, 1982) or, to use them very sparingly (Peterson, Napier,
& Shul-Shim, 2000). As such, an increase or decrease in Japanese subsidiary expatriate
intensity implicitly conveys an indication of the MNE’s choice between a greater
proportion of either home country employees (expatriates) or host country employees.
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Partnering strategy focuses on the MNE’s choice of partner. Makino and Beamish
(1998) developed a taxonomy of JV partnership arrangements which distinguishes
between three different JV configurations - traditional JV (a JV in which the MNE
engages a host country (local) equity partner in the subsidiary investment), crossnational
JV (in which the MNE engages a home country partner) and trinational JV (in which the
MNE engages an equity partner from a third country other than the home or host
countries). We estimated models using two different cutoff conventions that have been
used in the literature to distinguish JV investments from wholly-owned subsidiaries (Yiu
& Makino, 2002). Using the 80 percent cutoff, 316 of the subsidiaries in our sample were
JV investments, of which 252 (79.7%) were traditional JVs, 46 (14.6%) were
crossnational JVs and 18 (5.6%) were trinational JVs. The 95 percent cutoff convention
resulted in 367 of the subsidiaries being categorized as JV investments, 280 (76.2%) of
which were traditional JVs, 69 (18.8%) were crossnational JVs and 18 (4.9%) were
trinational JVs. Consistent with Makino and Beamish’s (1998) finding that trinational
JVs constituted close to 3% of the JV investments in their sample, we also found that
trinational JVs constituted a relatively nominal proportion of our sample of JVs. As
such, given the small proportion of trinational JVs in our sample and given that the
decision to choose a third country partner does not constitute one of the strategies
contemplated by our theory, these JVs were not included in our empirical analyses
pertaining to an MNE’s partnering strategy.
To summarize, based on our dichotomized conceptualization of a subsidiary’s
localization strategies as being either proximal or distal, a subsidiary executing proximal
localization strategies could be expected to prefer a traditional JV ownership structure
(with a home country (local) partner) and to employ a smaller proportion of expatriates in
the foreign subsidiary. Conversely, a subsidiary that chooses to implement distal
localization strategies would be expected to invest through a crossnational ownership
structure (with a home country partner), as well as an increased preference for expatriate
employees.
Public corruption pervasiveness and private corruption pervasiveness. Prior
work that has conceptualized host market corruption in terms of two distinct dimensions
(public versus private) has operationalized public corruption pervasiveness using
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Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) scores (Sartor, 2014b).
Similarly, we employed the measure of private corruption pervasiveness developed by
Sartor (2014b), utilizing data from IMD’s Word Competitiveness Yearbooks (WCY)
pertaining to insider trading and tax evasion, as well as indicators from the World
Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Reports (GCR) with respect to racketeering /
organized crime. We conducted a principal components analysis with an orthogonal
(varimax) rotation and an eigenvalue cutoff equal to 1 using a holdout sample of
subsidiaries that were established in the same host markets during the period 1998-2005.
The results supported the theoretically-expected one factor solution. Table 12 presents the
factor loadings for each indicator on the private corruption pervasiveness construct. A
reliability analysis was also conducted and we concluded that the Cronbach’s alpha for
these three indicators (0.88) was sufficient to establish internal consistency (Nunnally &
Bernstein, 1994). Given that the CPI, WCY and GCR data are reported such that low
scores indicate high corruption and high scores indicate low corruption, in order to
enhance the ease of interpretation of our regression estimations, we reverse-coded all
three data sources so that higher scores were indicative of more pronounced corruption
pervasiveness in our regression models.

Control Variables
Our study incorporated subsidiary, parent, industry, regional and countrylevel control variables that have been found to be significant predictors of the likelihood
of an MNE exiting a host market. Subsidiary size was measured as the log of the
subsidiary’s capitalization (Chung & Beamish, 2010) and included as a covariate because
a positive relationship has been shown to exist between subsidiary size and subsidiary
survival (Li, 1995). The focal MNE’s proportionate share of equity in the subsidiary
investment (parent ownership level) has also been found to exert a positive impact on the
likelihood of the subsidiary continuing to operate in the host market (Dai et al., 2013).
We controlled for parent size using the log of the parent MNE’s total worldwide sales
because larger size provides inertia against instability (Delacroix, 1993). Further,
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TABLE 12
Factor Analysis Results
Factor loading

Latent construct and associated ite ms
a

Private corruption pervasive ne ss :

a

Tax evasion

Tax evasion is (1 = a common practice,
10 = not a common practice) in your
country.

0.85

Insider trading

Insider trading is (1 = common in the
stock market, 10 = not common in the
stock market).

0.91

Prevalence of racketeering & extortion

(Racketeering & extortion) in your
country (1 = imposes significant costs on
business, 7 = does not impose significant
costs on business).

0.83

Cronbach's alpha = 0.88

corruption has been found to impair the growth of small firms but not larger firms (Zhou
& Peng, 2012). We also controlled for parent profitability using the parent MNE’s return
on assets (the log ratio of income to total assets), as well as parent leverage (the
difference between total assets and total debt as a percentage of total assets), reasoning
that stronger profitability and a greater availability of slack financial resources (Reuer &
Ragozzino, 2006) would provide greater stability for the parents’ subsidiaries. We
controlled for parent experience using the ratio of an MNE’s foreign sales (exports) to
total sales (Chang & Rosenzweig, 2001) because experience has been found to exert a
negative impact on subsidiary survival (Gaur & Lu, 2007). Industry effects were
controlled for using a dummy variable that categorized firms as either manufacturing or
non-manufacturing entities. Given that more than 55% of the subsidiary investments in
our study were situated in Asia, we employed a dummy variable (region) to distinguish
between subsidiaries hosted in Asian countries and subsidiaries established in other
regions. Host market size has also been found to exert a negative impact on the likelihood
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of market exit (Dai et al., 2013). We operationalized host market size using the log of
each host country’s total gross domestic product (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). Further, our
research focuses on the impact of host market corruption pervasiveness (an informal
institution) on the likelihood of market exit. Accordingly, we also controlled for the
effects of formal institutions on the persistence of these subsidiary investments by
operationalizing formal institutions in terms of FDI restrictions which we measured
using the Heritage Foundation’s score for each country pertaining to the restrictiveness of
the foreign investment regime in the host market. In doing so, we reasoned that more
restrictive formal institutions would provide an indication of the challenges to subsidiary
survival posed by the formal institutional environment. Finally, we controlled for cultural
distance. Among other uses (Robertson & Watson, 2004), the cultural distance construct
has been employed in research to explain differences in firm success (Shenkar, 2001).
Cultural distance was computed as the difference between Japan and the host countries
using Hofstede’s scores (2001) and Kogut and Singh’s (1988) measure of cultural
distance.

Estimation Method
Event history analysis or, survival analysis, involves substituting the assumption
of normally distributed residuals that characterizes OLS regression (Cleves et al., 2008).
Even though linear regression is robust to non-normality, it is not robust to the nonsymmetrical distributional features that characterize the survival variable in most data
sets employed in event history analysis (Cleves et al., 2008). While the Cox proportional
hazards model provides a convenient alternative to linear regression in the context of
event history analysis, the technique assumes that at any point in time, the ratio of the
hazards for any two subsidiaries will be constant (Allison, 1984). However, if this
assumption regarding the proportionality of hazards is wrong, misleading coefficients
will be generated (Cleves et al., 2008). As such, analysis based on the Cox proportional
hazards model should be accompanied by a test of the proportional hazards assumption to
confirm the veracity of the assumption (Allison, 1984). Unfortunately, scholars routinely
neglect to test the proportional hazards assumption in studies that use the Cox
proportional hazards model (Baba & Goko, 2009). Following the proportional hazards
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assumption tests specified in Cleves et al. (2008), we determined that the assumption of
proportional hazards could not be verified for our sample. As such, we needed to
ascertain a more appropriate distributional assumption with respect to the residuals.
Fortunately, parametric event history analysis contemplates the substitution of a more
appropriate distributional assumption with respect to the residuals (Cleves et al., 2008).
Parametric models offer the advantage of more precise estimates of the coefficients for
the variables that predict survival. When the shape of the hazard function is unknown, the
Akaike information criterion (AIC) provides a statistically-based approach to determine
the most appropriate parametric model (Cleves et al., 2008). The results of our AIC
analysis suggested that the lognormal and loglogistic models were the most appropriate
parametric models for our sample.
While Model 1 (which is presented in Table 14) was employed to test Hypotheses
1, 2 and 3, Model 2 (presented in Table 15) reports the results associated with our tests of
Hypotheses 4 and 6 with respect to expatriate strategy. Finally, Table 16 presents Model
3 which tests Hypotheses 5 and 7 pertaining to partnering strategy. Robust standard
errors were estimated to account for heteroskedasticity (Chung & Beamish, 2010; Dai et
al., 2013). Before investigating the effects of any of the interaction terms in our models,
the continuous focal independent variables (public corruption, private corruption and
expatriate intensity) were centered about their means (Aiken & West, 1991)

RESULTS
Table 13 presents descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix for our sample.
The results of our estimations are presented in Tables 14, 15 and 16. Our regression
tables present a base model which excludes the focal corruption variables and the MNE
strategy variables (expatriate strategy and partnering strategy), along with models that
introduce the interaction effects predicted in our hypotheses and the associated main
effects.
Notably, the correlation between public corruption pervasiveness and private
corruption pervasiveness was found to be 0.95 for our sample. Prior research that focused
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TABLE 13
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Variable
1 Exit
2 Expatriate strategy (log)

S.D.

1

-

-

-0.75

0.58

-0.03

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

3 Partnering strategy a
4 Subsidiary size (log)

-

-

-0.05

-0.23

2.17

1.01

-0.02

-0.07

5 Parent ownership level

75.82

35.14

-0.05

0.17

0.06

6 Parent size (log)

5.22

0.79

0.10

-0.18

-0.01

0.04

7 Parent profitability

0.01

0.06

-0.03

0.00

-0.01

-0.03

0.01

8 Parent experience

0.16

0.19

-0.02

-0.14

0.00

0.02

0.03

0.13

-0.03

9 Parent leverage

0.99

0.03

0.01

-0.08

0.01

0.01

-0.07

0.20

0.26

0.08

10 Industry dummy

-

-

0.09

0.09

-0.07

0.00

0.03

0.09

0.02

-0.12

11 Region dummy

-

-

-0.12

-0.21

0.12

0.03

-0.04

-0.03

-0.04

0.01

0.08

12 Host market size (log)

3.01

0.66

0.00

0.10

-0.08

0.03

-0.02

-0.09

-0.02

-0.07

-0.09

13 FDI restrictions

5.96

2.07

0.06

0.16

-0.04

-0.08

0.07

-0.01

0.06

0.00

-0.06

14 Cultural distance

2.88

0.87

-0.02

0.01

0.00

-0.07

0.04

-0.04

0.02

-0.02

0.03

15 Public corruption pervasiveness

4.28

2.29

-0.13

-0.28

0.10

0.08

-0.13

0.08

-0.05

0.05

0.06

16 Private corruption pervasiveness

0.08
-0.02
-0.15
-0.06

-0.01

4.94

1.20

-0.13

-0.24

0.09

0.09

-0.10

0.07

-0.05

0.04

0.06

17 Public corruption x expatriate strategy (log)

-

-

-0.04

0.38

-0.06

0.09

0.07

-0.01

-0.01

-0.03

0.03

18 Private corruption x expatriate strategy (log)

-

-

-0.04

0.35

-0.05

0.09

0.05

0.00

0.00

-0.03

0.02

19 Public corruption x partnering strategy

-

-

0.09

0.14

0.30

-0.04

0.07

-0.06

0.03

-0.01

-0.04

20 Private corruption x partnering strategy

-

-

0.10

0.12

0.25

-0.05

0.05

-0.07

0.04

-0.01

-0.04

10

11

Variable
11 Region dummy

a

Mean

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

-0.14

12 Host market size (log)

0.16

-0.50

13 FDI restrictions

0.01

-0.37

-0.15

14 Cultural distance

0.10

0.32

-0.23

-0.11

15 Public corruption pervasiveness

-0.15

0.61

-0.10

-0.58

-0.21

16 Private corruption pervasiveness

-0.14

0.51

-0.03

-0.59

-0.32

0.95

17 Public corruption x expatriate strategy (log)

0.03

0.05

0.04

-0.10

-0.10

0.13

18 Private corruption x expatriate strategy (log)

0.02

0.02

0.07

-0.08

-0.16

0.15

0.18

0.95

19 Public corruption x partnering strategy

0.08

-0.40

0.08

0.39

0.18

-0.68

-0.66

-0.24

-0.25

20 Private corruption x partnering strategy

0.08

-0.34

0.04

0.41

0.26

-0.66

-0.71

-0.24

-0.27

0.15

Dichotomous dependent variable: Traditional joint venture (with a host country (local) partner) or crossnational joint venture (with

a home country partner).
Correlations with an absolute value greater than 0.08 are statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level. All are two-tailed tests.
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TABLE 14
Results of Event History Analyses of Public Corruption Pervasiveness and
Private Corruption Pervasiveness on the Likelihood of Market Exit
Public and Private Corruption Pe rvasive ne ss
Main Effe cts

Base Mode l
Variable s

Mode l 1A

Intercept

1.96 (1.13)

Mode l 1B
t

a

Inte raction Effe ct
Mode l 1D

Mode l 1C

Mode l 1E

1.59 (1.14)

0.69 (1.17)

1.58 (1.07)

1.65 (1.08)

-0.06 (0.04)

-0.06 (0.04)

-0.05 (0.04)

-0.05 (0.04)

Subsidiary effects
Subsidiary size (log)

-0.06 (0.04)

Parent effects
Parent ownership level
Parent size (log)

b

0.04 (0.01)
-0.16 (0.07)

Parent profitability

2.49 (0.79)

Parent experience

-0.16 (0.25)

Parent leverage

2.06 (0.94)

**
*
**

0.04 (0.01)
-0.16 (0.07)
2.46 (0.79)

**
*
**

-0.18 (0.25)
*

2.09 (0.94)

0.04 (0.01)
-0.17 (0.07)
2.42 (0.79)

**
*
**

-0.19 (0.25)
*

2.10 (0.92)

0.04 (0.01)
-0.16 (0.07)
2.42 (0.78)

**
*
**

-0.18 (0.24)
*

2.07 (0.89)

0.04 (0.01)
-0.16 (0.07)
2.44 (0.78)

**
*
**

-0.18 (0.24)
*

2.06 (0.89)

*

Industry effect
Industry dummy

-0.54 (0.11)

***

-0.54 (0.11)

***

-0.53 (0.10)

***

-0.52 (0.10)

***

-0.53 (0.10)

***

Region effects
Region dummy

0.54 (0.12)

***

0.38 (0.16)

*

0.30 (0.16)

t

0.43 (0.17)

*

0.43 (0.17)

*

Country effects
Host market size (log)
FDI restrictions

0.22 (0.08)
-0.05 (0.02)

Cultural distance

-0.10 (0.05)

**
t
t

0.20 (0.08)

*

0.16 (0.09)

t

0.15 (0.09)

t

0.13 (0.09)

-0.03 (0.02)

0.00 (0.03)

0.00 (0.03)

0.00 (0.03)

-0.03 (0.06)

0.03 (0.06)

0.03 (0.06)

0.04 (0.07)

Main effects
Public corruption pervasiveness

0.06 (0.03)

Private corruption pervasiveness

t

-0.17 (0.09)
0.20 (0.08)

**

0.50 (0.18)

*
**

-0.17 (0.09)
0.49 (0.18)

t
**

Interaction effect
Public corruption x private corruption

-0.02 (0.03)

Variance inflation factor range

1.02 - 2.00

1.02 - 3.42

1.02 - 3.13

1.02 - 13.78

1.02 - 13.89

Number of observations

5,099

5,099

5,099

5,099

5,099

Number of exits

180

180

180

180

180

108.60 ***

108.15 ***

108.52 ***

110.98 ***

114.05 ***

AIC

1497.61

1496.93

1490.95

1488.08

1489.81

Log likelihood

-735.81

-734.46

-731.47

-729.04

-728.90

1.35

4.34

6.77

6.91



2

∆ log likelihood

c

a

The dependent variable is coded as follows: 0: survived; 1: exited.
-1
Rescaled by a factor of 10 .
c
When compared to the base model.
n = 1,239 subsidiary investments.
b

t

p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
All are two-tailed tests. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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TABLE 15
Results of Event History Analyses of Public Corruption Pervasiveness,
Private Corruption Pervasiveness and Expatriate Strategy
on the Likelihood of Market Exit
Expatriate Strate gy a
Base Mode l
Variable s

Model 2B

Mode l 2A

Intercept

1.92 (0.99)

Inte raction Effect:
Public Corruption x Expatriate Strategy

t

Model 2C

Interaction Effect:
Private Corruption x Expatriate Strategy
Model 2D

Model 2E

2.68 (1.81)

2.60 (1.83)

2.64 (1.84)

2.63 (1.84)

-0.08 (0.07)

-0.08 (0.07)

-0.08 (0.07)

-0.08 (0.07)

Subsidiary effects
Subsidiary size (log)

-0.05 (0.04)

Parent effects
Parent ownership level
Parent size (log)

b

0.04 (0.01)
-0.14 (0.07)

Parent profitability

2.24 (0.73)

Parent experience

-0.21 (0.25)

Parent leverage

1.78 (0.80)

**
*
**

*

0.10 (0.02)
-0.23 (0.11)
2.33 (0.90)

**
*
**

0.10 (0.02)
-0.23 (0.11)
2.32 (0.90)

**
*
*

0.10 (0.02)
-0.23 (0.11)
2.33 (0.89)

**
*
**

0.10 (0.02)
-0.23 (0.11)
2.35 (0.89)

0.04 (0.44)

0.03 (0.45)

0.06 (0.44)

0.05 (0.45)

1.64 (1.64)

1.64 (1.66)

1.67 (1.67)

1.65 (1.67)

**
*
**

Industry effect
Industry dummy

-0.52 (0.10)

***

-0.47 (0.16)

**

-0.46 (0.16)

**

-0.47 (0.16)

**

-0.46 (0.16)

**

Region effects
Region dummy

0.44 (0.12)

***

0.32 (0.26)

0.34 (0.26)

0.32 (0.24)

0.37 (0.26)

Country effects
Host market size (log)
FDI restrictions

-0.04 (0.02)

0.17 (0.08)

Cultural distance

-0.09 (0.05)

*
t
t

0.18 (0.12)
-0.06 (0.03)

t

-0.08 (0.09)

0.16 (0.14)

0.16 (0.13)

0.15 (0.13)

-0.05 (0.04)

-0.06 (0.04)

-0.05 (0.04)

-0.06 (0.10)

-0.05 (0.10)

-0.05 (0.10)

-0.26 (0.16)

-0.26 (0.16)

Subsidiary localization strategy
Expatriate strategy (log)

-0.27 (0.16)

t

-0.26 (0.16)

t

Main effects
Public corruption pervasiveness

0.01 (0.05)

-0.05 (0.14)

Private corruption pervasiveness

-0.06 (0.14)

0.15 (0.33)

0.05 (0.13)

0.16 (0.31)

Interaction effects
Public corruption x expatriate strategy (log)

0.11 (0.07)

t

0.11 (0.07)

t

Private corruption x expatriate strategy (log)

0.33 (0.15)

0.32 (0.15)

*

Variance inflation factor range

1.02 - 2.00

1.04 - 3.35

1.04 - 13.89

1.04 - 3.43

1.04 - 13.86

Number of observations

5,099

3,176

3,176

3,176

3,176

Number of exits

180

77

77

77

77

89.97 ***

52.00 ***

52.18 ***

53.36 ***

53.98 ***



2

AIC

1508.99

706.09

707.66

706.09

707.66

Log likelihood

-741.49

-337.04

-336.83

-335.15

-335.01

404.45

404.66

406.34

406.48

∆ log likelihood

c

a

The dependent variable is coded as follows: 0: survived; 1: exited.

b

Rescaled by a factor of 10 .

-1

c

When compared to the base model.
n = 665 subsidiary investments.
t

*

p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
All are two-tailed tests. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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TABLE 16
Results of Event History Analyses of Public Corruption Pervasiveness,
Private Corruption Pervasiveness and Partnering Strategy on the Likelihood of Market Exit
Partne ring Strate gy

ab

Inte raction Effe ct:
Base Mode l
Variable s

Mode l 3A

Intercept

Inte raction Effe ct:

Public Corruption x Partne ring Strate gy
Mode l 3B
Mode l 3C

Private Corruption x Partne ring Strate gy
Mode l 3D
Mode l 3E

-0.96 (6.53)

-1.34 (6.51)

-1.35 (6.54)

-1.35 (6.52)

-1.37 (6.55)

-0.01 (0.06)

-0.01 (0.07)

-0.02 (0.07)

-0.01 (0.07)

-0.01 (0.07)

Subsidiary effects
Subsidiary size (log)
Parent effects
Parent ownership level

0.01 (0.00)

Parent size (log)

-0.21 (0.11)

*
t

0.01 (0.00)
-0.22 (0.11)

*
*

0.01 (0.00)
-0.22 (0.11)

*
*

0.01 (0.00)
-0.22 (0.11)

*
*

0.01 (0.00)
-0.22 (0.11)

Parent profitability

2.37 (1.83)

2.31 (1.85)

2.31 (1.86)

2.35 (1.84)

2.36 (1.85)

Parent experience

-0.55 (0.42)

-0.45 (0.40)

-0.45 (0.40)

-0.44 (0.41)

-0.45 (0.40)

5.93 (6.56)

6.47 (6.56)

6.57 (6.59)

6.47 (6.57)

6.56 (6.59)

Parent leverage

*
*

Industry effect
Industry dummy

-0.70 (0.15)

***

-0.71 (0.16)

***

-0.73 (0.16)

***

-0.72 (0.16)

***

-0.72 (0.16)

***

Region effects
Region dummy

0.05 (0.21)

-0.03 (0.26)

-0.02 (0.25)

0.02 (0.25)

-0.01 (0.26)

Country effects
Host market size (log)
FDI restrictions

-0.09 (0.03)

-0.02 (0.16)

Cultural distance

-0.13 (0.08)

-0.04 (0.15)
**

-0.09 (0.03)

-0.03 (0.16)
**

-0.10 (0.03)

-0.04 (0.15)
**

-0.10 (0.03)

-0.02 (0.16)
**

-0.10 (0.03)

-0.12 (0.09)

-0.15 (0.09)

-0.14 (0.09)

-0.16 (0.08)

-0.26 (0.23)

-0.26 (0.23)

-0.27 (0.23)

-0.26 (0.23)

0.02 (0.10)

-0.13 (0.22)

-0.33 (0.22)

-0.34 (0.21)

**
t

Subsidiary localization strategy
Partnering strategy
Main effects
Public corruption pervasiveness

0.03 (0.05)

0.10 (0.11)

Private corruption pervasiveness

0.08 (0.11)

-0.16 (0.22)

Interaction effects
Public corruption x partnering strategy

-0.19 (0.11)

t

-0.19 (0.11)

t

Private corruption x partnering strategy
Variance inflation factor range

1.04 - 1.81

1.05 - 2.76

1.06 - 10.36

1.05 - 2.88

1.05 - 10.54

Number of observations

1,302

1,302

1,302

1,302

1,302

Number of exits

52

52

52

52

52

46.53 ***

51.82 ***

53.60 ***

50.73 ***

53.23 ***



2

AIC

384.01

385.90

387.40

387.39

387.39

Log likelihood

-179.01

-176.95

-176.70

-177.38

-177.10

2.06

2.31

1.63

1.91

∆ log likelihood

c

a

The dependent variable is coded as follows: 0: survived; 1: exited.
The partnering strategy independent variable is coded as follows: 0: traditional JV (with a host country (local) partner; 1: crossnational JV (with
a home country partner).
c
When compared to the base model.
n = 298 subsidiary investments.
b

t

p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
All are two-tailed tests. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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on emerging markets as a research context used the same indicators of public corruption
and private corruption that we employed in this study and found a 0.48 correlation
between the two constructs (Sartor, 2014b). When we isolated the emerging marketbased subsidiaries in our sample, we found a correlation of 0.53 between the two
constructs, whereas the correlation was 0.90 for developed market-based subsidiaries.
Given Rodriguez et al.’s (2006: 739) proposition that “it is clear that government
corruption and private corruption often go hand in hand”, we believe that there are both
theoretical and practical reasons for which it can be expected that public corruption and
private corruption exist simultaneously in host markets. Consequently, it seems
theoretically imperative that both variables should be included in the same regression
estimations. However, in light of the high correlation between the public corruption and
private corruption variables in our study, we recognize that this would pose an increased
risk of multicollinearity in our regression estimates. An increase in collinearity is
important for at least two reasons. First, the regression equation’s standard errors can
become inflated and, second, its estimated parameters can become increasingly uncertain
or unreliable (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). This is manifest in an increased variance
inflation factor score (VIF) for the regression model. The normally recommended
maximum VIF score in international business strategy research is 10 (Stephan & Uhlaner,
2010). Beyond the high correlation between the public corruption and private corruption
variables, none of the correlations for variables included in the same models in our study
exceed the recommended cutoff of 0.70 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Given this, we
implemented two strategies to ensure that the results that we present in Tables 15-16 are
robust and unencumbered by concerns regarding multicollinearity.
First, in Tables 15 and 16, we present a model which includes both the interaction
effect and one of the corruption main effects, along with a corresponding model which
includes the interaction effect and both of the corruption main effects. For example, in
Table 15, Model 2B presents a regression estimation which includes the interaction effect
between public corruption and expatriate intensity, along with the main effect of public
corruption and the main effect of expatriate intensity. Our expectation that
multicollinearity would not be a concern in this model was supported by the Model’s
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relatively low maximum VIF score (3.35). Model 2C includes these same three effects
and adds the private corruption main effect to the model as a covariate. We were not
surprised to find that the addition of this highly correlated main effect as a covariate
would result in a high maximum VIF score (13.89) for the model. However, our approach
allows for a comparison of the focal coefficient (the interaction effect) under conditions
of both low multicollinearity and high multicollinearity. We reasoned that if the focal
interaction coefficient was relatively similar under both conditions, then this would
support our position that multicollinearity was not driving our results.
Second, we re-executed Models 1-3 as two additional sets of estimations by
segregating our study’s full sample (1,239 subsidiaries) into two sub-samples. One subsample was constituted by subsidiaries hosted in developed markets (660 subsidiaries)
and the other by subsidiaries hosted in emerging markets (579 subsidiaries). The results
associated with these sub-sample robustness checks are presented in Appendix C.
Public corruption, private corruption and market exit. Table 14 presents the
results pertaining to the hypotheses that were developed to test the direct relationship
between host market corruption and the likelihood of market exit. Both Hypothesis 1
(public corruption) and Hypothesis 2 (private corruption) predicted that an MNE is more
likely to exit a market when corruption is more pervasive in the host market. The
significant main effect for public corruption (β = 0.06, p < 0.10) in Model 1B (χ2 =
108.15, p < 0.001) provided support for Hypothesis 1. Similarly, the significant main
effect for private corruption (β = 0.20, p < 0.01) in Model 1C (χ2 = 108.52, p < 0.001)
provided support for Hypothesis 2. The maximum VIF was 3.42.
Consistent with Husted’s (1994) observations that host market public corruption
and private corruption are not mutually exclusive, Model 1D (χ2 = 110.98, p < 0.001)
tests the main effects associated with both dimensions of host market corruption
simultaneously. The results reveal that both public corruption (β = -0.17, p < 0.05) and
private corruption (β = 0.50, p < 0.01) significantly predict the likelihood of market exit.
However, the results suggest that whereas an increase in the pervasiveness of private
corruption increases the likelihood of market exit, an increase in public corruption
reduces the likelihood of exit. As such, while the results support Hypothesis 2, the sign of
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the coefficient for public corruption is in the opposite direction of the sign predicted by
Hypothesis 1. In order to test the interaction effect in Hypothesis 3, Model 1E (χ2 =
114.05, p < 0.001) was estimated to include the main effects for each dimension of
corruption, along with the interaction effect between public and private corruption. The
main effects of public corruption (β = -0.17, p < 0.10) and private corruption (β = 0.49, p
< 0.01) both continued to be significant and the signs of the coefficients were unchanged.
However, the interaction effect between the two dimensions of corruption was not
significant. As such, Hypothesis 3 was not supported. While Models 1D and 1E exhibited
high maximum VIF scores (13.78 and 13.89, respectively), when we re-executed these
models using the two sub-samples (developed market-based subsidiaries and emerging
market-based subsidiaries), the maximum VIF score dropped below the recommended
upper limit of 10 (Stephan & Uhlaner, 2010). Further, the interaction effect became
significant when we used the emerging market-based sample of subsidiaries. We discuss
these results in more detail in the Appendix.
Expatriate strategy and public corruption. Table 15 presents the results with
respect to Hypotheses 4 and 6 pertaining to the moderating effect of expatriate strategy
on the relationship between host market corruption and market exit. Given that some of
the MNEs in our full sample did not report the number of expatriates employed in the
subsidiary investment, it was not possible to calculate some subsidiaries’ expatriate
intensity for our analyses pertaining to an MNE’s expatriate strategy. As such, our
sample of 1,239 subsidiaries was reduced due to this missing data and our estimations in
Table 15 were based on 3,176 observations pertaining to 665 subsidiaries. A total of 77
exits occurred within this sample during the study period. Model 2B (χ2 = 52.00, p <
0.001) was used to test the competition between Hypothesis 4 (which predicted that a
decrease in expatriate intensity would reduce the likelihood of market exit under
conditions of heightened public corruption), and Hypothesis 6 which predicted the
opposite outcome (an increase in expatriate intensity would reduce the likelihood of
market exit under conditions of heightened public corruption). As discussed above,
Model 2B (maximum VIF is 3.35) tests this interaction effect between public corruption
and expatriate intensity without controlling for the main effect of private corruption, in
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order to allay concerns regarding multicollinearity. Model 2C (χ2 = 52.18, p < 0.001)
tests the same interaction effect while also controlling for private corruption. Testing this
interaction between public corruption and expatriate intensity revealed a significant
effect (β = 0.11, p < 0.10) in both Models 2B and 2C. Figure 6 plots the interaction
(Dawson, 2014). The Figure reveals an interesting dichotomy. When the pervasiveness of
public corruption is low, a decrease in expatriate intensity appears to increase the
likelihood of market exit. However, as public corruption becomes more pervasive in the
host market, a decrease in the subsidiary’s expatriate intensity decreases the likelihood of
market exit. As such, we concluded that while the results of Model 2B and 2C are
generally supportive of Hypothesis 4 at higher levels of public corruption, Hypothesis 6
is supported only at low levels of public corruption.
Expatriate strategy and private corruption. Models 2D (χ2 = 53.36, p < 0.001)
and 2E (χ2 = 53.98, p < 0.001) in Table 15 were also used to test the comparison between
Hypothesis 4 (a decrease in expatriate intensity will reduce the likelihood of market exit
under conditions of heightened private corruption) and Hypothesis 6 which predicted the
opposite result (an increase in expatriate intensity would reduce the likelihood of market
exit under conditions of heightened private corruption). These estimations revealed a
significant interaction effect (Model 2D: β = 0.33, p < 0.05; Model 2E: β = 0.32, p <
0.05). Notably, the results for the interaction effect coefficient in the model that
controlled for public corruption (Model 2E) were very similar to the results in the model
that did not control for public corruption (Model 2D: maximum VIF = 3.43), which
supports our position that multicollinearity was not responsible for the focal results. We
plotted this interaction in Figure 7 and found that as private corruption becomes more
pervasive in the host market, a decrease in expatriate intensity reduces the likelihood of
market exit. As such, we concluded that Hypothesis 4 was supported in the case of
private corruption, but Hypothesis 6 was not supported.
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FIGURE 6
Interaction Effect of Public Corruption Pervasiveness and
Expatriate Strategy on the Likelihood of Market Exit a b c

1

Probability of exit

0.95
0.9

Low
Expat

0.85

High
Expat

0.8
0.75
Low Public

High Public

a

High Public and Low Public refer to public corruption pervasiveness one standard
deviation above and below the mean for public corruption pervasiveness.
b

High Expat and Low Expat refer to expatriate intensity one standard deviation above
and below the mean for expatriate intensity.
c

The dependent variable is the probability of subsidiary exit from the host country (the
variable is coded as follows: 0: survived; 1: exited).
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FIGURE 7
Interaction Effect of Private Corruption Pervasiveness and
Expatriate Strategy on the Likelihood of Market Exit a b c

Probability of exit

1
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0.5
Low Private
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a

High Private and Low Private refer to private corruption pervasiveness one standard
deviation above and below the mean for private corruption pervasiveness.
b

High Expat and Low Expat refer to expatriate intensity one standard deviation above
and below the mean for expatriate intensity.
b

The dependent variable is the probability of subsidiary exit from the host country (the
variable is coded as follows: 0: survived; 1: exited).
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Partnering strategy and public corruption. Table 16 presents the results with
respect to Hypotheses 5 and 7 pertaining to the moderating effect of partnering strategy
on the relationship between host market corruption and market exit. This Table is based
upon the 80 percent cutoff convention used to distinguish between JVs and whollyowned subsidiaries (Makino & Beamish, 1998). The results associated with using the 95
percent convention were substantially similar. Model 3B (χ2 = 51.82, p < 0.001) and
Model 3C (χ2 = 53.60, p < 0.001) were used to test the competition between Hypothesis 5
(which predicted that engaging a host country partner in the subsidiary investment would
reduce the likelihood of market exit under conditions of heightened public corruption),
and Hypothesis 7 which predicted the opposite outcome (engaging a home country
partner in the subsidiary investment would reduce the likelihood of market exit under
conditions of heightened public corruption). While Model 3C controls for private
corruption, Model 3B (maximum VIF = 2.76) does not include this main effect. Testing
the interaction between public corruption and partnering strategy produced a significant
effect (β = -0.19, p < 0.10) in both Models 3B and 3C. We plotted the interaction in
Figure 8 and found that as public corruption increases, the decision to engage a home
country partner rather than a host country partner in the JV investment reduces the
likelihood of market exit. As such, in the case of more pervasive public corruption we
concluded that Hypothesis 7 was supported, but Hypothesis 5 was not supported.
Partnering strategy and private corruption. Models 3D (χ2 = 50.73, p < 0.001)
and 3E (χ2 = 53.23, p < 0.001) both produced a non-significant interaction effect between
private corruption pervasiveness and partnering strategy. As such, we concluded that
neither Hypothesis 5, nor Hypothesis 7 was supported in the case of private corruption.
However, we note that the signs of the focal coefficients in these two models were
consistent with the predictions developed in Hypothesis 7. Further, the coefficients for
the interaction effects were only marginally non-significant in both Model 3D (p = 0.12)
and Model 3E (p = 0.10).
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FIGURE 8
Interaction Effect of Public Corruption Pervasiveness and
Partnering Strategy on the Likelihood of Market Exit a b c
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a

High Public and Low Public refer to public corruption pervasiveness one standard
deviation above and below the mean for public corruption pervasiveness.
b

Trad JV (traditional JV) refers to a JV with a host country (local) partner. Cross JV
(crossnational JV) refers to a JV with a home country partner.

c

The dependent variable is the probability of subsidiary exit from the host country (the
variable is coded as follows: 0: survived; 1: exited).
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
While corruption has become an increasingly important challenge facing MNEs,
the phenomenon has been under-researched to date (Rodriguez et al., 2006) and scholars
have provided little guidance to MNEs with respect to the relative efficacy of various
strategies (Mezias & Mezias, 2010) that could reduce the likelihood of market exit. Our
study has investigated the relationship between host market corruption pervasiveness, the
subsidiary localization strategies implemented by MNEs and the likelihood of host
market exit. We have conceptualized host market corruption as an informal institution
that precipitates uncertainty for foreign-investing MNEs because the norms or standards
of practice pertaining to these extralegal transactions are frequently ambiguous and
indeterminate (Fisman & Gatti, 2006; Lambsdorff, 2005) from the perspective of the
foreign-investing MNE. Given that organizations may seek legitimacy in foreign markets
by attempting to conform to the prevailing institutional norms in these markets, the
uncertainty surrounding informal institutions such as corruption can pose a threat to the
firm’s ability to navigate the standards of practice or conduct that are required to secure
legitimacy. As such, regardless of the MNE’s willingness or reluctance to engage in
corrupt transactions in the host market, host market corruption functions as a source of
uncertainty for foreign-investing MNEs, particularly in markets characterized by more
pervasive corruption. In turn, this poses a threat to the firm’s legitimacy in the host
market and heightens the likelihood of market exit. Given the range of benefits associated
with internationalization (Contractor, 2007), our theory has been based on the assumption
that market exit is a negative outcome.
In light of the foregoing, our research questions were developed to advance two
broad propositions. First, more pervasive host market corruption can be expected to
increase the likelihood that MNEs will choose to exit the market. Second, MNEs can
implement strategies that reduce the increased likelihood of market exit in countries
characterized by more pervasive corruption. To elaborate our theory, we expanded the
conceptualization of localization strategies and specified two broad categories of
strategies that we believe are pertinent to an MNE’s efforts to localize its subsidiary
operations and secure legitimacy within a host market environment. While proximal
localization strategies were defined to include strategies which employ host market
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equity capital and human capital to facilitate a subsidiary’s integration within the host
country market, distal localization strategies include those which facilitate integration
within the host country market by employing equity capital and human capital sourced
outside of the host country market. To test our hypotheses pertaining to the efficacy of
proximal (host market-oriented) localization strategies, we investigated the effects of an
MNE’s increased reliance on host country employees and equity partners to enhance the
subsidiary’s legitimacy and reduce the likelihood of host market exit. Conversely, the
efficacy of distal (home market-oriented) localization strategies was assessed in terms of
an MNE’s preference for home country employees and equity partners.
The nuanced results that emerged from our empirical analyses were highly
consistent with recent theory pertaining to informal institutional pluralism (Sartor,
2014a). More specifically, the results reveal that the answers to our research questions
pertaining to the direct effects of corruption on market exit, as well as the moderating
impact of an MNE’s subsidiary localization strategies, are dependent upon both the
dimension of corruption being considered (public or private) and the host market context
(developed market or, emerging market). Although our theory was not developed to
elaborate the market context distinction, our results suggested its inclusion through our
robustness analyses. Our findings reveal that while the interaction effect between public
corruption and private corruption significantly increases the likelihood of market exit
from emerging markets (as reported in Appendix C), this effect was not significant when
we conducted the same estimations using our full sample of subsidiaries (both developed
market-based and emerging market-based) or, when we tested the developed market
sample alone. Taken together, these results could be interpreted as suggesting that the
adverse effects of corruption are more pertinent to an MNE’s decisions regarding market
exit when the subsidiary investment is situated in an emerging market, rather than in a
developed market.
Table 17 summarizes our findings from Tables 15-16 and broadly suggests that
with respect to a foreign-investing MNE’s expatriate strategy, an increasingly proximal
(host market-oriented) approach can be expected to reduce the likelihood of market exit
under conditions of more pervasive private corruption and public corruption (except at
very low levels of public corruption). However, in considering its partnering strategy, a
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more distal (home market-oriented) approach can enhance an MNE’s efforts to reduce
the likelihood of market exit under conditions of more pervasive public corruption, but
not private corruption. Furthermore, while we did not find that expatriate strategy
exerted a statistically significant moderating effect in the sub-sample estimations
TABLE 17
Summary of Findings Pertaining to Moderating Effects

Strate gy

Localization Strate gy

Corruption
Dime nsion

Public
Proximal (lower expatriate intensity)
Private
Expatriate
Public
Distal (higher expatriate intensity)
Private

Public
Proximal (host country (local) JV partner)
Private
Partnering
Public
Distal (home country JV partner)
Private
a

Marke t Conte xt
(Location of
Subsidiarie s)

a

Like lihood of
Host Marke t Exit

Both DM & EM

Mixe d re sults

DM
EM
Both DM & EM
DM
EM

N/S
N/S
De cre ase d
N/S
N/S
Mixe d re sults
N/S
N/S
Incre ase d
N/S
N/S
Incre ase d
N/S
Incre ase d
N/S
N/S
N/S
De cre ase d
N/S
De cre ase d
N/S
N/S
N/S

Both DM &
DM
EM
Both DM &
DM
EM
Both DM &
DM
EM
Both DM &
DM
EM
Both DM &
DM
EM
Both DM &
DM
EM

EM

EM

EM

EM

EM

EM

c

DM = developed markets; EM = emerging markets.

b

Increased likelihood of market exit at low levels of public corruption and decreased likelihood of market exit
as public corruption increases (see Figure 1).

c
d

b

N/S = no significant moderating effect found.

Decreased likelihood of market exit at low levels of public corruption and increased likelihood of market exit
as public corruption increases (see Figure 1).

d

142
pertaining to the developed market- and emerging market-based subsidiaries, our reestimations with respect to the emerging market sample did reveal that a more distal
(home market-oriented) partnering strategy continued to weaken the positive relationship
between public corruption pervasiveness and host market exit.
We acknowledge that our interpretation of the empirical results is contingent upon
an assumption that underpins our theory, namely, that market exit is a negative outcome.
For example, in finding that an increase in expatriate intensity increases the likelihood of
market exit under conditions of more pervasive host market corruption, our theory would
attribute this relationship to the inability of expatriate employees to facilitate the MNE’s
efforts to secure legitimacy in increasingly corrupt host markets. Based on this
assumption, market exit is conceptualized as a reactive decision. Reversing our
assumption regarding market exit reveals an alternative interpretation with respect to our
results. Market exit can also be assumed to be a positive outcome because it facilitates an
MNE’s efforts to minimize the sunk costs associated with languishing foreign
investments (Hill, Hwang, & Kim, 1990). From this perspective, the fact that an increase
in expatriate intensity increases the likelihood of market exit under conditions of more
pervasive host market corruption could be interpreted as evidencing an MNE’s
heightened visibility into the current state of its subsidiary operations. An MNE’s more
nuanced comprehension of the challenges (i.e., corruption) encountered by the subsidiary
in the host market environment may result from deploying a greater proportion of
expatriates to the foreign investment (Boyacigiller, 1990) and lead to a proactive decision
to exit the market.

Limitations and Future Directions
Either way, the results of our empirical analyses provide general support for our
theory pertaining to the spatial orientation (Buckley & Ghauri, 2004; Dunning, 2009) of
an MNE’s localization strategies (distal versus proximal). Nevertheless, we also
acknowledge several limitations in our work. First, our study was conducted using a
sample of firms from a single home country (Japan). Future work should seek to confirm
our findings and test our theory using a sample of subsidiary investments that originate in
a home market other than Japan or, from multiple home markets. Second, while our study
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endeavored to investigate the relationship between corruption, MNE strategy and market
exit, we are not yet able to explain how these firm strategies interact in practice with the
phenomenon of corruption to either heighten or diminish the likelihood of market exit.
This dilemma is not surprising given the elusive nature of the norms surrounding
informal institutions such as corruption (Lambsdorff, 2005). We believe that intensive,
case study-driven qualitative research might be the most productive approach towards
fostering a richer comprehension of these mechanisms. Nevertheless, we are cognizant
that corruption is inherently difficult to study because “…the parties involved have every
reason to keep the data hidden” (Klitgaard, 1991: 30). Third, while the MNE’s quest for
external legitimacy (within the host country market) in more corrupt host countries
underpins the mechanisms in our theory, a consideration of the relevance of internal
legitimacy (within the MNE network) (Lu & Xu, 2006) was beyond the scope of our
work. However, we contend that, using appropriate data, future research with respect to
efforts to secure internal legitimacy could be conducted in an effort to advance our
spatially-oriented theory pertaining to subsidiary localization strategies. In this regard,
our theory is useful to institutional theorists because the tension that emerges from a
subsidiary’s efforts to secure both external legitimacy and internal legitimacy frequently
manifests itself in a decision between proximally- and distally-oriented localization
strategies. Consequently, our dichotomization of subsidiary localization strategies could
be employed by IT scholars to study the strategic localization efforts of foreign
subsidiaries confronted by a diverse array of institutional stimuli in the host country
market. Finally, our research also reveals that in addition to studying the phenomenon of
corruption broadly across the MNE’s global network of subsidiary investments,
corruption-oriented research should also consider partitioning the MNE’s investments
into developed market-based and emerging market-based investments in order to secure a
more nuanced understanding of the relationships being investigated.
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APPENDIX C
Results of the Robustness Checks Using Two Separate Sub-Samples
(Developed Market-Based Subsidiaries and Emerging Market-Based Subsidiaries)
In order to ensure that the results presented in Tables 14-16 are robust and
unencumbered by concerns regarding multicollinearity, we re-executed Models 1-3 as
two additional sets of estimations by segregating our study’s full sample of 1,239
subsidiaries into two sub-samples. While one sample was constituted by subsidiaries
hosted in developed markets (660 subsidiaries), the other included only subsidiaries
hosted in emerging markets (579 subsidiaries). Although these robustness analyses are
not presented in tables, the results can be made available upon request.

Model 1 (Table 14): Corruption and Market Exit
Developed market-based subsidiaries. Re-executing Model 1 using the sample of
developed market-based subsidiaries, Model 1D (χ2 = 102.87, p < 0.001) revealed that the
signs of the coefficients remained unchanged and the level of significance improved
(Public corruption: β = -0.89, p < 0.001; Private corruption: β = 1.06, p < 0.001). While
these results continued to support Hypothesis 2, they did not support Hypothesis 1.
Model 1E (χ2 = 104.14, p < 0.001) yielded results which were also consistent with the
results for the full sample that are presented in Table 14. More specifically, both the main
effects of public corruption (β = -0.86, p < 0.001) and private corruption (β = 1.10, p <
0.001) continued to be significant, the signs of the coefficients were unchanged from
those presented in Table 14, and the interaction effect between the two dimensions of
corruption continued to be not significant. As such, Hypothesis 3 was not supported.
Notably, the maximum VIF (8.71) in these re-executed models dropped below the
commonly accepted upper limit of 10 (Stephan & Uhlaner, 2010)
Emerging market-based subsidiaries. Re-executing Model 1D (χ2 = 58.76, p <
0.001) yielded results which supported neither Hypotheses 1 nor 2. However, Model 1E
(χ2 = 69.36, p < 0.001) did produce results which supported Hypothesis 1 with respect to
the main effect of public corruption (β = 0.25, p < 0.10). While private corruption (β = 0.47, p < 0.05) was found to be significant, the sign of the coefficient was opposite of the
predicted sign and, as such, Hypothesis 2 was not supported. However, most interesting
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was our finding that the interaction effect (β = 0.75, p < 0.01) in Model 1E was
significant, suggesting that the combined effect of an increase in the pervasiveness of
public corruption and private corruption in a host emerging market heightens the
likelihood that an MNE will exit the market. As such, Hypothesis 3 was supported when
Model 1E was re-executed using the sample of emerging market-based subsidiaries.
Given the considerably lower correlation between public corruption and private
corruption for the sample of emerging market-based subsidiaries (0.53), when compared
to the same correlation for the developed market-based subsidiaries (0.90), we were not
surprised to find that using the sample of emerging market-based firms to re-estimate
Models 1D and 1E resulted in a maximum VIF score (3.89) which was substantially
lower than the maximum VIF (13.89) presented in Table 14.

Model 2 (Table 15): Corruption, Expatriate Strategy and Market Exit
Using the sample of developed market-based subsidiaries and the emerging
market-based subsidiaries, we re-executed the Model 2 estimations in Table 15 that were
developed to test Hypotheses 4 and 6 pertaining to expatriate strategy. In each of these
re-executed models, the interaction effect was rendered not significant. However, when
re-executing the models in Table 15 using the sample of developed market-based
subsidiaries, the signs of the interaction effect coefficients in each of these models were
entirely consistent with the results presented in Table 15 using the full sample which
supported Hypothesis 4.

Model 3 (Table 16): Corruption, Partnering Strategy and Market Exit
Using the sample of developed market-based subsidiaries and the emerging
market-based subsidiaries, we re-executed the Model 3 estimations in Table 16 that were
developed to test Hypotheses 5 and 7 pertaining to partnering strategy. Interestingly, we
found much more nuanced results than we did in re-executing the expatriate strategy
models.
Developed market-based subsidiaries. Re-executing Models 3B and 3C rendered
the interaction effect between public corruption and partnering strategy non-significant
for the developed market-based subsidiaries. Consistent with our findings for the full
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sample in Models 3D and 3E of Table 16, the interaction between private corruption and
partnering strategy continued to be not significant.
Emerging market-based subsidiaries. Re-executing Models 3B (χ2 = 46.54, p <
0.001) and 3C (χ2 = 61.44, p < 0.001) using the sample of emerging market-based
subsidiaries yielded results in which the focal coefficients for both the main and
interaction effects were highly consistent with the results using the full sample. Both
models produced a significant interaction effect (Model 3B: β = -0.63, p < 0.05; Model
3C: β = -0.64, p < 0.01) which revealed that, under conditions of more pronounced public
corruption, engaging a home country partner in the JV reduced the likelihood of market
exit. As such, these models were supportive of Hypothesis 7. The maximum VIF in these
models was 3.50.
The interaction effect between private corruption and partnering strategy was not
significant when Models 3D and 3E were re-executed using the sample of emerging
market-based subsidiaries. However, just as the coefficients were consistent with
Hypothesis 7 and only marginally non-significant when Models 3D and 3E were
executed using the full sample, the same was also true for the coefficients in these reexecuted Models 3D (p = 0.11) and 3E (p = 0.10). The maximum VIF in these models
was 3.52.
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CHAPTER 5

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
Institutional scholars and international business strategy researchers have
recognized the need to develop theory, frameworks and constructs to facilitate
corruption-based inquiry (Lambsdorff, Taube, & Schramm, 2005; Rodriguez,
Uhlenbruck, & Eden, 2005). Nevertheless, we have continued to lack a comprehensive,
theoretically-based and empirically-validated understanding of how host market
corruption affects the subsidiary-level strategic behavior of multinational enterprises
(MNEs) in foreign markets. This is problematic because it undermines scholar’s ability
to formulate theoretically-grounded predictions with respect to the strategic behavior of
MNEs under conditions of heightened host market corruption, as well as their ability to
recommend strategies that will enhance the likelihood of achieving positive investment
outcomes. As such, this dissertation has been developed to address two broad research
questions. First, how does host market corruption impact the equity-based market entry
strategies implemented by MNEs with respect to their foreign subsidiary investments?
Second, how do subsidiary-level strategies moderate the influence of host market
corruption upon the continued existence of these subsidiary investments?
Essay 1 (Chapter 2) synthesized insights from institutional theory and integrative
social contracts theory to disaggregate the concept of

“government corruption”

(Rodriguez et al., 2005) into two dimensions – grand corruption and petty corruption.
While extant theory has used the terms government corruption and public sector
corruption interchangeably (Rodriguez et al., 2005; Uhlenbruck, Rodriguez, Doh, &
Eden, 2006), in the interest of consistency, I adopted the term government corruption in
Essay 1. Although prior research found that more pervasive host market government
corruption precipitates an MNE’s preference for nonequity-based entry over equity-based
entry into foreign markets (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006), less was known about MNEs that
choose equity-based strategies. Rodriguez et al. (2005) suggested that the pervasiveness
of host market corruption would influence the equity ownership decisions of these
MNEs. However, subsequent research never found a statistically significant relationship
that empirically validated this proposition. Essay 1 built upon Uhlenbruck et al.’s (2006)
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observation that the phenomenon of corruption might be more nuanced than had been
previously expected. As such, the theory developed in Essay 1 extended the concept of
institutional pluralism (Kraatz & Block, 2008) and introduced the notion of informal
institution pluralism. In doing so, it proposed that discrete informal institutions (such as
government corruption) within a host market could be conceptualized as pluralistic
phenomena constituted by distinct dimensions which are disparate both in their origin and
their impact on the foreign entry strategy of MNEs. Leveraging integrative social contract
theory’s hierarchy of norms concept, I suggested that the distinct origins of the norms
pertaining to grand corruption and petty corruption effectively precipitate different types
of uncertainty (environmental and behavioral) for foreign-investing MNEs which, in
turn, motivate MNEs to vary their equity-based entry strategies. More precisely, under
conditions of more pervasive grand corruption, I theorized that the primary source of
uncertainty will be environmental (response) uncertainty, while behavioral uncertainty
will predominate under conditions of heighted petty corruption pervasiveness. My
empirical analyses revealed that more pervasive grand corruption increases the
likelihood that foreign-investing MNEs engage in joint venture (JV) investments with
host country partners. Second, an increase in the pervasiveness of petty corruption was
found to precipitate the opposite outcome. Namely, under conditions of more pervasive
petty corruption, firms that chose to invest through a JV are more likely to engage a
partner from the foreign-investing MNE’s home country. Finally, an increase in the
pervasiveness of petty corruption was found to weaken the hypothesized positive
relationship between grand corruption pervasiveness and the likelihood that MNEs
would invest in JVs.
Essay 2 (Chapter 3) employed the theory pertaining to informal institutional
pluralism to investigate the structure of equity-based foreign subsidiary investments in
emerging markets, focusing specifically upon the public and private dimensions of
corruption pervasiveness in foreign host markets. I theorized that an MNE’s choice of
structure and entry strategy is contingent upon the pervasiveness of each dimension of
corruption in the host market. Further, I proposed that the primary mechanism driving the
distinct approaches to foreign entry was the firm’s anticipated reliance on different
sources of bargaining power to reduce information asymmetries that it expects to
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encounter in its public sector transactions and private sector transactions in the host
market. More specifically, I hypothesized that under conditions of more pervasive public
corruption, the firm’s resources are likely to be a more prominent source of bargaining
power in its public sector transactions, when compared to the bargaining power that the
firm derives from its context (or, its other alternatives). Conversely, under conditions of
more pervasive private corruption, I expected that the firm’s context or, the availability
of alternatives within the host country, is likely to be a more prominent source of
bargaining power than it is in the case of its public sector transactions. In this study, an
increase in public corruption pervasiveness was found to increase the likelihood that
MNEs will invest via JV ownership with a host country (local) partner, while an increase
in private corruption pervasiveness was found to increase the likelihood that MNEs will
invest through a wholly-owned structure when entering foreign emerging markets.
Further, an increase in the pervasiveness of private corruption was found to negatively
moderate the likelihood that MNEs would invest in a JV with a local partner under
conditions of more pervasive public corruption.
Essay 3 (Chapter 4) focused on the relationship between host market corruption
pervasiveness, the subsidiary localization strategies implemented by MNEs and the
likelihood of host market exit. I assumed that the pervasiveness of corruption in the host
market threatens to undermine the legitimacy of foreign-investing firms in the host
market environment. Despite the fact that the tenets of resource dependence theory and
institutional theory converge on the conceptualization of “legitimacy”, the theories are
also characterized by a degree of divergence, particularly when the theories are employed
to study the phenomenon of corruption. Leveraging this theoretical tension, I extended
the prior literature on localization to introduce the concept of subsidiary localization
strategies which I disaggregated into proximal localization strategies (strategies which
employ host market equity capital and human capital to facilitate a subsidiary’s
integration within the host country market) and distal localization strategies (those
strategies which facilitate integration within the host country market by employing equity
capital and human capital sourced outside of the host country market). I investigated the
relative efficacy of these strategies by developing hypotheses that posed divergent
predictions with respect to the moderating impact of proximal and distal localization
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strategies upon the likelihood of market exit in increasingly corrupt host market
environments. First, I hypothesized that proximal (or, host market-oriented) localization
strategies, in which subsidiaries prefer to engage host country partners and employees in
the subsidiary investment, would be better-suited to reducing the likelihood of exit from
increasingly corrupt host market environments. Next, I predicted that distal (or, home
market-oriented) localization strategies, in which home country partners and employees
are engaged in the subsidiary investment, would be best-suited to efforts to enhance the
subsidiary’s legitimacy and reduce the likelihood of host market exit. My empirical
analyses revealed that a proximally-oriented partnering strategy heightened the
likelihood of market exit under conditions of more pervasive host market public
corruption, but not more pervasive private corruption. Conversely, a distally-oriented
expatriate strategy increased the likelihood of market exit under conditions of both more
pervasive public corruption and private corruption.

Contributions
This dissertation makes a number of conceptual and empirical contributions. To
broadly summarize, I have presented empirical and theoretical support for the
foundational theory of host market corruption in international business strategy research
(Rodriguez et al., 2005). Moreover, I have extended the conceptualization of host market
corruption in terms of its ethical origins (grand versus petty), in terms of its sectoral
origin (public versus private), and in terms of its impact upon the strategy and structure
of MNEs’ foreign subsidiary investments. I have also contributed new tenets to
institutional theory by introducing the concepts of informal institutional pluralism
(conceptualizing informal institutions as pluralistic phenomena), proximal (host marketoriented) localization and distal (home market-oriented) localization strategies.
More precisely, in Essay 1, I extended the conceptual domain of institutional
pluralism (Kraatz & Block, 2008). While prior work has focused on the strategic
relevance of institutional pluralism created by geographic space, my theory suggests that
discrete institutions within a host market can themselves be characterized as pluralistic
institutional phenomena, constituted by distinct dimensions that exert different impacts
upon the strategies of foreign-investing MNEs. Empirically, I independently replicated an

156
important component of Uhlenbruck et al.’s (2006) findings, providing further support
for the theory which proposed that MNEs would be more likely to favor nonequity-based
entry over equity-based entry under conditions of more pervasive host market
government corruption. However, I also presented new theory that disaggregates the
concept of government corruption pervasiveness into two distinct dimensions (grand
corruption pervasiveness and petty corruption pervasiveness). Employing this refined
conceptualization, I shed new light on the relationship between the equity-based foreign
entry strategy of MNEs and the pervasiveness of government corruption.
In Essay 2, I synthesized the research of international business strategy scholars
and business ethicists by refining the conceptualization of “host market corruption” to
incorporate a consideration of both its public and private sector dimensions. By focusing
on the role of a firm’s bargaining power in shaping its strategic foreign entry decisions
under conditions of more pervasive host market corruption, my work contributes to
efforts to more closely integrate market and nonmarket strategy research. More
specifically, I have drawn attention to an important theoretical mechanism that could be
used to bridge the institutionally-oriented and resource-oriented perspectives that have
been advocated by strategy theorists as a means to enhance our understanding of the
strategic relevance of contemporary nonmarket phenomena such as corruption (Doh,
Lawton, & Rajwani, 2012). This research also offered important insights for policy
makers.

Two

key

assumptions

have

traditionally

underpinned

the

policy

recommendations of anti-corruption scholars (first, corruption primarily occurs within
firm-government transactions; second, engaging a partner is a key strategy employed by
firms to manage the increased uncertainty precipitated by public corruption). My research
suggests that policy prescriptions designed to curb MNE engagement in foreign market
corruption must consider the multidimensional nature of the construct in order to ensure
that policy efforts are not misguided. To date, scholars have focused on formulating
policy recommendations that are designed to reduce the efficacy of the transaction costreducing strategies employed by firms to facilitate corrupt transactions (Lambsdorff,
2002; Svensson, 2003). My findings that public corruption and private corruption each
exert a distinct impact upon the foreign-investment decisions of MNEs, coupled with my
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findings pertaining to the interaction effect between both types of corruption upon these
foreign entry strategies, suggests the need for more nuanced anti-corruption initiatives.
Finally, in Essay 3, by elaborating two distinct approaches towards facilitating a
subsidiary’s localization into the host country market (proximal versus distal), I have
enhanced our comprehension of the veiled relationship between corruption pervasiveness,
MNE strategy and host market exit. In doing so, my work provides theoreticallygrounded and empirically-validated guidance to MNEs that seek insights with respect to
the relative efficacy of various localization strategies that can be implemented in host
markets characterized by heightened corruption. Testing this theory revealed that the
direct effects of corruption on market exit, as well as the moderating impact of an MNE’s
subsidiary localization strategies, are dependent upon both the dimension of corruption
being considered (public or private) and the host market context (developed market or,
emerging market).

Limitations
As is often true of most research endeavors, my work is not without limitations.
The most significant limitation to my work has been the challenge associated with
engaging in qualitative analysis that could either confirm or contradict my theory and
quantitative analysis. In this regard, my research experience indirectly provides support
for Klitgaard’s (1991: 30) seemingly timeless observation that corruption is so difficult to
study because “…the parties involved have every reason to keep the data hidden.”
Closely related to this challenge has been the limitation posed by the availability of
quantitative data. While non-governmental agencies such as Transparency International
(TI) have made significant advances in developing and collecting data (such as TI’s
Corruption Perceptions Index) that help us to broadly understand public sector- or,
government-oriented corruption over time in foreign markets, longitudinal data with
respect to the multiple, more fine-grained dimensions of host market corruption that I
theorize in this dissertation is lacking. As one example, an important limitation in my
research has been the absence of a comprehensive index to operationalize the private
corruption pervasiveness construct (Faria, Morales, Pineda, & Montesinos, 2012), akin to
the Corruption Perceptions Index that is available to measure public corruption. I hope
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that my research will either stimulate an agency’s efforts to collect the data needed to
develop and maintain such an index or, provide me with an opportunity to pursue the
development and maintenance of such as index.

Future Research
This dissertation enhances our understanding of how host market corruption
affects the subsidiary-level strategic behavior of multinational enterprises (MNEs) in
foreign markets. Further, it equips scholars and managers to formulate theoreticallygrounded predictions with respect to the strategic behavior of MNEs under conditions of
heightened host market corruption. However, the theory and constructs that I have
developed also open up new lines of inquiry that promise to further extend our
comprehension with respect to the phenomenon of corruption and its relationship with
MNE strategy, as well as exposing new research opportunities outside the domain of
corruption-oriented international business strategy research.
At the very least, my dissertation provides a point of departure for what I believe
are two important areas for future research inquiry. First, my research collectively
suggests that in the context of corruption-oriented research, the distinction between
developed market-based and emerging market-based investments may be highly pertinent
to efforts to secure a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between host
market corruption and MNE activity. Second, while my work has sought to build upon
and extend prior work in economics that has focused extensively on the country as the
unit of analysis (i.e., the relationship between corruption and dependent variables such as
foreign direct investments flows, economic growth, etc.), my research has concentrated
on firm-level strategic analysis. An opportunity exists for behavioral scholars to leverage
my theory and empirical findings to explore unanswered research questions pertaining to
increasingly more micro levels of analysis and to better comprehend how decisions
pertaining to the strategy and structure of subsidiary investments unfold under conditions
of more pervasive host market corruption. Just as my research promises to inform the
work of scholars whose research focuses on these more micro levels of analysis, I expect
that their findings will reverberate back and generate insights that are relevant to scholars
working at the firm-level.
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Both of these research undertakings are imperative. As I noted in Chapter 1 of this
dissertation, without a theoretically-based understanding of the interrelationship between
host market corruption and subsidiary-level strategy in foreign markets, it becomes more
difficult to prescribe how MNEs can effectively integrate the Global Compact’s tenth
principle (Businesses should work against corruption in all its forms, including extortion
and bribery) into the business strategies, operations and structures of their foreign
subsidiaries. In developing a framework designed to secure corporate commitment to the
Global Compact’s principles, the United Nations has suggested that the engagement of
worldwide subsidiary operations is one of the most important avenues through which
MNEs can scale-up corporate responsibility efforts (Kell, 2012). It’s my sincere hope that
this dissertation makes a contribution to this timely and important endeavor.
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